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# WORLD POLITICS

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





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





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# ABSTRACTS

## Nuclear Devolution and World Order

By J. J. WELTMAN

This essay examines the balance of constraints and advantages set by the international environment, as that balance impinges upon national decisions relating to the acquisition of nuclear weaponry. The effect of the balance is to reduce constraints against such acquisition, and to increase advantages; thus, some increase in the number of nuclear-weapons states is likely. It is possible that the general and local effects on international stability which would follow from such an increase in number may not affect the stability of the central balance adversely. The effects in local nuclearized environments will vary, depending in part on the policies of outsiders, but any assumption of massive instability would be unwarranted.

## State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?

By S. K. PURCELL and J.F.H. PURCELL

The Mexican state is based on a constantly renewed bargain among several ruling groups and interests representing a broad range of ideological tendencies and social bases. Mexican political stability rests primarily *not* upon formal institutions, but upon the interaction of principles of political discipline (closely linked to the concept of authoritarianism) and political negotiation (associated with the concept of proto-democracy). The combination of repression and co-optation with just the "right" mix of responsiveness and compromise produces: (1) elites that are both linked to, and insulated from, their potential constituencies; (2) a pattern of political and administrative decision making called "policy incoherence"; and (3) avoidance of the crystallization of factional alliances, and their opposition to one another.

## Rethinking the Organizational Weapon: The Soviet System in a Systems Age

By P. COCKS

There is growing realization in the U.S.S.R. that the "contemporary scientific and technological revolution" is as much a managerial and cultural revolution as a scientific and industrial revolution. The key task is to develop not only modern technical hardware, but also an effective and distinctive software appropriate for the times. Accordingly, Soviet authorities have begun to think seriously, really for the first time, about organization and the structural requirements of progress. As organizations become more complex, the area of organizational design gains importance. Because it focuses attention on interrelationships, interdependencies, and integration, the "systems approach" has emerged as a way of coping with advancing complexity. The real significance of the U.S.S.R.'s belated awakening to the modern systems age is the discovery that the Soviet system is, in fact, not a "system." Lacking both the power and the technique to deal with contemporary issues, Soviet leaders are busy forging new organizational weapons. Despite their increasing efforts to use modern systems terminology and technology to enhance integrative capabilities, conditions militate against any radical systems engineering.

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## Coalition Maintenance in the Soviet Union

By D. ROSS

Few students of the Soviet political scene have used coalition theory to explain Soviet behavior. However, the fact that coalitions are assumed to exist suggests that the different elements of coalition theory—coalition formation and coalition maintenance—may be useful for the study of Soviet decision making. Because the Soviet political system has evolved to the point where the elements that are vital to preserving coalitions are also an integral part of the Soviet system (e.g., fear of the alternative to the coalition, unanimity rule in decision making, the existence of a power broker, and the exclusion of contentious issues), the operation of coalition maintenance may describe the decision-making process. If that is so, the key institutional actors in the Soviet hierarchy must be minimally satisfied before major decisions can be reached. Although elite harmony and coalition stability are ensured thereby, lowest-common-denominator policies will serve to rule out fundamental changes or reform attempts that are necessary for coping with emerging problems. As emerging economic problems make it difficult to satisfy the incremental demands from elite actors and the society at large, it is quite possible that the current decision-making process, or the distribution of power it ensures, will not endure.

## Research on Korean Communism: Promise versus Performance

By S. S. KIM

Research on Korean communism is clearly subsumed under a new field of inquiry known as "comparative study of communism" or "studies of comparative communism." Developed in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the comparative study of communism claims greater conceptual and methodological potency through the use of "value-neutral" models and theories developed in the social and behavioral sciences. The author critically examines the performance of current scholarship on North Korean politics in light of the promise of the comparative study of communism. Specifically, he first identifies key normative, conceptual, and methodological problems that plague the current lines of inquiry in the field. He then probes the areas of substantive strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in our present knowledge about the North Korean political system, focusing on two issues of normative and policy importance to both domestic and foreign policy—legitimacy and *chuch'e*. The author suggests several alternative methods and approaches for liberating the field from its intellectual isolationism and for charting a path toward a cumulative, orderly, and systematic way of building a body of knowledge about Korean communism.

## "Role Theory," Political Science, and African Studies

By A. MAGID

Numerous studies of role, employing diverse methodologies in a wide range of social contexts, have accumulated in the social sciences over many decades. The concept of role retains considerable appeal for some who still pursue the goal of a unified theory of behavior for the social sciences, and for many others who discern in the role perspective a major source of concepts and insights on which they may draw eclectically for all manner of social research. Since the 1950s, and especially during the current decade, political scientists have produced studies of role and of role conflict focusing on political and administrative actors caught up in the process of change in various independent African states. Because the number and diversity of these studies are likely to increase in the future, they merit description and evaluation as a group. Both objectives are pursued in this article, with particular reference to three works on politics and administration in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.

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# NUCLEAR DEVOLUTION AND WORLD ORDER

By JOHN J. WELTMAN

DISCUSSION of nuclear proliferation[1] is often characterized by a retreat to notions of apocalypse and redemption, beyond which analysis cannot penetrate except to suggest radical and profound discontinuity with historical experience. This, of course, reflects a philosophic outlook of great psychological attractiveness as well as antiquity. Human beings have often sought in technological change a providential solution to the ambiguities and insecurities of their condition. Thus, revolutions in technology have continually been looked to as vehicles through which violence and the threat of violence might be removed from the relations among human collectives. As is often the case, the vision has a reverse image: a new arms technology might eliminate not only violence, but civilization itself. Commonly, the two visions are combined in a redemptive dialectic: the very horror and novel destructiveness of the new devices would itself force men to break with history

[1] The literature on nuclear proliferation is extensive, and we will not attempt to note it exhaustively here. Major bibliographies can be found in Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, *Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975–1995* (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute 1976); Albert Wohlstetter and others, *Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd?* (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics 1976). For an encyclopedic collection of data and documents, see *Nuclear Proliferation Factbook* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 1977). An account of recent developments, and an authoritative projection as to the state of the uranium market, can be found in *Strategic Survey, 1977* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies 1978), 108-13.

For some recent studies of note, see (in addition to the above); John Maddox, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 113 (Spring 1975); Ted Greenwood and others, *Nuclear Proliferation* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1977); *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 1977); David C. Gompert and others, *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1977); George H. Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1973); SIPRI, *Safeguards Against Nuclear Proliferation* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press 1975); William Epstein, *The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control* (New York: Free Press 1976); Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1975); Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1974).

For an account of the evolution of American attitudes toward nuclear proliferation, see William B. Bader, *The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Pegasus 1968). Current U.S. policy is embodied formally in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. For accounts of this policy, see Joseph S. Nye, "Nonproliferation: A Long-Term Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56 (April 1978), 601-23; Frederick Williams and others, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Reactions from Germany, India, and Japan," *International Security*, III (Fall 1978), 44-66.

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and to find the means of carrying on their relationships without recourse to war.

Historically, these hopes and fears have proved to be overblown; new weapons technologies have turned out to be capable of domestication within an essentially unchanged international order for the last three centuries. The weapons have been assimilated into the panoply of means that states employ to defend or advance their interests. The world has continued to consist of a number of collectives embedded in a web of relationships colored and conditioned by the presence and possibility of war. Those radical disjunctures in the historical process—for good or evil—that some have foreseen, have not in fact come to pass.

Our purpose here will be to examine whether or not nuclear weapons —should they come into the possession of many states—might prove similarly domesticatable. Is it reasonable to anticipate that many more states will indeed come in time to possess these weapons? What would be the effect of such widespread possession on the likelihood of regional and general war? What means might be found to reduce the likelihood of such events? To what limits must such means be subject?

## I

The reception of atomic weapons into international political and strategic thought was a complex process played out over the better part of two decades.[2] Some scholars were struck immediately with what they felt to be the essential novelty of the weapons, which had brought to warfare a wholly unprecedented level of destructiveness. While the first atomic weapons could still be compared in violent effect to the largest conventional bombing raids of World War II, thermonuclear weaponry represented a leap into an order of violence wholly beyond experience. Other commentators emphasized the creation of a new set of objective conditions which would determine the future structure of the international order; still others saw the new conditions as merely posing an unavoidable occasion for choice. Perhaps the chaos heralding Armageddon was upon us; perhaps this prospect itself would cause the demise of the nation-state and the emergence of a world community. Perhaps chaos could only be averted by deliberate decisions on the part of governments to divest themselves of atomic weapons and the capacity to produce them—transferring what had traditionally been consid-

[2] For an understanding of this process, see, e.g., George H. Quester, *Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years* (New York: Dunellen 1970).

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ered the core of state sovereignty to an international body. Whatever the formulation, and whether they were optimistic or pessimistic, those struck with the novelty of nuclear weapons had in common the expectation that the traditional structure of the international order could not long survive the emergence of these devices.

While some emphasized the qualitative distinctiveness of the new weapons, others maintained that the new weapons represented only a quantitative change from what had gone before; they stressed continuity with the past in the effects on the international order to be anticipated from their introduction. As sizable numbers of nuclear weapons appeared in the arsenals of the superpowers, this outlook proved to be justified.

To be sure, some of the more extreme predictions of operational continuity in the manner in which the next war was likely to be fought were not borne out. Prior to the development of thermonuclear weapons, it was possible to argue that strategic bombardment would not prove decisive in the next war, or that it would only become decisive very slowly, through a process of attrition. It was further argued that the level of destruction by atomic weapons would not exceed that experienced in the large conventional bombing raids against German and Japanese cities in the Second World War, and that active defense against incoming bombers would quite likely be far more effective. Thus, a decisive result would only be achieved by repeated attacks which might prove beyond the capacity of even superpowers to sustain against well-prepared and determined defenders. If the decisiveness of strategic bombardment was considered questionable, then any threat of such an attack would be of equally questionable efficacy as a deterrent. The revelation of the practicability of fusion weapons, and the step-level increase in destructive potential which they represented, gradually put these notions to rest; the prospect of delivery capabilities of intercontinental missiles that were far less vulnerable to active measures than bombers confirmed the demise of these notions.

The operational character of any future general war (at least as expected in the West) was thus generally perceived as essentially different from that of previous wars. Air bombardment would be so destructive as to be decisive if employed—and thus unquestionably a persuasive deterrent if threatened. These expectations were reinforced by prospects of mutuality in the capacity of the superpowers to make such threats. Periodic speculation that central war might be carried on in such a way

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as to limit its destructiveness—and thus to regain its traditional character as a rational means to achieve policy goals—occurred, but these views never approached dominance.

Within a certain sphere, the effect of the new weaponry on strategic doctrine was thus a radical one, serving to put into doubt the continued utility of at least one species of war as a tool in foreign policy. This radical effect, however, remained limited to the sphere of central strategy. Beyond this sphere, continuity rather than radical change prevailed; the superpowers carried on their conflicts through proxies and a variety of military means below the nuclear threshold. Indeed, even within this sphere, although a general consensus emerged as to the disutility of central war, a similar consensus developed simultaneously as to the utility of continued maintenance of the weapons—and the manipulation of complex implicit and explicit threats of their use.

Thus, in the relations between the superpowers, strategic concerns and considerations of weaponry have not become irrelevant.[3] Instead, these relations have been marked by the development of highly sophisticated techniques involving the manipulation of threat, and fear of escalation, both within discrete periods of crisis and during periods of lower tension. Much of the process of maneuver to gain strategic advantage or minimize adverse developments (in former times carried on in considerable part through external means such as shifts in alliances and alignments), is now carried on by internal means such as national decisions on defense budgets, research and development programs, and deployment of forces. The subtlety and fine calculability of the new means have afforded statesmen a confidence—thus far justified—that the process can be carried forward without recourse to the *ultima ratio* of war.[4]

Thus, taken from the most general perspective, nuclear weapons have proven to be assimilable and manageable within an international system that remains decentralized and structured by strategic considerations. This system has survived the introduction of the weaponry intact, and indeed without catastrophe. Expectations that the unparalleled destructive potential of the new weaponry would displace the primacy and autonomy of nation-states, and would create a common international interest powerful enough to override the national interests of the

[3] See Weltman, "On the Obsolescence of War," *International Studies Quarterly*, XVIII (December 1974), 395-416.

[4] See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93 (Summer 1964); Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1967), esp. 3-192.

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actors in the traditional system, have proved unjustified. Far from ushering in an age of anarchic violence and pervasive national and personal insecurity (as was feared by many at the outset of the nuclear age), the past three decades have proved to be relatively benign—especially in areas close to the central balance—both in the incidence of interstate conflict and the effect of such conflicts on the lives of the citizenry. Indeed, this low incidence may itself be traceable in part to the new technology. Pervasive personal insecurity, and popular fears of sudden outbreak of general war—through surprise attack or a variety of scenarios involving accident or "catalytic" war—reached their height in the mid 1950s in the West (when the capacity of the Soviets to mount a catastrophic attack on the United States was in fact questionable). They have declined since then, while destructive capabilities, and the reliability of mechanisms to manage them, have improved.

The conventionalization of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals has not served, however, to induce optimism about the likelihood of a similar process occurring as and when other powers acquire the weapons. Indeed, excepting only American attitudes toward Britain's entry into the club, the assumption has generally been that the experience of the two superpowers, and the evolution of their relationship in the nuclear era, would be irrelevant to a world in which other states acquired the devices.

This paradoxical denial of the relevance of experience is in part explicable as a justification of the interests of the nuclear powers in preserving what they believe to be their own unique status and advantage. If, in fact, the reassuring manageability of the superpowers' experience with nuclear weapons is unique to them, it is possible to argue that acquisition by others will be profoundly destabilizing; insofar as the argument is believed, it may in fact retard such acquisition and the consequent erosion of the superpowers' advantage.

This explanation must be supplemented by the inherent conservatism that may be expected in decision makers. Whatever their assumptions as to the effects of the spread of nuclear weapons, decision makers must expect to be faced with problems more complicated than, and certainly different from, those with which they are familiar at present. One naturally prefers a known environment to an unknown one, and—if one can—will attempt to prevent the emergence of the unknown.

A variety of reasons thus exist which support an inclination to accept uncritically the notion that a world in which numerous states in addition to the great powers possess nuclear weapons would be one to which

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the historical experience of "conventionalization" would not apply. Assertions that such a world would be unmitigatedly horrific and would portend the destruction of civilized life on the planet or the emergence of a new autarchic feudal dark age—or, conversely, that faced with such a danger, governments would at last subordinate their national existence to a common good, ushering in an era of universal peace—are so commonly made as to have become clichés.[5] What all these assertions have in common is the assumption that the spread of nuclear weaponry would at some point produce radical historical discontinuity.

When the prospect of such widespread proliferation was set in some vague future, the importance of subjecting these assumptions to critical analysis was not great. Since a considerable lapse of time may no longer be assumed, such analysis becomes vital.

## II

Alarms about the imminence of widespread nuclear proliferation have been a regular feature of public discourse since the beginning of the nuclear era. Many today find comfort in the fact that these alarms have regularly proved to be unfounded. Indeed, empirical examination might even seem to suggest that the rate of proliferation has *slowed* over time.[6]

Peculiarities in the political and technological contexts in which these early pessimistic predictions were set should, however, give us pause before we dismiss similar predictions for the future. Early speculation about imminent proliferation had centered on relatively advanced industrial states and states with ambitions to great-power status, most of them occupying positions within the alliance systems of the superpowers. Decisions about the acquisition of nuclear weapons were assumed to relate to the central strategic balance, and to deterrence of an attack by a superpower on a putative "Nth" country. A great many of these

[5] See, e.g., the following articles, all in *Annals* (fn. 1): Lewis A. Dunn, "Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics," 96-109; Frederick C. Thayer, "Proliferation and the Future: Destruction or Transformation," 133-46; Michael Nacht, "The United States in a World of Nuclear Powers," 162-74.

[6] For an early prediction of the extensive spread of nuclear weapons, based simply on a survey of capabilities, see National Planning Association, *1970 Without Arms Control* (Washington, D.C. 1958). If, for purposes of simplification, we take the date of first detonation of a nuclear device as marking the emergence of a new nuclear power, the intervals are as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| First (U.S.A., 1945) to second (U.S.S.R., 1949): | 4 years |
| Second to third (U.K., 1952): | 3 years |
| Third to fourth (France, 1960): | 8 years |
| Fourth to fifth (China, 1964): | 4 years |
| Fifth to sixth (India, 1974—"peaceful"): | 10 years |

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states were in fact capable of constructing the weapons—thus giving rise to initial simplistic fears that they would simply build to the limits of their capacities. But the problem of constructing a weapon and a delivery system with sufficient first-strike survivability to credibly deter a superpower—or even with sufficient first-strike penetrability against an adversary superpower to trigger a second strike by an allied superpower—proved to be very difficult, owing both to the cost and the pace of technological development maintained by the superpowers, a pace that smaller powers could not hope to match. Above all else, willingness to bear economic costs is a function of the felt necessity of the expense; in spite of periodic theoretical scenarios suggesting the contrary, the credibility of the American commitment proved to be sufficiently durable—or the fear of direct Soviet attack sufficiently ephemeral—for the additional security of national nuclear forces to seem marginal at best. Only the French, the British, and the Chinese felt the costs of this additional security to be economically justifiable.[7]

The relevance of these conditions to the present and probable future international order is questionable. A wider variety of potential new nuclear states is now perceived, with a correspondingly wide variety of motives and strategic situations. Concern no longer centers on the advanced members of the bipolar alliance systems; it now includes states for whom the superpowers' nuclear umbrellas are non-existent or less than highly credible—often those whose socioeconomic status places them in the Third World. Decisions about the acquisition of nuclear weapons are no longer taken solely—or even primarily—in the context of relations with the superpowers. A far wider array of concerns is apparent. Consideration of regional security and of status are the principal components in the decision-making process of many potential new nuclear states. This, of course, changes the economics of the situation drastically. No longer is it necessary to assume that any positive decision on weapons acquisition must necessarily involve the immense costs of a force with the capability to penetrate the defenses of a superpower and to survive a first strike by such a power. If nuclear weapons are perceived as having some utility for a state's regional or local position, the type of force that would be appropriate may be far cheaper. If deterrence of a superpower is not contemplated, it is not necessary to attempt to keep pace with it in technological sophistication.

In addition to this broadening of the political context, developments

[7] For analyses of factors impinging upon the French, British, and Chinese decisions, see, e.g., Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press 1964).

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in the technological field make the acquisition of nuclear weapons an easier and cheaper process than was assumed earlier. A peaceful nuclear industry, consisting not only of a wide range of physical facilities but also of a large body of technically trained and knowledgeable personnel, has now spread throughout the world.

It has been argued that this spread was unwarranted in strictly economic terms, and that therefore the industry's future expansion can and should be discouraged.[8] This is hotly disputed, especially by experts in states that are energy-poor or concerned about the vulnerability of their external energy sources.[9] With opinions so divided, one is led to the conclusion that the extent to which nuclear fission as a source of electric power will prove economically viable is a moot point which can be resolved only when a large mass of experience with the technology "on line" has been accumulated.

Initially, non-military uses of atomic energy were merely a by-product of weapons programs. Now, weapons programs are available as a by-product of civilian nuclear programs. Much of the technology and knowledge necessary to produce weapons is not distinguishable in any essential degree from that involved in applications of atomic energy to energy production and research.[10]

The extent to which knowledge of the processes of weapons production and the capacity to engage in such production has become widespread should not be exaggerated. Hundreds or even thousands of highly trained people, as well as industrial plants requiring substantial investment, remain necessary. The general knowledge available to the public is not sufficient to enable small groups or individuals to produce weapons without such an investment in personnel and plants. The fear that terrorists or criminals might produce these devices is therefore vastly exaggerated.[11] However, it is true that weapons production may be based on existing civil programs, requiring only marginal additional commitment. Furthermore, new and cheaper techniques for the fabrication of weapons-grade material are now in existence or in prospect,[12] thus making the technical disincentives against the production of nuclear weapons even less important.

Much attention has been directed to the prospect of the emergence of a nuclear electric industry that is based on a plutonium cycle and

[8] See Wohlstetter (fn. 1).

[9] See, e.g., Ryukichi Imai, "Safeguards against Diversion of Nuclear Material: An Overview," *Annals* (fn. 1), 58-69.

[10] See, e.g., Maddox (fn. 1).

[11] See, e.g., Greenwood (fn. 1), 99-107.

[12] See Maddox (fn. 1), esp. 8-14.

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involves "breeder" reactors producing large quantities of weapons-grade material as reactor fuel. Such a technology would have obvious implications for the ease with which it could be employed in weapons programs. The controversy over the economic viability of this technology has been exceptionally intense: it pits those concerned with the implications of the technology for proliferation against those who perceive it as a means of drastically reducing dependence on external sources of energy. As is the case with the question of the economic viability of energy production from nuclear fission in general, firm conclusions about the plutonium cycle are impossible without experiencing it in operation.

Whether in fact the plutonium cycle does become a major worldwide component of energy production should not obscure the implication that the production of nuclear weapons has become easier and cheaper, and that we should expect this process to continue.

The close relationship between atomic power programs and military capabilities has led to an emphasis on physical inspection of civil atomic plants and distribution networks of fissile materials as the most important component of a strategy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to keep governments from acquiring atomic arsenals, they are to be rendered physically incapable of acquiring the material components of a bomb without detection. These physical safeguards are a key element of the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 (N.P.T.); they were present in American and other export programs of civil atomic energy before the Treaty came into effect. Insofar as nuclear safeguards, and the N.P.T. system itself, promise a definitive and reliable solution to a problem through technical and concrete measures, they reflect that traditional American approach to foreign affairs which emphasizes legal solutions and attempts to reduce political problems to technical puzzles.

Closer examination of the safeguard system reveals, however, that its technical reliability is considerably less than perfect; indeed, no such scheme, within the context of the international system, is impervious to evasion or circumvention. One can normally expect that a certain fractional percentage of the fissile materials passing through a reactor, uranium enrichment plant, or plutonium reprocessing plant will inadvertently be unaccounted for; traces of materials may remain in the machinery, or there may be limitations on the accuracy of the measuring equipment. No means exist whereby such innocent accounting limitations could with certainty be distinguished from surreptitious

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governmental attempts to amass sufficient fissile materials for the manufacture of weapons. Whether a government is likely to engage in (or is engaging in) such an attempt is a matter for political judgment and intelligence, wholly outside the competence of any scheme of technical inspection.[13] Technical safeguards can have a certain marginal effect in building confidence if that is considered politically desirable. Their effect in retarding progress if a government is privately bent on proceeding toward a weapons capability might be politically significant in such specific cases. But, like the demand for foolproof inspection schemes in arms control agreements, the search for technical certainty is doomed to fail. Technical safeguards become reliable only when all sides accept that all the parties' separate interests are better served by complying with their constraints than by attempting to evade them.

Indeed, evasion of legal obligations under the N.P.T. is not strictly necessary for a swift program of weapons production, since a party to the N.P.T. may denounce the Treaty on three months' notice. A state with considerable expertise and a large nuclear power industry could thus quite legally go through all the steps involved in the research, development, and production of nuclear weapons—with the exception of the actual fabrication of weapons-grade materials—prior to denunciation; it could then legally produce such material very quickly after the expiration of the three-month waiting period.

The possibility of producing weapons as a by-product of civil nuclear energy programs at marginal cost should not be regarded as the only route to a weapons capability. The "direct" route, involving facilities operated primarily for the production of nuclear weapons, remains open to potential new nuclear powers, as it was available to the first five. This route involves massive capital costs for purely military purposes, but it promises considerably swifter unit production of nuclear weapons than does reliance upon facilities primarily engaged in the production of electric power. Furthermore, new technologies for uranium enrichment now promise significant reduction in cost.[14]

It is also no longer necessary to demonstrate through a nuclear detonation that one has acquired a weapons capability. (An actual detonation may still be necessary to establish the precise explosive yield of a weapon.)[15] True, a detonation may be the most dramatic and the quick-

[13] *Ibid.*, 22-26; SIPRI (fn. 1).

[14] At the time of writing, reports in the public press suggest that the "direct" route, via surreptitious acquisition of an uranium enrichment plant, has been chosen by Pakistan. See *International Herald Tribune*, April 18, 1979, and May 3, 1979.

[15] See, e.g., Rosecrance (fn. 7), 308; Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies 1962), 19.

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est way of removing doubts as to one's nuclear status in the minds of others, but it is not the only way.[16] A power perceiving some advantage in the disclosure of its acquisition of nuclear arms need no longer risk the adverse reactions that might accompany an actual explosion.

Indeed, the conceptual distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers may no longer be useful, because of the growing ease and speed with which weapons may be constructed. As Thomas C. Schelling has suggested,

> From now on it will make more sense to describe a country's nuclear-weapons status not with a yes or a no but with a time schedule. The answer will be a chart, giving the number of weapons of certain energy yields and certain physical characteristics that could be available after elapsed hours, days or weeks from the decisions to assemble them.[17]

Nuclear proliferation therefore means not only the prospect of additional states' possessing the weapons after having explicitly announced that possession by detonation. It also means that states will implicitly or explicitly exploit their presumed capabilities to produce the Bomb, as well as a calculated ambiguity about quietly having actually done so. It constitutes a political device of multifarious utility in international political and strategic bargaining.

Production of the weapons—or the credible threat to produce them—has thus become easier and cheaper. Physical safeguards designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are fragile where the political will to circumvent them exists. To what extent should we assume that it does exist, that it is likely to become more prevalent in future years, or indeed, that it is likely to decline in the future?

## III

One mode of essaying an answer to these questions would be through close analyses of a series of individual governmental perspectives and the probable outcome of internal decision-making processes in specific states. Such an exercise would be of great interest, but by itself indeterminate and unpersuasive in its explanatory implications.

From the perspective of any single government, decisions relating to

[16] For some discussions of Israel's creative use of the manipulation of ambiguity, see George H. Quester (fn. 1), 82-102; Yair Evron, "Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity, 1957–1967," *Orbis*, XVII (Winter 1974), 1326-43; Lawrence Freedman, "Israel's Nuclear Policy," *Survival*, XVII (May-June 1975), 114-20; Alan Dowty, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Israeli Case," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXII (March 1978), 79-120.

[17] Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?," *International Security*, I (Summer 1976), 79.

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the acquisition of nuclear weapons—or the capability to produce them within finite periods of time—are taken within the context of a perceived balance of advantages and disadvantages. Indeed, such decisions are in no way distinguishable from decisions about the acquisition of a host of other national capabilities that are relevant to international politics. One can anticipate that significant costs as well as benefits will be apparent to decision makers in the potential nuclear powers of the future—as they were to similar decision makers who grappled with these questions in the past, with differing results. Therefore, no speculations about specific future governmental decisions can be more than highly tentative and contingent upon a host of problematic, detailed considerations. Furthermore, specific decisions in this area are not irrevocable—especially negative decisions. A decision *not* to acquire the weapons—or not to put oneself in a position to acquire them quickly at some later date—can always be reversed later.

The future courses of action of individual states are thus highly indeterminate. A far more useful approach—and one more likely to anticipate outcomes over the middle- and long-range future—lies in an attempt to assess the effects of the international system, as well as probable future changes in the structure of that system, on the pattern of constraints and opportunities existing for individual states within the system.[18] These effects should not be understood to be causal or determining, but rather as tending to produce an environment for decision makers in which the costs of certain decisions are generally increased while the costs of others are decreased.

An attempt to make predictions about the future structure of the international system is of course an exceedingly tendentious enterprise. Although one may simply attempt to extrapolate from present trends, there is no reason to assume that these will continue; furthermore, the very nature of those trends in the present period may be open to dispute. Differing ideological perspectives characteristically carry with them differing images of the direction in which the international order is evolving.

Yet it may be possible to isolate a small number of significant components of the international system, however conceived. Expectations as to the evolution of these components may then be examined in terms of their implications for the pace and quality of the spread of nuclear weapons. Our analysis may proceed from two alternative premises. The

[18] See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1979).

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first centers upon power and influence as central to the relations between nation-states, and on the behavior and capabilities of a few great powers, as setting the bounds for the behavior of other actors. The second presumes the emergence of a new class of international actors, for whom traditional power relationships and the influence of the great powers are unimportant.

This analytic dichotomy is close to that between the "East-West" conflict and the "North-South" conflict, although there are areas of difference. To a great extent, the former has been understood as centering primarily on traditional political and strategic questions, while the latter has been conceived as relating primarily to economic and social issues—areas in which novel modes of interaction transcending the nation-state have gained centrality. Yet, paradoxically, those who look for signs of the imminent demise of the nation-state find those signs most prominently displayed in the industrialized regions of the world and in the relationships among units in those regions—that is, in sectors centrally embedded in the East-West conflict. Conversely, national units in the Third-World, which supposedly forms the second pole of the North-South conflict, show a remarkable persistence. Furthermore, some observers have noted that, rather than originating new ideas in issue areas or in mechanisms to resolve questions at issue, the policies advocated by many Third-World governments are fairly traditional means to achieve a redistribution of power-bearing national capabilities in their favor—that is, to change the identity of the powerful, but not in any way to diminish the centrality of the nation-state itself.[19]

It has become a commonplace of contemporary analysis to postulate a decline in the influence of the superpowers over third parties, and to expect that this condition represents a trend that will continue. In part, this decline is attributed to the character of the strategic weaponry of the superpowers—weaponry which has proved to be of doubtful utility except in the central relationship between them. Associated with this factor is a perceived decline in the capability of the superpowers' conventional military arsenals to coerce others, flowing from the smaller states' increased capacity for effective resistance. The difficulties of the United States in the Vietnam War are a vivid illustration of this contention.

A number of factors tend to make alliance commitments both less attractive and less credible to all parties—except for the special case of Europe, which should properly be regarded as an aspect of the central

[19] See, e.g., Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations* (New York: Basic Books 1977).

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strategic relationship between the two superpowers. The fear of escalation to a nuclear confrontation makes each of the superpowers reluctant to undertake commitments to smaller states, since such commitments might enable the smaller state to manipulate the alliance to its advantage in its regional setting. This reluctance also tends to erode the credibility, and thus the value to the smaller state, of any commitment or assurance that a superpower might nevertheless offer in specific circumstances. The decline in the efficacy of the superpowers' conventional forces tends both to reduce the salience of their threats to the security of third powers (outside Europe) and to cause the value of their commitments to small states to decline further.

The net effect is to decouple regional international systems from the superpowers' bilateral relationship. It is to be expected that states outside Europe will increasingly arrive at foreign and defense policy decisions in an environment dominated by regional concerns, with the interests of the superpowers occupying a correspondingly residual position. The ability of the superpowers to induce smaller states to adopt policies that one or both of them prefer has declined, and will continue to decline. This is not to suggest that the superpowers will forgo their attempts to induce smaller states to follow their wishes, but rather, that these attempts will continue to prove only intermittently successful. Their recent failures to maintain influence over sometime clients in the Middle East illustrate the decline of the superpowers' control over third powers. The policies of Egypt, Somalia, and Iran have recently been vitally influenced by the play of regional and domestic politics within their immediate neighborhoods. The ease with which these states have been able to overthrow political and military relationships that had existed for some time is a striking phenomenon.

We should not assume that this decoupling of regional systems from the central balance is only, or primarily, a function of the eroding credibility of the superpowers' threats and promises. The declining relevance of their relationship to regional international political processes—beyond the limits of the two major alliances—is at least equally a product of factors indigenous to the world beyond that relationship. From being predominantly objects over which others contended, a great many new states have emerged, as in Africa and Asia, as independent actors who are attempting to determine the direction of their foreign policies in the light of their own interests, perspectives, and concerns. It has often been observed that the decolonization process that followed in the wake of the Second World War triggered the emergence of an

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international system that is truly worldwide in terms of the identities of the actors within it.

A major component of the foreign policy of these new states consists of individual relations with their neighbors and concerns about the evolution of regional patterns. Insofar as the foreign policies of these new states exhibit common interests, they appear in a large-scale concentration on economic issues bearing upon the desire for a greater share of the world's wealth. A few of these states have found themselves in a position to force a redistribution in their favor because of their control over natural resources; many others have attempted to emulate these few, with indifferent results. The assumption, however, that both the ends and the means of the foreign policies of the new states are likely to remain predominantly in the economic sphere may flow from only a superficial analysis. If in fact the world has become interdependent, we should not assume that this development will cause conflict to decline. On the contrary, interdependence may well cause the incidence of conflict to increase as new occasions for dispute arise.[20] How are these conflicts to be resolved? Interdependence itself provides no novel mechanism—unless we accept the proposition that the mere intellectual acceptance of a long-run common good will induce some states to accept developments adverse to themselves in the short run. If, in fact, redistribution of wealth or of opportunity is the goal of the new states *en bloc*, that goal is not reachable without some mechanism to compel those who are relatively well off now to accept significant relative deprivations.

The so-called North-South conflict may bear a closer resemblance to traditional power struggles than is commonly realized. In this, as in other traditional conflicts, outcomes turn upon the ability of the contestants to compel others to accept their desired state of affairs. Military power is one of the traditional means of influence: whether employed directly to secure material advantage, or indirectly to inflict pain; and whether in fact employed, or merely threatened, implicitly or explicitly. Even if we assume that the North-South conflict will dominate international relations for the foreseeable future and that the substance of that conflict will relate to the allocation of economic goods, there is no

[20] For a recent survey of the literature on the effects of interdependence, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "International Interdependence and Integration," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, VIII (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 363-414. The argument denying that the modern world has become more interdependent is made by Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation: A Symposium* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press 1970).

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ground for assuming that military power will be irrelevant to the outcome of that conflict. A number of astute Western observers have perceived that the North-South conflict is ultimately a power conflict. Its outcome will be influenced by the relative capacity of the contending interests to employ means of coercion in order to resolve the questions at issue—unless we assume the creation of some authoritative central mechanism for rendering such decisions.[21]

Nor should we assume that such perspectives are confined to scholars in the "Northern" industrialized sector. A parallel outlook may be found among observers in the Third World. As Rajni Kothari put it: "Changes in the global structuring of power and resources do not follow nice principles of equity or participation but require effective disturbance of the *status quo* through the acquisition of significant power by those outside the prevailing oligarchy."[22]

Kothari goes on to suggest explicitly the likelihood of acquisition of nuclear weapons by Third-World states that are motivated by a determination to force such a change.[23]

Thus it can be expected that the emergence of numbers of relatively autonomous decision-making centers outside the industrialized sectors of the world will create a more favorable environment for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by new states, unless some factor now unforeseen should intervene to upset present trends. This conclusion follows whether we emphasize the possible fragmentation of the Third World or anticipate a growing awareness of common interest in that sector, as well as common action based on that interest.

If fragmentation is emphasized, decisions relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons—like other decisions relating to foreign and security policy—will most likely be taken in the light of hopes and fears relating to the evolution of the regional environment in which a new state is embedded. The decoupling of these regions from the superpower nexus will have the dual effect of reducing the superpowers' capacity to offer protection to clients, as well as their capacity to prevent decisions on foreign and security policy of which they disapprove, separately or in tandem.

If the commonalty of the Third World is presented as a significant element in an emerging world order, the acquisition of nuclear weapons—or the threat of it—will be perceived by the disadvantaged as an

[21] See, e.g., Tucker (fn. 19); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan 1977), 316.

[22] Kothari, "Sources of Conflict in the 1980's," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 134 (Spring 1977), 2.

[23] *Ibid.*, 6.

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important device with which to achieve that redistribution of resources and opportunity that they maintain is just. Although no combination of Third-World governments can be foreseen which would possess the capability to credibly threaten states in the developed world with nuclear attack, nuclear weapons would remain attractive as a generalized symbol of autonomy, status, influence, and the capability to cause disturbance.

## IV

It has been suggested that both technological developments and projections as to the evolution of the international system should be understood as contributing to a common conclusion: the creation of a more favorable environment for the possession of nuclear weapons by additional states. It follows that we should now direct our attention toward the consequences of such a tendency. To what extent and in what manner do these consequences imply a more violent world?

Without the consideration of further factors, the indicated conclusion does not provide for specific predictions as to the nature of individual national decisions—which may, and often do, run counter to general trends. Furthermore, in order to assess fully the consequences of a more "nuclearized" world, it is necessary to specify the nature of the expected nuclear environment in a detail which our conclusion by itself does not provide. The implications of a world of many nuclear powers flow not only from such a situation in the abstract, but also from such additional and specific factors as the pace with which proliferation occurs in specific regions, and the nature of the weaponry (including delivery systems) acquired. In addition, the implications for stability in the central balance between the superpowers need not vary in direct relation to the implications to be drawn for stability in regional balances, and may indeed vary inversely. To complicate the question still further, stability of a nuclearized environment may in part be manageable by outside agencies.

Bearing these *caveats* in mind, we may still be able to offer some general observations on the implications for stability in a world in which nuclear weapons status has become significantly more widespread than it is at present. What might be called the "received wisdom" on the topic is clear enough: any increase in the number of governments possessing nuclear weapons is held to decrease stability and to increase the probability of war, both in the strategic relationship between the superpowers and in regional conflict situations. A few early writers attempted to demonstrate a contrary case—that in some cases

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possession of nuclear weapons might have a stabilizing effect[24]—but such assertions have generally been dismissed. It is possible to summarize the characteristic arguments employed in this dismissal.

The most general of these arguments may be called the argument from complexity: a world of many nuclear powers would be inherently more difficult to manage—a difficulty which would be a direct function of the rise in the number of nuclear decision-making centers. The more actors, the more difficult it becomes to monitor each of them, and the greater the danger of surprise or miscalculation in crises.[25]

To this may be added the doubt that the prudence generated by the Soviet-American strategic relationship would be reliably or automatically transferrable to strategic relationships involving other states. As Stanley Hoffmann has put it, "The trouble is, of course, that the enlightenment these weapons bring to their owners is fragile and conditional."[26] The stability of the Soviet-American relationship owes as much or more to the larger political historic and geographical context as to the technology. A corollary to this argument is the view that these contextual matters are in themselves peculiar and unusual conditions which we should not expect to see generally replicated in other strategic relationships. The parties to the Soviet-American conflict were geographically separated; the relationship could develop patterns of restraint because the most vital interests of the parties were not engaged. Outside the Soviet-American relationship we may therefore encounter governments not imbued with the patterns of caution and circumspection prevalent within it.

A number of more specific arguments supplement these general ones. We may take their formulation by Beaton and Maddox as representative.

> Apart from this direct danger of turning local wars into nuclear wars, there are a number of other reasons why the spread of these weapons

[24] Cf., e.g., Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1961); George Liska, "Nuclear Diffusion: Domestic, Regional, and Global Perspectives," in *Political Problems of Nth Country Arms Choices 1966–1980* (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University 1965), 86-119.

[25] This is the burden of Stanley Hoffmann's argument in "Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics," in Alastair Buchan, ed., *A World of Nuclear Powers?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1966), 89-121. See also Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 390-406; and Buchan's "Introduction," in Buchan, *op. cit.*, 1-11. The classic argument for the virtues of a bipolar situation, as inducing a general political calculability and thus stability, is made by Kenneth Waltz (fn. 4).

[26] "Terror in Theory and Practice," in Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York: Praeger 1965), 251.

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> cannot be expected to serve the cause of stability. Broadly, there are five [sic] serious aspects to this: (1) the instability of the period during which particular countries are known to be developing weapons but have not; (2) the inevitability of imbalance as between rivals as the spread goes on; (3) the possibility that as nuclear forces grow surprise attack may become safe for one side or another; (4) the danger that small powers may obtain the ability to draw great powers into nuclear wars (the notion of catalytic war); (5) the complication of disarmament or arms control negotiations; (6) the general increase in world-wide levels of military power.[27]

Some of these arguments suggest instability for nuclearized regional balances, while others suggest that proliferation will adversely affect the stability of the central balance. Some carry implications for both areas.

Among the specific points made by Beaton and Maddox, (4), (5), and (6) clearly relate to the central balance. It seems that (5) and (6) are corollaries of (4), and thus valid only if (4) is accepted. Only if regional nuclearization carries the potential of triggering war between superpowers should we expect that disarmament negotiations might become complicated, or global tension increased, as a consequence. Yet the fear of catalytic war embodied in (4) flows from technological circumstances peculiar to an earlier period. The development of second-strike capabilities by the superpowers eliminated serious concern about catalytic war and similar scenarios. In the absence of a necessity to "launch on warning" (without waiting to determine the character, size, and originator of a presumed attack) in order to avoid involuntary disarmament, no causal link between instability on the local level and instability in the central balance suggests itself.

It may be argued, however, that the possibility of being drawn in may induce the superpowers to withdraw commitments in areas of local nuclearization, and that this withdrawal would have adverse effects upon the stability of the central balance. Where such withdrawal has in fact occurred or been threatened, it has been due to causes other than incipient nuclearization. Whatever the causes, in the absence of a radical change in strategic nuclear technology it is difficult to see how instability in the central balance could be precipitated by factors extraneous to it.

The only exception to the presumption that instability in local balances would not involve instability in the central balance might arise from a war between nuclear-armed members of the two alliance sys-

[27] Beaton and Maddox (fn. 15), 202-3.

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tems in Europe, other than the superpowers. Even in such a case, however, the danger to the stability of the central balance would flow less from the possibility of catalytic war than from the possibility that one of the superpowers might feel it faced unacceptable losses to its position if its opponents' allies prevailed. But such a possibility is inherently no more ominous than the oft-played scenarios of the last quarter-century suggesting that a superpower might be driven to use, or would threaten to use, its strategic forces against its principal opponent when faced with unacceptable losses to its position flowing from *conventional* attack. The addition of more nuclear powers leaves the prospect quite frightening, but no more so than it already is with the present number of nuclear-weapons states in Europe. It should also be noted that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Britain and France did not cause a dilution of the American commitment to NATO.

These points would seem to affect adversely the force of the general argument concerning complexity. To be sure, a world of many nuclear powers would be more difficult to manage, but that this general difficulty would *ipso facto* affect the specific manageability of the strategic relationship between the superpowers has not been demonstrated. And it might be added that this growing difficulty in the management of the international order has many causes other than nuclear proliferation, and has indeed been proceeding apace while proliferation has remained largely only a prospect. The spread of nuclear capability may thus represent more a *symptom* of a growing underlying fragmentation and intractability in the postwar international system than a *cause*.

We need not fear, therefore, that an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states will affect the stability of the central balance adversely. This realization, however, is not a sufficient basis for any optimistic belief in a decline of the dangers posed by a nuclearized international order. Even if we escape a central war, the prospect of widespread use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts is a horrendous one for those in the area—not to mention the dangers represented by fallout and a rise in radiation levels. To what extent, then, must we accept those arguments which maintain that the nuclearization of regional international systems would tend toward instability, including the probability of widespread military use of the weapons?

The arguments tending toward this conclusion stress the difficulties of transferring the prudence engendered by the Soviet-American strategic relationship to other relationships; they are supported by Beaton and Maddox's specific points (1), (2), and (3). These points should be

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understood as demonstrating and illustrating why the general proposition should hold. They are, however, contingent and indeed peculiarly manipulable. The introduction of nuclear weapons into a regional conflict may produce an impetus either to stability or instability, depending on the specifics of the technology introduced, the pace of its introduction, and the extent to which that introduction is made on a symmetrical or asymmetrical basis as between the parties to a regional conflict. There is no reason to assume, as a general proposition, that one or another outcome must eventuate. Indeed, insofar as the outcome is considered solely a product of technological considerations, one can only presume that it would be quite susceptible to manipulation in desired directions by outside supplying agents.

In the absence of a *technological* impetus to instability, any assertion that regional nuclear balances would, as a general rule, be unstable for *political* reasons—the absence of those patterns of behavior and modes of thought that produced prudence in the Soviet-American relationship —must be regarded to be of questionable validity. Such an assertion would assume that the capacity for political rationality is a narrow, culturally based attribute. In this context, rational action is understood in its limited sense as action which, in Hedley Bull's phrase, is "internally consistent and consistent with given goals."[28] One goal is no more rational, in this sense, than another. Thus a government's policy goal of preserving the collective for which it is acting cannot be considered more rational than a goal of destroying the collective. That the former is considered the "normal" or "usual" state of affairs is simply an empirical generalization derived from experience. It is indeed quite unusual to find governments seeking, as the goal of their policies, to destroy the collectives for which they are acting. They may—and often do—achieve such a result unintentionally, owing to some miscalculation of means, or simply to unanticipated events or events over which they have no control. But the deliberate and direct pursuit of self-destruction by collectives is surely a rare occurrence. Notions of a "collective death-wish" should be understood as rhetorical flourishes, whose meaning is simply that an observer believes that a government is pursuing means toward self-preservation which are in fact profoundly ill-chosen and will produce effects opposite to those intended. We may take it as given, for all practical purposes, that collectives (or, more properly, their agents) seek to preserve themselves, and will attempt to pursue policies consistent with such goals.

[28] Bull (fn. 21), 125-26.

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Thus, the assertion that states other than the Soviet Union and the United States—especially new states in the Third World—would not be capable of responding to regional nuclearization with the prudence that characterizes the Soviet-American relationship can hardly mean that such states pursue policies aimed at self-destruction, or that they are uniquely indifferent to that possibility. It must instead flow from a belief that these states are somehow incapable of making the correct instrumental inferences as to the means to effectuate goals of self-preservation. Is there any basis for such a view—beyond that Western conceit which would hold rationality to be an attribute confined to ourselves? Surely the burden of proof must lie with those who would maintain that any new nuclear-weapons states would be so handicapped.

Certainly nothing in our experience with the political behavior of the new states gives evidence of a congenital inability to recognize dangers or to draw inferences of prudence therefrom. Indeed, a manifest concern for self-preservation and its implications can be seen even in the policies of those most commonly referred to as "madmen." One should not automatically take bizarre behavior patterns and wild rhetorical posturing at face value. Cultivation of an image of inflexibility, monomaniacal commitment, or even sheer madness may at times prove to be a useful bargaining device. Thomas C. Schelling has developed this notion in his concept of the "rationality of the irrational."[29] Sustained analyses of the foreign policies of even those regimes that appear most bizarre to Westerners would show that they are not unaware of external dangers, that they pursue policies of self-preservation, and that they have demonstrated that they can react instrumentally to external threat —implicit or explicit—with prudent and circumspect policies that function as means to that self-preservation.

To be sure, the adoption of successful means to achieve self-preservation is often defeated by a variety of intervening factors that may induce miscalculation. The most notable of these may be the sheer complexity of a situation, which may make the content of a putatively successful policy ambiguous.

This stricture may be of limited applicability, however, when applied to crisis behavior in hypothetical regional nuclearized environments. The dangers represented by nuclear forces actually or prospectively in the hands of an opponent do not make a situation complicated; instead, they simplify it. As Dr. Johnson put it, "When a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully." The dan-

[29] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1960), passim.

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ger becomes clear-cut and manifest. Little sophistication is required to imagine it.

If rational behavior is to be expected in such a context, and if the stark nature of the dangers removes ambiguity about the content of that behavior, this content will not necessarily be non-violent or tend toward stability in a regional crisis. The reverse might well be true, depending on the specific state of arms technology in the region. Asymmetrical introduction of nuclear weapons into an area might make preemptive strikes against the presumed incipient nuclear capacity of an opponent the prudent course for the first nuclear-weapons power in a region. Mutual vulnerable capabilities might make a disarming first strike in a crisis—or "out of the blue"—eminently sensible. The prospects for regional stability (defined here narrowly as the absence of propensity for nuclear attack) would tend to follow directly from the implications of the technological base of the weaponry. The capacity and will of the actors in such circumstances to act rationally should not be put into question; the issue is whether or not the strategic environment within which they are operating will allow them to be both rational and peaceful.

Insofar as the technological variable is the controlling (or at least dominant) variable, possibilities for successful management of regional nuclearized environments in the direction of stability increase. Outside suppliers would possess the capacity to ensure that technological environments with a propensity toward instability do not arise, or are not allowed to continue. To the extent that the problems are technical, they are susceptible of reliable technical resolution with considerable precision.

The political obstacles to that type of resolution would be immense, however. In order to surmount these obstacles, the nuclear supplier-states would have to eliminate their antiproliferation posture and replace it with a posture whose cardinal directive was the discouragement of local nuclear instability by whatever means. These means might include, in certain cases, the supply to one or all parties in a regional nuclear nexus (actual or incipient) of advanced command-and-control systems, delivery systems, and warheads. It would then not be imperative for the recipient to maintain a launch-on-warning posture in order to avoid a disarming first strike by an opponent. The historic antiproliferation posture of the U.S. Congress—far more consistent and insistent than that of American presidential administrations—should suggest the great changes in attitude that would be required.

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One would be advised to avoid adopting anything other than a reserved attitude toward the implications of nuclearization for regional peace and stability. Political problems may prevent the emergence of a favorable technological environment. Further, the arguments "from technology" are themselves only statements of the balance of constraints; they describe tendencies under hypothetical conditions, not necessary and universal consequences. A variety of additional factors—technological, topographic, ideological, political, and historic—will need to be considered in order to determine whether general tendencies will be borne out in specific cases of incipient nuclearization. We may well witness the explosion in anger of the third, fourth, or fifth nuclear weapon before the century is out. But if such events—horrific in their immediate context—should occur, it is likely that their effect would be to redouble the concern of all governments with prudence and its requirements.

## V

In this essay, we have examined the balance of constraints and advantages set by the international environment, as that balance impinges upon national decisions relating to the acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Upon finding that the effect of the balance is to reduce constraints against such acquisition and to increase advantages, we have assumed some increase in the number of nuclear-weapons states (a category which we should understand as including some states that have not actually detonated a device). We have then attempted to deduce, in the abstract, the general effect on international stability which would follow from such an increase in number, and have found it to be somewhat more benign in character than has commonly been assumed.[30]

The analysis suggests an important benchmark by which thought on proliferation and its implications should be guided: We must learn to resist any suggestion of historical discontinuity in thinking about nuclear proliferation. We must resist any assumption that our historical experience of the states system is somehow irrelevant to thinking about a nuclear future.

That experience implies three lessons. The first is that, unless the system of states undergoes a revolutionary transformation, any suggestion that further proliferation can be stopped borders upon the absurd. Decisions about the acquisition of nuclear weapons are not in essence

[30] See also Kenneth N. Waltz, "What Will the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Do to the World?" in John Kerry King, ed., *International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. 1979).

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different from the other decisions that autonomous decision-making units continually make about the means by which they will individually advance or protect their interests. Many states have decided that the acquisition of nuclear capability is not in their best interest; no doubt many more will continue to do so. But to assume that *all* the actors in the system can be made to come to a universal negative decision beggars the imagination—especially when they have before them the examples of a number of states which have quite obviously come to the opposite conclusion about the requirements of their own self-interest. In a world of independent states, some proliferation will be inevitable, much as will some war and the threat of it.

The second lesson is that, while history is in part a record of catastrophe, it is also a record of adaptation, of human ability to tame new forces and to make them bearable. We should not shrink from the expectation that nuclear weapons can be made to undergo such a process of normalization in the future as other weapons have been made to in the past.

The third lesson is this. What order international relations has historically possessed has in large part been a product of a hierarchy of power, with Great Powers capable of influencing smaller states to refrain from disruptive behavior. If this capability were to decline to an important degree (whether through the alleged obsolescence of war or the emergence of a qualitatively novel politics of resource scarcity and interdependence), and supranational organization were unlikely to fill the breach, the orderly devolution of responsibility and capability to smaller states might be the best hope for international stability.

No course of action is without risk. Perhaps antiproliferation efforts will succeed in keeping the number of nuclear powers below a dozen by the dawn of the 21st century. Certainly we make no argument here for lessening efforts to retard the spread of nuclear weapons. But the problem of managing that spread which will occur cannot be evaded. Failure to develop policies to do so will most likely ensure that that measure of nuclear devolution which will take place will have the most horrendous effects on peace and on human life.

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# STATE AND SOCIETY IN MEXICO:
## Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?

By SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL and JOHN F. H. PURCELL*

CONTEMPORARY discussions of the Mexican political system tend to emphasize the solidity and stability of the ruling coalition and the strength of those institutions that allow the continued cooptation and control of the masses by the political elite.[1] We shall argue, however, that the Mexican state is in reality a precarious association of ruling groups and interests finely balanced between repressive authoritarianism (probably military in nature), and political instability with mass politicization.[2]

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[1] See, for example, Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1964); Roger Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press 1971), Richard R. Fagen and William S. Tuohy, *Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1972), David Ronfeldt, *Atencingo: The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1973); Evelyn P. Stevens, *Protest and Response in Mexico* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press 1974); Susan Kaufman Purcell, *The Mexican Profit Sharing Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1975); L. Vincent Padgett, *The Mexican Political System* (2d ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1976); José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, eds., *Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Philadelphia: ISHI Press 1977); Susan Eckstein, *The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977). See also the following articles: Bo Anderson and James J. Cockcroft, "Control and Cooptation in Mexican Politics," in Irving Louis Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., *Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements* (New York: Random House 1969), 366-89; Rafael Segovia, "Tendencias políticas en México," *Foro Internacional*, XVI (No. 4, 1976), 421-28; Lorenzo Meyer, "Veinticinco años de política mexicana," in *Comercio Exterior*, XXV (December 1975), 1334-42. These writings, as is evident from some of the titles, often explicitly classify the Mexican political system as a type of authoritarian regime.

[2] From time to time, a few observers have suggested this characterization of the

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The Mexican state is a "balancing act" because it is based on a constantly renewed political bargain among several ruling groups and interests representing a broad range of ideological tendencies and social bases. To a greater degree than in most stable and mature modern states, the political bargain is at the forefront of Mexican politics and of the administrative decision-making process. The politics of daily renewal takes precedence over politics-as-usual. Those who do play politics-as-usual must be constantly aware of their interest in holding together the fragile association upon which their power is based.

In a sense, every new state represents a political bargain. Over time, the bargain is transformed into a series of institutions which, if they work, make all but the most historically minded political participant forget its original terms. The institutions, in other words, develop a life of their own.

The Mexican state is unique, however, in that it has never evolved from its original bargain into an institutionalized entity in the above sense. The bargain through which political stability was achieved in the 1930s was struck between the representatives of lower-class revolutionaries and middle-class revolutionaries. It was and remains an agreement to share power among proponents of quite different interests and constituencies. The system is held together not by institutions, but by the rigid discipline of the elites in not overstepping the bounds of the bargain. It is therefore less a set of institutionalized structures (though structures like the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] are there to trap the unwary observer) than a complex of well-established, even ritualized, strategies and tactics appropriate to political, bureaucratic, and private interaction *throughout* the system. More than anything else, the Mexican political system is a set of *ways of doing things*. The mechanisms for constantly renewing the political bargain necessary to keep diverse elements together account for the unusual mixture of authoritarianism and negotiation observed in Mexican politics.

One may object that our characterization of Mexican politics as a clearly defined set of ways of doing things is precisely what is meant by the term institutionalization. That is true at one level. Institutions

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Mexican political system. See especially Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development: The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1965). Journalists are more likely to have this view than scholars, probably because they are influenced more by immediate considerations and see Mexico in times of crisis. Scholars have more long-range views and tend to assume that, because Mexico has been politically stable for a number of decades, it will remain so. For a recent interpretation of Mexican politics by a journalist emphasizing instability, see Gene Lyons, "Inside the Volcano," *Harper's*, Vol. 254 (June 1977), 41-55.

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in this very general sense, however, differ widely in the degree to which they are structured and formalized. At one extreme are political structures (whether legally or constitutionally defined or not) such as legislatures, executive branches, or parties. At the other extreme are the very loose, informal institutions constituted by social conventions governing most (and even some of the minutest) aspects of daily life. Somewhere in between are social institutions such as marriage. Marriage is governed and delimited by formal and legal rules, but in essence its content is worked out and negotiated through prolonged and intimate face-to-face interaction. Today, in the United States at least, there is nothing inevitable about the maintenance of the marriage "bargain"; its fate depends on the constant efforts and sensitivity of the partners. It is at this latter level of the meaning of institution that we shall explore the nature of the Mexican state.

Let us cite but one example of the problem confronting a formal institutional approach: Samuel Huntington uses Mexico as a major illustration of an institutionalized system that he contrasts with the praetorianism of most of the Third World.[3] His analysis suggests that, whereas institutionalized systems can be analyzed in terms of the adaptiveness and flexibility of their (structured) institutions (particularly political parties), praetorian systems can be understood (since they lack viable institutions) in terms of common political tactics that include direct action by social forces, corruption, and the political leaders' "sell-out" of their followers.[4] However, some of these praetorian tactics are not only commonly used in Mexico—indeed, are "institutionalized"—but a strong argument can be made that they contribute in a very basic way to the stability of the system.[5]

We may resolve this apparent incongruity by viewing Mexican political stability as resting primarily not upon institutionalized structures such as the party or the presidency, but upon the interaction of two principles of political action: *political discipline* and *political negotiation*. They combine to reinforce and provide flexibility for the bargain among the ruling groups. Their combination accounts for the strong impression of dualism and paradox that has long been noted and explored by some of Mexico's most brilliant poets and philosophers.[6]

[3] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968), esp. 255-56 and 315-24.

[4] *Ibid.*, 59-71.

[5] See Hansen's discussion of the praetorian aspects of Mexican politics (fn. 1), 101-2.

[6] See, for example, the discussion of the dualism between the *tlatoani* (the institutional, impersonal ruler) and the *caudillo* (the personal ruler) in Octavio Paz, *The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid* (New York: Grove Press 1972), 102-5. See also

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Contemporary political analyses also reflect this dualism. Some observers have regarded the Mexican presidency as extremely strong, others as quite weak. Some have viewed Mexico as an authoritarian system, others as a proto-democracy. And some have emphasized hierarchy while others have stressed horizontal relationships and negotiation.[7]

The principles of political discipline (closely linked to the concept of authoritarianism) and political negotiation (associated more with the proto-democratic concept) have in turn mixed and combined into a variety of quasi-institutions that we shall call *modes of political action.* The list of modes of political action presented here is probably not exhaustive, but includes those that in our opinion are the most important: fluid political clientelism, political turnover (elite circulation), the reliance on political middlemen, and rules about corruption, patronage, and political entrepreneurism.

From the perspective of modes of political action, the structured institutions of Mexican politics which receive the greatest attention—the dominant party, the presidency, and the bureaucracy—are simply convenient formal frameworks within which the true balancing act, so necessary to the survival of the heterogeneous Mexican state, is performed. This political "fine-tuning" is carried out by means of fairly specific sets of rules and expectations which, while they may be regarded as institutions, are not structures. They do not, even in principle, have specific boundaries or a consistent internal organization. They are personalistic, and reflect the style, personality, and goals of their members. In addition, the configuration of these personalistic relationships at any given instant is often a secret known only to a select few.

First, we will briefly examine the historical background of the bargain that gave rise not only to the institutional structure of the Mexican political system, but also helped to institutionalize the specific modes of political action that hold it together. The historical view will also help us to explore the manner in which ideology is a mechanism both for

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the discussion of dualism in the works of Mexican thinkers such as José Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos, Octavio Paz, and Leopoldo Zea, in Michael A. Weinstein, *The Polarity of Mexican Thought: Instrumentalism and Finalism* (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press 1976). Of course, the substance of the dualisms described are not always the same; nor are they precisely the ones developed here.

[7] Vernon (fn. 2) emphasizes the constraints on presidential decision making. The principal studies that stress the proto-democratic aspects of the Mexican political system are Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1959), and Martin C. Needler, *Politics and Society in Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press 1971).

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linking elites to, and insulating them from, their potential constituencies. The next section will be devoted to an analysis of the functioning of the modes of political action. In the final section, we will discuss the manner in which these modes produce a pattern of political and administrative decision making that we call "policy incoherence." In the conclusion we will offer a characterization of the Mexican state with particular reference to the unique political stability of Mexico among Latin American States.

## Intra-Elite and Elite-Constituency Relations

It is impossible to understand the contemporary Mexican political system without reference to its genesis. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 ended the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz—a dictatorship that managed fairly successfully to hold in check the pronounced centrifugal forces of Mexican society. With the fall of Díaz, Mexico was plunged into a decade of civil war; one group after another attempted to establish hegemony over the others. The fact that none of them ever really succeeded helps to explain why the basis upon which the fighting was ultimately terminated was a kind of pact among the competing revolutionary leaders and their personal followings: they pledged themselves to mutual toleration and a division of the spoils that reflected the existing balance of power among them. The pact was symbolized by the still extant Constitution of 1917.

The Constitution reflects the heterogeneity of the revolutionary bargain in the sense that it is the primary repository of the varied ideological tendencies espoused by its creators—a kind of revolutionary grab bag. It supports socialism, capitalism, political democracy, authoritarianism, corporatism, interest-group liberalism, and a host of unimplemented provisions for specific social reforms.[8]

In the 1920s, two of the strongest leaders—Plutarco Elías Calles and Alvaro Obregón—entered into an alliance that tipped the balance of power sufficiently to enable them to alternate control of the Mexican presidency between them. The murder of Obregón in 1928 (just as he was about to assume the presidency for the second time after sitting out a term in favor of Calles), was a persuasive reminder of the consequences that could ensue from failure to abide by the original distributive bargain. Faced with the impossibility of succeeding himself in office, yet desiring to maintain control of the political system, Calles set up a catch-all official party, the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario*

[8] Brandenburg (fn. 1), 7-18.

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(PNR), known since 1946 as the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI).[9] Although his original intention was to rule indefinitely through a succession of puppet presidents, that plan was short-lived. Others wanted their turn to lead; the opposition to the *continuismo* of Calles coalesced around Lázaro Cárdenas, who became President of Mexico from 1934 to 1940. Committed more than most to the previously ignored goals of social justice of the Mexican Revolution (and also to building a power base for himself independent of that of Calles), Cárdenas initiated a massive program of land distribution, restructured the official party so as to bring the weight of the organized workers and peasants into play, and built up the state bureaucracy at the expense of the political party.

The Cárdenas regime was important for its wedding of ideology and practice. In spite of arguments over just how revolutionary Cárdenas was, there is little doubt that his regime pursued a model of development that emphasized benefits for workers and peasants, as well as collective organization and state intervention in the name of social justice in a manner equaled by no Mexican president before or since. This "progressive" model of political and economic development is often set against the more "conservative" model which emphasizes economic growth *per se* and reliance on the private sector for investment. The conservative model has characterized most social and economic policy since Cárdenas. During the presidency of Luis Echeverría (1970–1976), a Cárdenas-like model was labelled *desarrollo compartido* (shared development), while the more conservative approach came to be known as *desarrollo estabilizador* (stabilizing development). These competing models of development and associated permutations have provided additional ideological weapons in the constant, though limited, struggle for power within the ruling coalition.

It comes as no surprise—given the Mexican political system's origins as a pact among revolutionary leaders—that one of its most striking aspects is its emphasis on hierarchy. It is an alliance among the few that is one basis for the prevailing authoritarian conceptualization of the Mexican political system. The leaders come from varied socioeconomic backgrounds, but they share more or less equitably not only in the spoils of government but also—not quite as equitably—in the opportunity to assert one or another ideological tendency or policy perspective. The gap between the living standards of the leaders and the masses is extremely wide, and it is in the leaders' common interest to

[9] The name of the ruling party itself illustrates the conflicting tendencies inherent within the very make-up of the Mexican state: the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party.

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avoid any conflict or social movement that would threaten the continued viability of the alliance that has served them so well. They therefore emphasize political control and prefer to limit behind-the-scenes decision making to as few participants as possible. Elite privilege also helps to explain the avoidance of public discussion of policy options (at times when this would unacceptably expand the arena of conflict) and the opposition to spontaneous mass movements. It also lies behind the leaders' ruthless intolerance of aspiring counterelites who refuse to be co-opted, and of members of the coalition who refuse to abide by the rules of the political game.

Hierarchy and elitism, however, are only half the story. *Because of the revolutionary origins of the political system, the constituencies, or bases of support, of the rulers are not exclusively elitist.* The original ruling alliance was superimposed upon a society that included mobilized peasants and urban workers. From the very beginning, therefore, at least some of the leaders had peasant or working-class constituencies or backgrounds. Herein lies the great paradox of the Mexican political system: it is *simultaneously* an elitist and a mass-based system. The constituencies of the rulers run the gamut from the richest to the poorest in society.

The political system established in the 1920s was essentially an alliance among elites for the distribution rather than the *re*distribution of wealth. It was a system concerned with ratifying existing political and economic relationships, not with changing them. In fact, as already noted, the rulers had a common interest in keeping the system as elitist as possible, which meant avoiding the formation of broad social movements aimed at changing the status quo. And although from the very beginning the system contained a populist element because of the links between various revolutionary leaders and their peasant and worker constituents, it was a unique kind of populism. Unlike the populism characteristic of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in recent years, Mexican populism has tended to mobilize functional and geographical *sections* of the population (encouraging, for example, the organization of tobacco growers in Nayarit but not those in Veracruz, or mobilizing factory workers in Monterrey but demobilizing electrical workers in Mexico City). Mexican populism has always been highly successful at activating particular categories of people in the name of specific bread-and-butter demands while dampening, through co-optation and repression, further demands as well as the rapid spread of these demands to other groups. Tiny segments of social classes are mobilized in the name of social justice, but class-based mobilization is firmly and successfully

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discouraged. In this sense, Mexican populism has had a disaggregated quality that elites in other Latin American countries might envy, but have difficulty duplicating.

The populism of the system, being channeled into a distributive and disaggregative mode, carries with it the possibility for a very gradual wider distribution of new resources. Because of the populist strain, it has always been legitimate in Mexico for aspiring members of the political elite to mobilize the have-nots—as long as the goal is the incorporation of the disadvantaged group into the *existing* distributive framework rather than the destruction of the system. The rules of the game also require, however, that once an aspiring leader has become a member of the elite alliance and his followers have been rewarded, the leader is amenable to keeping his newfound constituents' demands under control.

The continuous expansion of the political elite as a result of this process also implies the expansion of the number of people who receive economic payoffs and thereby improve their standard of living. Whether or not such improvement is at the expense of those who already receive economic benefits depends on the rate at which the economy is able to grow. If the economy can keep pace with the new demands being placed on it, the newly incorporated groups will be given *new* resources, and conflict will be kept to a minimum. If the economy cannot grow fast enough, the new groups will be paid off with a portion of *existing* resources, and such a redistribution will put a noticeable strain on the distributive system. The latter situation obtained during the administration of Luis Echeverría, while the former characterized the halcyon days of *desarrollo estabilizador* under several of his predecessors.

Although reliable data are lacking, it is our strong impression that Mexico's distributive populism is producing an expanded middle class. The groups that manage to gain entry to the distributive network are never the poorest, since the latter are not organized. Recent assertions to the effect that the gap between the richest and the poorest people in Mexico is increasing are probably accurate. But the new groups that *are* improving their economic situation—whether as a result of higher prices for their products (as is the case of the tobacco workers) or of access to subsidized basic foodstuffs through the expansion of CONASUPO outlets[10]—are moving toward middle-class living standards. Income

[10] CONASUPO (*Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares*) is a decentralized government agency that buys agricultural commodities at fixed prices and sells basic foodstuffs in lower-class urban areas at reduced prices.

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distribution statistics conceal this progress because they do not take account of the numerous non-wage economic benefits that are distributed in Mexico. Studies are needed to verify this hypothesis.

Despite the obviously inequitable distribution of resources in Mexico, the conclusion that the economically disadvantaged groups in society lack political leverage is not inevitable. Mexican political leaders are often severely limited in terms of what they can or cannot do to or with their lower-class constituents. For instance, although the *ejido* system (collective agricultural holdings) is often viewed as unproductive from the perspective of the national capitalist economy, the government is unable to abolish it. Nor can it cease channeling funds into the *ejidos*. It cannot even make credit contingent on productivity or invoke sanctions on peasants for failure to repay loans. As one informant explained, "I don't think the government wants to create any new Zapatas."[11] In Brazil, when urban or rural land invasions occur, the hapless invaders are summarily removed.[12] In Mexico, the government's solution to peasant invasions is to allow the peasants to remain on the land, and sometimes even to give them tools and money with which to work it—*as well as* to compensate the landowners for their loss. The same pattern is followed in urban areas. An attempt to use force against invaders in Mexico City resulted in the political fall of Ernesto Uruchurtu, the powerful regent of the Federal District, who had been invulnerable until then.

The situation is similar with organized labor. Although most analyses correctly stress the control of organized labor and the way in which its corrupt leaders enrich themselves at the expense of their rank and file and in return for keeping labor's gains low, the full picture is somewhat more complicated. Employers complain that they cannot fire union members; small businessmen in particular find their profits continually squeezed by obligatory contributions for social security, profit sharing, workers' housing, and the like. There is now a system of annual negotiations over minimum wages: according to participants, the bargaining is real and rough. One student of the labor movement went so far as to state that "the government controls labor basically by giving it what it wants." This overstatement calls attention to the distinction, and the trade-off, between the government's political and economic control of organized labor.

[11] Interview, Mexico City, 1976. This and all other quotations attributed to informants are from interviews carried out by the authors in Mexico City between September 1975 and October 1976. All translations are by the authors.

[12] Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1976).

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The above phenomena do not occur because there is elite consensus concerning the way in which certain demands by the lower classes should be treated. Rather, some members of the heterogeneous ruling coalition depend for their positions upon their willingness and ability to respond to relatively intense demands from lower-class constituents; at a particular political juncture, their strategic position within the coalition makes it possible for them to assert themselves.

Not all members of the ruling coalition in Mexico, of course, have lower-class bases of support. Nor are all constituencies exclusively extragovernmental. For various reasons—including the fact that Mexico is a late-industrializing country with a long tradition of state involvement in its capitalist economy—the governmental bureaucracy is extremely large. There are many members of the political elite whose constituencies lie within state enterprises and decentralized agencies such as PEMEX (*Petroleos Mexicanos*, the nationalized oil industry), government ministries, or the like. These political elites use the resources of the public sector of the economy as a power base in a way somewhat similar to that in which business elites use the resources of the private sector. Still other leaders base their power on groups both within and outside the government. Finally, there are members of the ruling coalition—mainly highly trained economists and technicians—who have no visible constituency to support them, but who rise to positions of great power simply because they can provide their expertise to a president at a particular time, to help solve a particular set of problems.

Because the bases of power of the members of the ruling coalition are so different, each member can confront the others with a different kind of "punishment" in case of direct conflict. The technical elites can, if thwarted, cause serious breakdowns in policy implementation for key programs. Most serious, however, are the threats of economic breakdown accompanied by capital flight that may be engineered by the private sector and its government allies, and of the specter of mass politicization that can be raised by elites with a mass constituency. The implementation of these threats is probably prevented by the recognition by all members of the ruling coalition that each is very real and represents a kind of "doomsday" mechanism that could destroy the state, with unknown consequences for all.[13]

[13] This is the praetorian problem pointed out by Huntington. Each social force uses its particular strong suit to confront its competitors directly. This usually results in clubs becoming trumps (Huntington [fn. 3]). See also Douglas Chalmers's description of the politicized state in his "The Politicized State in Latin America," in James M.

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At a more specific level, it is the "institutionalized" modes of political action, and the political group configurations that they produce, which hold each member in check. They maintain equilibrium in two directions: by regulating conflict among competing elites, and by balancing the activation and deactivation of ideological and organizational linkages between elites and potential followers.

## Principles and Modes of Political Action

The preceding overview has emphasized the importance both of the vertical linkages between elites and their constituencies, and of the horizontal intra-elite connections. It is now relevant to ask what the mechanisms are that make these connections work. We have suggested that the answer could lie in two general principles of political action: political discipline and political negotiation. The former is more easily observable because it constitutes the outward display of the overall institutional structure.

Virtually all recent analyses of Mexican politics refer to Mexico as an authoritarian system. The concept of authoritarianism has been discussed extensively elsewhere.[14] To state it briefly, an authoritarian system emphasizes the centralization of power, the flow of decisions from the top down rather than of demands from the bottom up, deference to authority, limited pluralism, and the use of violent repression when other methods of co-optation and control fail.

Many observers have noted the use of repression in Mexican politics; what has been less thoroughly explored is the importance of self-discipline by competing elites. One element of the political bargain in Mexico is that it rests less on a traditional authoritarian structure than on a system of rational calculation and realistic expectations (for elites). The structure of authority at the political decision-making level in Mexico is overwhelmingly utilitarian even for political actors at very low levels. Political culture and traditional authority patterns obviously play a part in understanding the system, but it is striking how much of Mexican politics can be comprehended by a model of the rational politi-

Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1977), 23-45.

[14] On the concept of political authoritarianism in general, see Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society 1964), 291-341. For an adaptation of Linz's framework to Mexico, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study," *World Politics*, XXVI (October 1973), 28-54. See also the works cited in fn. 1.

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cal actor. Traditional political authority patterns appear to be incorporated and made to serve the ends of a finely tuned pattern of political discipline, based on rational calculation of strategy, by political actors with clear perceptions of the limits and opportunities inherent in their environment.

The emphasis on political discipline is clear in most public manifestations of Mexican politics. The state's principal spokesman, the Mexican President, is never publicly criticized. In fact, his words echo throughout the system so that all politicians appear to be speaking with one voice. The President sets the tone for the nation during his term of office, and all below him follow his lead. When the tone is radical and conflictual, as it was during Echeverría's *sexenio* (six-year presidential term), the country teems with social revolutionaries. When the tone is more conservative and conciliatory, as it turned when José López Portillo became President in 1976, the same politicians "demagogically denounce demagoguery," and extoll the virtues of increased efficiency and productivity.

Perhaps this sense of political discipline and control is projected most clearly in the process of presidential selection. The competition for the top office is intense, and all aspiring members of the political elite give the campaign their best. But once the official candidate is announced, political differences are buried, and the race to jump on the political bandwagon of the victorious candidate (*irse a la cargada*), begins. Nowhere in Latin America is the closing of ranks behind the winner so impressive; the visibly hurt losers publicly declare that "the best man won," and governors and other high-ranking politicians announce in the newspapers how they had always supported the winning candidate. The same closing of ranks characterizes the political decision-making process. All groups involved—despite their original stand on the issue—greet the result with joyous announcements of unanimous support for the outcome.

Self-discipline, of course, rests to some extent on the threat of imposed discipline. The image of the strong state is reinforced by the way in which it deals with dissent. Even members of the ruling coalition who exceed the narrow limits of allowable opposition are harshly dealt with. When the outspoken editor of *Excelsior* took President Echeverría's "democratic opening" too seriously and persisted in criticizing high-ranking government officials, the government organized a peasant invasion of the lands owned by the *Excelsior* cooperative, a maneuver that "encouraged" the shareholders to vote *Excelsior's* editor out

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of office. For less well-placed dissenters, the cost of dissent may be even higher. When Rubén Jaramillo, a popular peasant leader, could not be dissuaded from continuing his efforts to organize dissatisfied peasants, his body, together with those of his family, was found riddled with army bullets at the side of a country road. The brutal repression of student demonstrations (resulting in several hundred dead in 1968 and 1971), has been repeated on a smaller scale at frequent intervals.

Members of the private sector are not exempt from political discipline. Most members of the private sector whom we interviewed expressed the understanding that they would be severely punished for major political sins such as publicly insulting the President, or too obviously thwarting the goals of powerful political figures. Indeed, there is evidence that over the last decade or so, two or three major economic empires have fallen at least partly because of bad political relationships between their leaders and powerful politicians or bureaucrats.[15]

Since the maintenance of self-discipline and the acceptance of discipline when it is imposed do not rest entirely upon the threat of punishment, rational calculation of individual or group interest is important. Such calculation must be based on an understanding of the ways in which personal and ideological goals may be realized within the context of political discipline. Thus, the principle of negotiation legitimizes the principle of political discipline, but at the same time modifies it. It is the interplay between these two principles that helps us to comprehend the extraordinary stability of elite interaction in Mexico in recent decades. We stress the principle of negotiation not because it is more important than that of discipline, but because it has received less attention in the context of the analysis of the authoritarian state.[16] However, the principle of discipline creates much of the environment within which the modes of political action operate. In some cases, discipline forms an important "other face" to the principle of negotiation.

The following discussion focuses upon three interrelated modes of

[15] Examples of powerful families that are said by some observers to owe their fall at least partially to the hostility of the President or other powerful political figures include García Mora, Longorria, and Sacristán.

[16] Among those who *have* focused on the theme of political negotiation are Roger Hansen (fn. 1), in certain aspects of that work; Merilee S. Grindle, *Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Peasants in Mexico: A Case Study of Public Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977); William P. Glade, "Entrepreneurship in the State Sector: CONASUPO of Mexico," revised version of paper prepared for seminar on "The Economic Anthropology of Investment Behavior in Latin America" (School of American Research, Santa Fe, N.M., August 1975); Vernon (fn. 2); Wayne A. Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1975); L. Vincent Padgett, *The Mexican Political System* (1st ed.; Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1966); Scott (fn. 7); Needler (fn. 7).

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political action: the organizational mode, characterized by fluid clientelism; the operational mode, characterized by political entrepreneurism; and the ideological mode, characterized by free-floating resources.

1. *The organizational mode.* The term "organizational mode" refers to the complex of patterns of political action that help define the relationship of political elites to one another. In Mexico, the organizational mode may be described as one of fluid clientelism. Since the present Mexican political system evolved from an alliance among elites, each with their specific followings, the patron-client relationship has been an essential aspect of Mexican politics from the beginning.[17]

The grouping together of several levels of patron-client relations is called a *camarilla.* In a political system where there is little change at the top, there is a tendency for patron-client networks and *camarillas* to crystallize, and perhaps for polarization to set in among them. In countries where there is little movement at the top of an authoritarian system, it becomes fairly easy to identify who is in and who is out of power, as well as which patrons go with which clients. That is not the case in Mexico.

Since the murder of Obregón in 1928, no Mexican President has served more than a single term in office, and since the presidency of Cárdenas (1934–1940), the presidential term has been fixed at six years. Consequently, the supreme patron is replaced every six years. The new patron has different loyal followers who in turn have different followers of their own, and so on down the system. The fact that there is a high degree of turnover of positions with the advent of a new president has never been disputed. Brandenburg, for example, estimated over a decade ago that approximately 18,000 elective offices and 25,000 appointed posts change hands each *sexenio.*[18] What has been disputed, however, is whether what was occurring was a game of musical chairs, or whether a substantial proportion of the dispossessed jobholders actually left politics to pursue their private interests. Recent research by Peter H. Smith has confirmed that the latter is the case.[19] According to his data, approximately one-third of the former officeholders leave the government at the end of a presidential *sexenio.* Every three *sexenios,* or eighteen years, there is a complete turnover of personnel.

[17] For a more detailed discussion of clientelism in Mexico, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Clientelism and Development in Mexico," paper presented at a conference on "Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development," Bellagio, August 1978.

[18] Brandenburg (fn. 1), 157.

[19] Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1979).

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The high degree of turnover is combined in Mexico with a presidential selection process that remains a mystery to this day. At one point, a pattern seemed to emerge: several presidents succeeded to the office from their position as Minister of the Interior. This supposed pattern was broken in 1958 with the selection of the Minister of Labor as the presidential candidate, and again in 1976 with the nomination of Treasury Minister José López Portillo. And by naming as Minister of the Interior a man who, according to the Constitution, cannot assume the presidency because his parents are not Mexican citizens, President López Portillo has eliminated any semblance of a patterned ascent route.

The high turnover and unpatterned process of presidential succession give vertical linkages in Mexico a unique character. Patron-client links must be fluid and flexible, since today's high-powered patron may be tomorrow's loser. As one informant expressed it, "You have to play by the rules and this essentially means showing loyalty but not too much. You get burned if you're too close to somebody who is very high up."

Contacts must be as broad as possible, so that the chance of picking a winner is increased. Aspiring politicians therefore tend to play down ideological differences and to seek patrons throughout the ideological spectrum—particularly since the presidency appears to alternate between men who are flamboyantly reform-oriented and those who are consolidators of the status quo. Care must also be taken never to write anyone off in the political game prematurely. As one businessman told us, "Mexican politicians are like the phoenix. They are capable of rising from the ashes."

The extreme pragmatism and flexibility that characterizes personal relationships in Mexico is highlighted by this anecdote:

> While Mr. X was Director of Credit, he played squash every week with Mr. Y. After he had left his post as Director of Credit, the squash game ceased. Then one day the ex-Director of Credit ran into his former squash partner and asked what had happened to their squash game. The man replied, "Oh, I still play golf every week with the Director of Credit."

The fact that the basic interpersonal links of the system are always in flux makes it difficult to identify the structure of the *camarillas*, since that too is always changing. To a certain extent, it is in the interest of all to keep their alliances from becoming public knowledge, since disclosure decreases flexibility and maneuverability. Nevertheless, the identities of some of the higher-ranking members often become public

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knowledge as a result of the inability to contain inter-*camarilla* competition at the ministerial level. For example, during 1976 the political column of the newspaper *El Universal* frequently provided blow-by-blow descriptions of the political battles waged within the Agrarian Reform Secretariat during 1976:

> The fight in the S.R.A. is said to be between Augusto Gómez Villanueva and Hugo Cervantes del Río. The circumstantial evidence offered in support is that the *Oficial Mayor*, Guillermo Romero Martínez, supposedly directed by Augusto, attacked Sergio Reyes Osorio, whom Gómez Villanueva wants to eliminate from the S.R.A. before the next *sexenio* begins, because he has shown ideological flexibility and has taken refuge near the ex-secretary of the presidency [Cervantes del Río]. This is why Hugo tried the almost impossible task of putting in as Sub-secretary of New Population Centers, a position that has just been vacated, Pedro Vázquez Colmenares, who has always been loyal to him.[20]

This kind of infighting goes on constantly and at all levels of the political system.

Since the alliance system is fluid, and people are always looking for useful contacts or for ways of broadening their bases of support, it is also never too late for outsiders to be brought into the personalistic networks, provided they agree to abide by the rules of the game. Thus, former leaders of the 1968 student movement were able, within a short time, to become high-ranking political officials during the Echeverría administration.

The fluidity and flexibility also shed some light on the phenomenon of the omnipresent middleman in Mexican politics. The middleman is a person who has cultivated an exceptionally broad range of contacts. He spends his time bringing together people whose paths would otherwise never cross. This facilitates the integration of very different kinds of people and interests into the political system, and enables high-ranking members of the political elite to broaden their bases of support considerably when they deem it expedient to do so. Middlemen are used to touch base with the alienated left as well as with the alienated right. During the Echeverría administration, they helped to establish contact with the guerrillas in Guerrero state as well as with the angry businessmen of Monterrey.

2. *The operational mode.* The term "operational mode" refers to the operating principles for individuals within the system, as defined by the patterns of rewards and punishments for certain kinds of behavior. We

[20] *El Universal*, April 9, 1976, p. 1.

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may call these patterns the opportunity structure. The operational mode in Mexico may be characterized as political entrepreneurism.

Political entrepreneurism is a set of operating principles distinguished by instrumentalism and rapid mobility, both horizontal and vertical, through the party and bureaucracy. It emphasizes skills in converting economic resources into political resources and vice versa, and assumes the existence of strict time limits for achieving one's political and personal goals.[21]

The close link between political entrepreneurism and fluid clientelism is demonstrated when we ask ourselves how the intricate system of fluid personalistic alliances is held together. The answer leads us to a discussion of the rewards offered to the political entrepreneur, and what he must do to win them. In the first place, the continuous turnover of political positions helps keep alliances together: there is always the promise, and often the reality, of a political appointment—if not this year, then the next; if not this *sexenio*, then the next *sexenio*. If there is not enough patronage available, new jobs can be created. The Mexican bureaucracy expands at an amazing rate, providing the opportunity to reward loyal supporters and attract new ones. One study found a 144 percent increase in the number of department heads between 1956 and 1972.[22] Measured in monetary terms, the increases are even more impressive. In 1970, for example, the old Department of Agrarian Affairs and Colonization had a budget of 125,000,000 pesos; in 1976, after it had been transformed into the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, its budget totaled 1,164,000,000 pesos.[23]

The additional people who are hired in the process of bureaucratic expansion may actually have little work to do. Frequently, however, the new positions represent new functions or duties of the bureaucratic agency. As one informant illustrated,

> The Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources, for example, is supposed to build irrigation works. It should do this exclusively. But one of the strategies of the bureaucracy in Mexico is to broaden its own function so that it expands, and the S.R.H. is doing many things that are really within the

[21] Political entrepreneurism is used here in a sense quite similar to, although broader than, Glade's concept of bureaucratic entrepreneurism. Glade (fn. 16, p. 31), argues that bureaucratic entrepreneurs in the parastatal sector in Mexico are nourished by the fact that "just as the pecuniary sale of 'economic' outputs provides the public or parastatal enterprise with financial resources, the non-pecuniary 'sale' of political benefits yields a return in constituency-building, power and influence. The two 'currencies' enjoy at least limited or partial convertability. . . ."

[22] Rainer Horst Godau, "Mexico: A Bureaucratic Polity," M.A. thesis (Austin: University of Texas, October 1975), 137.

[23] *El Universal*, August 3, 1976, p. 7.

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jurisdiction of the Secretariat of Agriculture, like setting up demonstration farms.

Bureaucratic expansion, however, no matter how dramatic, cannot provide the number of rewards necessary, and so it is supplemented by corruption. Political corruption in Mexico permeates all levels of the hierarchy. The local *comisariado ejidal* (the person in charge of supervising the *ejido*) can supplement his salary by illegally renting *ejido* lands to private farmers, or by organizing "his" peasants to invade private landholdings and subsequently negotiating their removal in return for a payoff from the landowner. Union leaders also do not lack means for supplementing their earnings. During 1976, for example, one union leader was accused of selling 308 union positions to temporary workers at the cost of 50,000 to 60,000 pesos (US $4,000-4,800) each.[24] At a somewhat higher level, a top official bought a building for a new program housed in his ministry, and earned a million pesos on the deal. And finally, there are the rumors—impossible to prove but widely believed—regarding the astronomical fortunes made by former presidents.

Not only is corruption found at all levels, it is also highly institutionalized. There are apparently unwritten rules regarding what is considered to be a reasonable amount to skim off. As one official explained, "when bribing on import permits, the rule of thumb is 7 percent of the value of the product." Another informant, a Mexican businessman, more or less confirmed this estimate: "*Mordidas* (bribes) have increased tremendously in recent years. They used to be about 5 percent. Now this is not considered enough." Still another government official summed it up by saying, "As you go up in the political hierarchy, augment the quantity (of corruption) by zeros."

Perhaps the ultimate in institutionalization of corruption is the *año de Hidalgo*, which derives its name from a poem that goes: "*Este es el año de Hidalgo: Buey el que no roba algo.*" (This is the year of Hidalgo; he is a fool who doesn't steal something.) The Year of Hidalgo is the final year of the six-year presidential term; the name Hidalgo no doubt refers to the picture of Miguel Hidalgo that appears on Mexican currency. The year of Hidalgo is notorious for wholesale private appropriation of public monies. In a political system where there is such a large turnover of political elites, something must be done to compensate those who are about to be retired from public office. The Year of Hidalgo is the Mexican solution to the problem of how to retire politicians

[24] *Excelsior*, September 4, 1976, p. 28.

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without provoking intra-elite conflict. Thus, as each presidential administration draws to a close, important politicians are named to positions where the opportunities for personal enrichment are seemingly limitless.

Also related to the fact that a portion of the political elite is retired every six years is the existence of a category of people whom we have tentatively labeled "political entrepreneurs." Such individuals are usually important former politicians (although the category sometimes includes political incumbents), who have availed themselves of the privileges, contacts, and often extremely high salaries of office in order to acquire substantial economic interests. These people are not universally corrupt, though many are. The businesses they choose to enter are usually those that depend for their existence on concessions from, or a special relationship with, a government ministry, state enterprise, or decentralized agency. It is thus a case of the political elites "looking out for one of their own."[25]

3. *The ideological mode.* The term "ideological mode" refers to the ideological and policy content of politics, and serves as a qualifier for the operational mode.[26] In Mexico, the ideological mode may be described as free-floating resource utilization. Our discussion of the organizational and operational modes might lead one to conclude that politics in Mexico is without moral, ideological, or policy content. That is not our position—although one sometimes hears both Mexicans and foreigners in their more cynical moments express that view. It should be apparent, however, from our earlier discussion of the revolutionary ideology that, although there is an eclectic element to the ideology, it is nevertheless important in the political scheme of things. There is a certain incoherence at the policy-making level, but this does not indicate an absence of policy content.

At any given instant, different *camarillas*, or alliances of *camarillas*, are identified with a particular ideological and/or policy position. The short-term success of this policy position depends upon the success of the alliance that espouses it. Conversely, the political influence of the alliance and its leading figures depends somewhat upon the apparent

[25] For specific examples of this type of economic involvement on the part of politicians or former politicians, see *Excelsior*, November 9, 1974, p. 1, and March 19, 1976, p. 1; *El Universal*, February 26, 1976, pp. 1 and 13, and June 30, 1976, p. 1.

[26] While not suggesting that all policy output is explicitly derived from some ideological position, we are including in the ideological mode certain policy positions that are explicitly tied to ideology; see below, in our discussion of the development models known as "stabilizing" and "shared" development.

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success of "their" ideological tendency/policy position on a variety of political and economic criteria. During the Echeverría *sexenio*, for example, the policy positions of various competing alliances could be placed at various points between the alternative development models of *desarrollo estabilizador* and *desarrollo compartido*.

Two factors make political competition and policy making *appear* devoid of content at times. First, the very heterogeneity of the state and the wide range of ideological tendencies defy a single clear ideological characterization of the position of a particular administration. Second (less obvious but perhaps more important), the fluidity of the *camarillas* themselves, not to mention their patterns of shifting alliances, means that the relationship between a particular "group" and a particular ideological tendency/policy position is short-lived. A particular "group" does not remain identified as the proponent of a policy position because it soon has dissipated or rearranged itself; its "heirs," for strategic reasons, may be soft-pedaling the position they previously embraced. It may also happen that two competing "groups" with apparently similar ideological positions are engaged in a power struggle, and therefore attempt to seem more different in their policy positions than they really are.

The fluidity of political "groups" means that ideology and policy position become free-floating resources—to be embraced both for themselves and for strategic reasons, but never to be permanently appropriated. One result of this phenomenon is that the various groups in society that might be (or have been) mobilized by a particular ideological or policy approach may find themselves cast adrift as their political mentors make strategic withdrawals or are "burned" (*quemado*).[27]

Ideology and associated policy positions therefore are not only a mechanism for *linking* members of the state coalition to constituents in society. The interaction between ideology and political organization also provides an *unlinking* mechanism that serves to insulate elites from their social bases.

## Modes of Political Action and Policy Incoherence

The mechanisms that have evolved for maintaining the delicate balance among elites, and between elites and masses, have a highly fragmentizing impact upon the formation of public policy. It is true that at a

[27] To be "burned" (*quemado*) means that one's political fortunes have suddenly become bleak due to an error in judgment. Note the connection in imagery with the earlier quotation to the effect that "Mexican politicians are like the phoenix. They rise from the ashes." To be *quemado* is therefore not necessarily a permanent condition.

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certain level, political discipline extends to areas of economic and social policy. No matter whether a Mexican President goes down in history as a reformer or a supporter of the status quo, his announced priorities —parroted by all below him—are the same: the implementation of the goals of social justice proclaimed by the Mexican Revolution. All Mexican politicians are by definition "revolutionaries"; the improvement of the standard of living of the peasants and workers is their most highly publicized priority. When inequities continue to persist, the culprits are also always the same: *malos mexicanos* (bad Mexicans), usually members of the private sector, or *fuerzas oscuras* (sinister forces), generally foreign business and political opponents, are held responsible for the failure to achieve social justice. They are accused of being more interested in profits than in Mexico's progress, and viewed as antirevolutionary parasites who take from the state and give little in return.

When we turn our attention to the day-to-day decision-making process, a different impression emerges. Despite the one voice with which the Mexican government speaks officially, *dentro del gobierno hay muchas lenguajes* (within the government many languages are spoken). There is no firm agreement in Mexico on how to classify this variety of voices. One of our respondents divided the public sector into four main groupings, each of which includes more than one ministry, and none of which encompasses all the high-ranking members of each ministry:

> First there are *il vaticani* or the *curia*. This group includes prominent Treasury and Bank of Mexico people. Popes come and go but the *curia* remains. Then there are the *Corleones*, to use a more modern analogy. They are attached to the Interior and Justice Ministries and the PRI. Next come the *técnicos*. These are the engineers centered mainly in Ministries like Hydraulic Resources. Finally there are the *guerrillas*, the left-wing ideologues who, during the Echeverría administration, were concentrated in the National Patrimony Ministry.

An overlapping model of the Mexican state placed each ministry in a category by itself, along a basically left-right spectrum. A particular ministry's policy stance was attributed to the interests of its constituents:

> In Mexico, whatever balance of power there is exists within the executive branch. . . . Power groups work through the different ministers. All different political leanings from right to left are represented. The Treasury represents the banks' point of view, Industry and Commerce represent industry's point of view, Agriculture represents that of the small farmers, Agrarian Reform that of the *ejidatarios*, and National Patrimony represents the views of the state enterprises.

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Both classification schemes attribute specific, identifiable policy positions to particular ministries. In the course of our research, however, we found that some ministries exhibited greater consistency of policy than others. During the Echeverría administration, the two extremes were the Treasury and the Ministry of National Patrimony. The latter represented, to paraphrase a remark by former President López Mateos, the extreme left within the Constitution. They were the "guerrillas," the vocal nationalists who attacked the abuses of multinational corporations, criticized the pampered national businessmen, and favored the expansion of the state into the economy and the nationalization of important industries. The Treasury, in contrast, was the home of the *curia*. It advocated a balanced budget, low taxes on the private sector to encourage savings and investment, a controlled labor movement to keep wage demands down and wages low, and the creation of a good investment climate in order to attract foreign investment.

On the major policy issues we studied, the fiscal conservatism of the Treasury was always apparent. The Treasury did not favor the construction of the Las Truchas steel complex in Michoacán state because of the huge expense such an investment would entail.[28] It feared that the project would be inflationary and further unbalance Mexico's budget. During the intragovernmental bargaining over fiscal reform, major opposition to the elimination of bearer (anonymous) shares came from the Treasury and the Bank of Mexico. Their argument was that such a reform would damage Mexico's investment climate and would cause capital to flee abroad. Further, because of the Treasury's concern with overspending, *Nacional Financiera* (the government's development bank) had to scale down its plans for setting up industries to produce capital goods. And it was the Treasury Minister who in the 1960s favored increasing the domestic price of sugar in order to increase government revenues and avoid subsidizing the industry. When all else failed (as often happened), the Treasury and the Bank of Mexico used the threat of devaluation as a means to counteract President Echeverría's propensity to spend money.

The Ministry of National Patrimony, which regulates and controls the ever-growing number of state enterprises and decentralized industries, took a statist position on all issues. In contrast to the Treasury, it showed a very low sensitivity to the interests and concerns of the private sector. It advocated, for example, the state's increased involvement in

[28] This is a controversial point. At least one person who was a very high-level Treasury official at the time denies that the Treasury opposed the project.

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and control of the mining industry; the new mining law, which originated in National Patrimony, achieved just that. National Patrimony also strongly supported the building of Las Truchas, arguing that it would open a new growth pole within Mexico, and that increased steel production was necessary for the continued rapid industrialization of Mexico. Under the leadership of Horacio Flores de la Peña in particular, a longstanding practice of deficit-financing in public enterprises (thereby subsidizing the infrastructure costs of private industrialists) began to be reversed, and the state enterprises were encouraged to improve the efficiency of their operations. This state-oriented ministry also supported the inclusion of private agricultural banks under the new agrarian reform law, which increased governmental regulation of agricultural lending practices. Finally, when the tobacco industry became a focus of conflict, the Minister of National Patrimony reportedly offered the predominantly foreign tobacco companies a choice between "Chileanization or Mexicanization."[29] The latter was ultimately achieved; as one member of the private sector put it, "When the government offers you two soups and one is poison, the other seems delicious."

The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (SIC) during the Echeverría years had a less consistent—but nonetheless identifiable—position on policy issues. It combined moderate statism with a high sensitivity to the interests of foreign and domestic businesses, and supported the creation and implementation of laws to control foreign investment as well as the transfer of technology, patents, and trademarks. However, it fought hard against the more radical versions of such legislation emanating from CONACYT.[30] SIC favored Mexicanization in principle, but opposed it where Mexico stood to lose more than it gained by Mexicanization. It kept improving the enforcement capabilities of its Foreign Investment Commission while insisting on its need and right to allow exceptions to the foreign investment law when it was in Mexico's interest. And, although it supported industrial decentralization, it did not advocate a system of harsh penalties against industries, in order to ensure the success of such a program.

In contrast to the above ministries, there are some that seem to lack any ideological coherence. They are plagued by intraministerial conflict and highly visible corruption. Particularly noteworthy in this regard

[29] "Chileanization" implied nationalization; "Mexicanization" merely implied majority ownership by Mexicans, with continued foreign private ownership in a minority position.

[30] CONACYT (*Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología*) is the National Council of Science and Technology.

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during the early to mid-1970s was the cabinet-status Department of the Federal District (DDF), which has responsibility for Mexico City and its surrounding area. The DDF seemed to spend a great deal of its time drawing up plans for the development of Mexico City's metropolitan area. Despite the existence of these plans, it was difficult to ascertain what its position was on such basic issues as the desirability of the continued growth of the capital. During the administration of Díaz Ordaz, the Department was highly praised for supporting and constructing the *Metro*. Under the succeeding administration of Luis Echeverría, however, it resisted various efforts to extend the *Metro*, despite the city's obvious need for a more extensive subway system. Instead, it approved construction of the infamous *Circuito Interior*, a circular freeway within the city, to facilitate travel in automobiles—despite the fact that traffic can move only at the average rate of three miles per hour; moreover, the overwhelming number of inhabitants are too poor to own a car.

The Secretariat of Agrarian Reform also lacked a clear policy orientation. Some functionaries favored collectivization of the *ejido*, while others wanted the *ejidos* to continue being farmed as discrete units; some favored the expropriation of private agricultural holdings and their redistribution among the peasants, while others argued that land redistribution was not the answer to Mexico's rural problems, and advocated programs encouraging rural industries; some supported the devolution of significant decision-making power to the peasants, while others believed that Mexico's political stability and economic growth would thereby be threatened.[31]

One explanation for the variations in the policy coherence of the various ministries has to do with patterns of recruitment. Some ministries draw people from many sources, others from only one or two with well-defined policy perspectives. An example of the latter is the Treasury, which hires most of its top officials from the Bank of Mexico:

> The Bank of Mexico has been a central institution for the recruitment and socialization of leaders in the economic sphere. It was the first important domestic institution to create a civil service with security of tenure and a certain independence from the executive. . . . The Bank has produced more trained people than it could assimilate. The biggest demand outside the Bank was from the Treasury, and it is almost entirely made up of people from the Bank.

[31] A good recent description of these conflicting points of view is to be found in Dana Markiewicz, "*Ejido* Organization in Mexico, 1934–1976," Interdisciplinary paper submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the M.A. degree in Latin American Studies (University of California, Los Angeles 1978).

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Many Bank "alumni" work in the Treasury while on leave from the Bank. They continue to receive the benefits associated with Bank affiliation—generous financing for houses and cars, inexpensive insurance, medical services, and substantial discounts on food and household items. There is a sense of belonging to an exclusive club among Bank people. Emphasizing the impact of the Bank's socialization process, one "member" stated, "You can even tell which people are from the Bank by the way they draw up statistical tables." Bank alumni are also known for their fiscal conservatism. Central banks the world over support noninflationary economic policies and living within one's means. The Bank of Mexico is no exception.

The need to defend bureaucratic self-interest also produces a well-defined policy stance. In Mexico's mixed economy, both the state and the private sector are important economic actors. A ministry such as National Patrimony, which regulates industries in the public sector, reinforces its constituency as the state's involvement in the economy increases. The Secretariat of Industry and Commerce, on the other hand, which deals mainly with private industrial and commercial interests, has a large stake in the continued existence and expansion of the private sector of the economy. A dynamic tension is thus built into the Mexican economy, and is reflected in the competing policy stances of the respective government institutions.

The most significant element to an observer of political decision making, however, is not that so many ministries have consistent policy positions, but rather that so few do. Polarization over policy issues is not the exception but the norm. The ministries that are able to sustain a particular policy orientation can do so because they have constituencies whose interests are clearly affected by what type of economic growth policy is pursued.

Most ministries or agencies, however, have constituencies whose growth and expansion are not necessarily dependent upon one or another kind of policy for economic growth; they are less motivated to pursue a particular line. The absence of the structural necessity for a policy orientation enables them to pursue whatever activities happen to reinforce their own competitive position. The result is vicious bureaucratic infighting that leads to time-consuming and wasteful duplication of efforts in some areas, and to a total lack of needed attention in others. We found a prime example in the area of agricultural credit, where the government's three agricultural banks competed among themselves to attract the same groups of *ejidatarios*. At the same time, more than 50 percent of Mexico's peasants lacked access to any institutional credit,

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either public or private. In the housing field, there are numerous agencies such as INDECO, INFONAVIT, and FIDEURBE, all of which enable essentially the same workers (those who earn at least the minimum wage) to get access to low-cost housing.

Each ministry or agency also refuses to give up any functions for the sake of a greater rationalization of governmental decision making. As one government technocrat complained:

> There's no real coordination of effort in agriculture. There's a dilution of responsibility. The Secretariat of Agriculture operates in the rainfall areas, the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources operates in the irrigation districts, the official bank gives credit, CONASUPO buys crops, the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform takes land, and *Guanos y Fertilizantes* (the government fertilizer company) makes fertilizer. No one wants to give up his slice of the pie.

In the area of import control, a similar situation exists. Tariffs are handled by the Ministry of Finance, and import permits by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Neither ministry wants to relinquish its power; the result often is an uncoordinated import policy.[32]

Efforts to establish some kind of coordination have not been successful. The coordinating agencies that are set up are no match for the politically powerful heads of government ministries, state agencies, and the like. One veteran of such a coordinating committee summed up the essence of the problem: "It's very difficult for one rat to coordinate ten elephants." Another individual who refused a position to head a committee to coordinate a largely government-owned basic industry said, jokingly, "I should have taken the job. It would have been easy since I would supposedly have been coordinating three or four of the most powerful men in the country. No one would have listened to me and I could have just sat in my office and collected my salary."

Planning has fared even worse than coordination. One informant explained the problem as follows:

> Formal planning began in 1954 with the Committee on Investments. It reported directly to President López Mateos. There was no intervening agency between the President and the commission. The commission then was transformed into the Secretariat of the Presidency. This means that there is now an intervening variable since the Secretary of the Presidency is automatically a candidate for the Presidency of the country. The Secretary thus wants to protect his candidacy and will not take personal risks for the general good. The result is that the Secretary

[32] Gerardo Bueno, "The Structure of Protection in Mexico," in Bela Belasa, *The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1971), 181.

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prefers to do nothing in the way of planning. He doesn't want to put forward anything that will compromise him.

On a more general level, the basic trouble is that the entire *camarilla* system discourages officials from treating problems in terms of policy. They prefer not to define the issues too clearly, lest they be identified with the wrong side: it is better not to group issues together into plans, since that would create larger blocs of opponents. Planning produces big winners and big losers, and what Mexican political elites require for the continued existence of their elite alliances is a system enabling everyone to win as much as possible and to lose as little as possible.

In normal times, the system thus produces a continuous stream of public decisions benefiting first one group of elites and their constituencies, then another: *ejidatarios* and private landholders, workers and businessmen, state-sector firms and private-sector firms. The result is usually a decision-making process and style that favors the status quo. All the political elites live well, but the situation of their constituents varies. Those groups in society that are the most politicized and most privileged exact more from their leaders than those that are less highly politicized and poorer.

The existence of policy incoherence does not mean that there are never any changes in public policy. The preceding description portrayed the decision-making system in normal times, or politics-as-usual. There are times, however, when the Mexican political system enters periods of severe crisis. The causes are varied. During the initial years of the Echeverría administration, for example, international factors—such as the world food shortage, the depression in world trade, increases in the price of petroleum, and the devaluation of the dollar—combined with internal factors—such as an annual rate of population growth of 3.5 percent, declining productivity of the agricultural sector, a spiraling foreign debt, growing unemployment, and decreasing industrial productivity—to produce a sudden and drastic decline in the economic growth rate and an escalation of political demands. The political elites, recognizing that continuous economic growth is required for the continued viability of their distributive alliance, start their search for solutions to the problem of the stagnating economy immediately.

It is this search for a solution that helps to produce the atmosphere of political crisis that occasionally pervades Mexico. A sluggishly performing economy, and attempts to remedy it, provide the more reform-oriented elites with a justification for reorienting the system's goals. As long as the mixed economy "works," criticism is muffled. Once its

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performance begins to falter, it becomes legitimate to criticize the old "model" and to suggest innovative policy alternatives.

Because of the ideological legacy of the Mexican Revolution and the obviously privileged status of private economic interests, the reform-oriented elites almost always blame the economic slowdown on the behavior of the private sector, both domestic and foreign. The solutions they propose usually involve a reduction in the privileges and an increase in government regulation of the private sector, as well as an expansion of the state into new areas of the economy.

The administration of President Echeverría was thus a period of transition. The slowdown of the economy resulted in wholesale criticism of the model of "stabilizing development" and its emphasis on high profits and low taxes for businessmen (supposedly to encourage private capital accumulation and investment), low wages for labor (to discourage inflation), and unrestricted government borrowing abroad to make up for the small amount of income the government received from taxes.

Taking advantage of the unique opportunity confronting them, groups of young, reform-oriented *técnicos* who had been brought into the government by Echeverría, in alliance with reformists already in government, quickly attempted to convert their ideas into legislation and programs. Their efforts gave the Mexican political system one of its rare moments of a certain policy coherence. The reformers were only partially successful, however: too many elites have their constituencies in the private sector, too many *camarillas* include members of the private sector, and too many former politicians have private economic interests, to allow easy passage to any major reform program. The result was a kind of compromise. The most radical reforms failed. On the other hand, some incremental reforms that focused on a reorientation of the relationship between the state and the private sector were implemented. Numerous reforms, such as the celebrated atttempt to abolish bearer shares and to institute a patrimony tax, never got as far as the legislature, but many others were at least initiated. These included new laws to regulate foreign investment, the transfer of technology and patents and trademarks, programs to collectivize the *ejido*, higher taxes for the upper and middle classes, annual revision of minimum-wage legislation, a housing program for workers which was to be financed by employers, and the elimination of many protective tariffs.

The private sector did not accept its partial loss of privileges gracefully. Businessmen and business groups publicly attacked the govern-

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ment; private investment declined; and large amounts of money were withdrawn from the country on the basis that the government no longer merited the confidence of the private sector. As in other, similar episodes of Mexican history, the next President immediately moved to smooth ruffled feathers and to assure those elites whose interests had been affected that the situation had returned to normal and that all could profit from the new equilibrium.

Although the crisis atmosphere has ended and the rhetoric of the new regime is placatory toward the private sector, the system has not moved back to the old equilibrium of the Díaz Ordaz period. President López Portillo has committed himself to the enforcement and implementation of the reforms instituted under Echeverría. What we observe is a *new* equilibrium, a period of adjustment to new rules and relationships.

According to the so-called "pendulum theory," a radical administration is followed by a conservative one, and so forth. Although the pendulum theory may be overstated, particularly with regard to "radical" and "conservative" administrations, alternation between "activist" and "consolidating" presidents can be observed. For example, activist presidents such as Lázaro Cárdenas, Miguel Alemán, Adolfo López Mateos, and Luis Echeverría have been followed by consolidating presidents like Manuel Avila Camacho, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, and José López Portillo.

The swings of the pendulum are not between two fixed ideological positions. Changes in institutions and in the relationship between public and private sectors tend to be cumulative. The new strata of institutions and relationships laid down by one president form the basic materials with which his successor must work, even if his style of doing so is different.

The differences between succeeding *sexenios* may be viewed, therefore, as attempts to deal with the tensions generated by six years of *any* particular policy line and presidential style. No matter what posture an administration adopts, the heterogeneity of the ruling association guarantees that some important groups will feel that their interests are being disregarded. As a result, the danger of political instability always exists. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the most clearly perceived danger was from the left: students, workers, and some *campesino* groups as well as a growing urban and rural guerrilla movement. By the mid-1970s, there was concern about the disaffection of the right: the private sector, large portions of the middle class, and even the possibility of direct action by the military.

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Our earlier discussion of free-floating ideology is also relevant to the status-quo orientation of the decision-making process and style. A relatively open politics, in the sense that various groups are constantly being mobilized and making demands, nevertheless results in a relatively closed and narrow pattern of distribution. Because the elite groups that carry the ideological banners are only temporarily wedded to their standards, their followers (those who would press their demands for a greater share of benefits) can never create a solid link to their mentors: the latter may suddenly vanish (politically) without a trace.[33]

## Conclusion

We have seen that the Mexican state, unlike most stable and mature modern states, is a constantly renewed political bargain among ruling groups with different political interests. A partial analogy illustrating the fineness of the political balance can be made with the multi-ethnic state in which a *modus vivendi* among competing ethnic groups has been achieved. We do not wish to conjure up images of "consociational democracy"[34] by suggesting this analogy, and we readily accept that the balancing of ethnic or other corporate groups is very different from the balancing of ideological tendencies in Mexico. The analogy rests in the idea that—in contrast to more homogeneous systems such as the United States, or heterogeneous systems where one ruling group has temporarily eliminated others from the governing coalition (as in much of Latin America)—the balancing act itself is always at the forefront among political priorities. It is not simply a matter of logrolling and pork-barreling, but of combining these modes of negotiation with just the "right" mix of discipline and repression. Viewed from the other perspective, it is not just a matter of maintaining authoritarian control through a mixture of repression and co-optation, but of combining this mode with just the "right" mix of responsiveness and compromise.

Approached in this way, Mexico is less institutionalized than it might seem, given its history of stable government. In times of crisis—for instance, during Echeverría's *sexenio*—uncontrolled conflict and political breakdown are possibilities that are taken very seriously by political leaders. At such times, the fragility of the "revolutionary bargain" and

[33] For a compelling description of this frustrating process of constantly having to search for new "leaders" as old ones disappear, as it affected the *ejidatarios* of Atencingo, see Ronfeldt (fn. 1).

[34] Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, XXI (January 1968), 207-25.

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the possible limits of the modes of political action come to the fore. The authoritarian nature of Mexico's political institutions places a major burden on the personal political skills and judgment of the president and a few other powerful leaders who must arrest the ever-present tendencies toward irreconcilable conflict within the governing coalition and within the society as a whole. The authoritarian institutions themselves—because they are largely oriented toward control—cannot play the bargaining and negotiating role required to maintain flexibility. For example, the PRI, though it formally incorporates working class, peasant, and middle-class groups, is not the primary locus of interclass or intergroup bargaining; the most important aspects of this bargaining take place in *ad hoc*, informal settings.

If we are to explore the nature of the Mexican state, we must also deal with such questions as: Between what groups or categories is the political bargain struck? What is the basic unit of analysis for understanding the nature of the Mexican state? Class analysis of Mexican politics is compelling under many circumstances, and perhaps it is necessary to a basic understanding of the Mexican state. Nevertheless, most forms of class analysis of Mexico are not entirely satisfying—especially when applied to the day-to-day workings of the political bargain. Many important groups and factions do not have a class basis that is clear enough to make the observer feel comfortable with the concept of class "factions." Of course, this does not invalidate a class approach at a higher level of analysis. However, a full examination of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper. Our concerns here are focused at the level of political stability.

Corporate groups or categories have often been considered important political units in Mexico and Latin America. However, in Mexico at least, corporate structures, such as the worker, peasant, and popular sectors of the PRI, are less a reflection of Mexican society or even key political alliances than a technique of control developed by the association of ruling groups.[35]

In Latin America, including Mexico, a less "pure" form of political

[35] Evelyn P. Stevens, "Mexico's PRI: The Institutionalization of Corporatism?," in Malloy (fn. 13), 250. That corporatist institutions frequently do not reflect society and are often created by political elites for the purpose of controlling their constituencies is also argued by Alfred Stepan in his discussion of "organic-statist" regimes in Latin America. See Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), esp. chap. 2. For an interesting discussion of corporatist control in terms of the interplay between constraints on group behavior and inducements to attain group support, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" *American Political Science Review*, forthcoming.

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cleavage is discernible. As Douglas Chalmers has pointed out, political cleavages and groupings in Latin America are a confusing mixture of class, geographic, and personalistic factional interests—sometimes combined within the same party.[36] This kind of cleavage, together with the factionalism it produces, tends to cut across class, functional, or corporate lines most of the time. Chalmers's description of factionalism in Brazil and other Latin American countries corresponds quite closely to patterns observed in Mexico, with two important differences: in Mexico, factions are more fluid and (to continue the image), ideology is more free-floating with respect to its factional bases.

The instability of many Latin American regimes appears to be related to the crystallization of various factional alliances and their opposition to one another, sometimes over a period of decades.[37] Factions that have very little "logical" or coherent basis for existence may over the years develop a reality, solidity, and permanence, simply through the process of competing for power and because of the fact that various leading political personalities depend upon them as a power base. Although in Mexico, one can at any given instant identify personalistic factions with a combination of regional, class, or functional bases, these are impermanent and fluid instead of long-lasting and crystallized.

In Latin America generally, *ad hoc* factions acquire particular ideological slants, from left-wing populism to various shades of conservatism. Although the ideology is not necessarily congruent with the social base of the faction or party, the two become wedded over time. In this way, ideologies rise and fall with the fortunes of the factions that have appropriated them. Many Latin American states have developed a serial sharing of power among different factions associated with varying ideological tendencies; these factions take turns at overthrowing one another, usually in military coups.

In Mexico, a somewhat similar phenomenon appears to take place as one six-year presidential regime gives way to another. The appearance is deceiving, however. In the first place, conflicting ideological tendencies coexist *within* any given presidential administration in Mexico. Proponents of left-wing populism are present, often in high positions, within "conservative" administrations, while more "radical" administrations harbor conservatives in their midst. It is our hypothesis (which needs verification) that the tendency to combine groups with

[36] Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, VII (No. 2, 1972), 102-30.

[37] Robert R. Kaufman, "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries," in Malloy (fn. 13), 109-48.

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diverse ideological positions in the same administration is much more characteristic of Mexico than it is of other Latin American states: it is part of the political bargain.

Our second hypothesis is that in Mexico, but not in other Latin American states, rapid political turnover produces factions that do not exist long enough to become firmly identified with, and to appropriate, a particular ideology. Rather, certain "standard" ideological tendencies (usually with roots in the Constitution of 1917) are "borrowed" by an aspiring faction for a period of usually no more than one *sexenio*.[38] Thus it is the ideological tendencies (polished up and refurbished for application to prevailing circumstances) that have persisted, while the political groupings that espouse them come and go.

Ideology therefore represents a free-floating resource in Mexican politics, not associated permanently with any one group or party. The ruling party, the PRI, must accommodate all tendencies and thus cannot totally embrace one or another (except temporarily). To a lesser extent, this is true of each presidential administration. The political bargain we have discussed is aimed at making sure that these ideological tendencies are never appropriated in any permanent way by any particular faction or group; furthermore, such factions and groups must remain fluid and flexible. *The modes of political action described in this paper function in order to maintain the separation between ideology and its social base.*

In returning to the analogy with multi-ethnic states, we note that some political observers have used the Dutch term *verzuiling* (the formation of pillars or columns) to describe the division of some European societies into discrete corporate, ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups that cut vertically through social strata.[39] To maintain political stability in the face of such cleavages, political institutions must exist

[38] These ideological tendencies are constantly updated; concepts and applications are borrowed from the rest of Latin America and elsewhere by Mexican intellectuals. The relationship between the intellectual community and the government is close; many professors and researchers have entered the government (at least recently) at high levels or have obtained well-paid government advisory positions. Perhaps the importance of ideological resources to various political factions requires the constant manufacture of relevant and up-to-date ideology-cum-policy perspectives, and a large number of government-oriented intellectuals to perform the task. The fact that reform-oriented and even radical perspectives ("within the Constitution") have a potential "market" within the government seems to encourage Mexican intellectuals to succumb, at times, to the temptation of policy relevance; in other Latin American countries they appear to be hopelessly alienated.

[39] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press 1967), 15-16.

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to balance and accommodate the interests of these corporate groups at the top. This is possible (though certainly not inevitable) because the interests to be balanced are relatively clearly defined. In Latin America, such is not the case. There is an unpredictability and lack of congruence to the factions that makes them harder to accommodate through any set of formal institutions.

Mexico has arrived at a unique solution to the problem of Latin American stability. To imagine that this solution is achieved through the incorporation of groups into the party on a corporate basis (which would be the functional equivalent of *verzuiling*) would be a mirage. Rather, stability is achieved by creating (either through design or historical accident) certain mechanisms that balance ideological tendencies and the specific policies associated with them, while divorcing them from existing interests in society that might tend to embrace and appropriate them permanently. In doing so, these mechanisms create the means for perpetuating and even intensifying the extreme inequalities in wealth that are found in Mexico. Whether the current structure makes this *level* of inequality inevitable is a question for future study.

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# RETHINKING THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON:

## The Soviet System in a Systems Age

By PAUL COCKS

AS Kremlin leaders climb the learning curve of what is officially called the "contemporary scientific and technological revolution" (STR), they are becoming increasingly aware of the changing conditions and new demands associated with this phenomenon. Above all, there seems to be growing realization, at least in some elite circles, that the STR is as much a managerial and even a cultural revolution as it is a scientific and industrial revolution. The key task of the times is to develop not only modern technical hardware, but also an effective and distinctive software that is appropriate to Soviet conditions as well as capable of accelerating technological change and of managing the innovation process. Indeed, that is the essence of Brezhnev's call, articulated at the 1971 CPSU Congress and reiterated at the 1976 Congress, for "combining organically the achievements of the revolution in science and technology with the advantages of the socialist economic system, to unfold more broadly our own, intrinsically socialist forms of fusing science with production."[1]

Wrestling with the new agenda of problems raised by the STR, Soviet analysts and policy makers have begun to think seriously, for the first time, about *organization* in the broadest sense. Studies involving important "cognitive reorientation and conceptual search," to borrow Erik Hoffmann's terminology, have been sanctioned and are underway.[2] Basic ideas about organization and the structural requirements of technical progress are being re-examined. A relatively static view of organizational structure as an immutable given is being replaced by a and Soviet experience, has been rediscovered and given new life and more dynamic conception of organization as a set of complex variables about which some choice can be exercised. In short, the notion of "the organizational weapon," which is deeply rooted in Leninist doctrine

[1] *XXIV s"ezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii otchet* [Stenographic Report of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU] (Moscow: Politizdat 1971), I, 82; *XXV s"ezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii otchet* [Stenographic Report of the XXV Congress of the CPSU] (Moscow: Politizdat 1976), II, 237. All translations from the original Russian are by the author.

[2] Hoffmann, "Soviet Views of 'The Scientific-Technological Revolution,'" *World Politics*, xxx (July 1978), 615-45, at 617.

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meaning by the STR. It needs only to be retooled to the changed requirements of a different developmental stage and technological era.

## Soviet Development, Technical Progress, and Organizational Lag

More and more, science, technology, and organization have moved to the forefront of the Soviet Union's modernization strategy. In 1970, Brezhnev had already observed that "the solution to many of our economic problems should now be sought at the juncture between progress in science and technology and progress in management." At that time he also made the statement that has since become a slogan of the day: "The science of victory [in building socialism] is, in essence, the science of management."[3] Dzherman Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, also noted early that "fusion of the latest achievements in science and technology with the most up-to-date achievements in organization and management is an imperative of the contemporary STR."[4] Increasingly, organization is seen to be the decisive element that links technology and development. As P. M. Masherov, the Belorussian First Party Secretary and candidate-member of the Politburo, observed shortly before the 25th Congress, "The deepest roots of our successes, of our failures, and of our capabilities are to be found precisely in the organizational factor."[5]

Underlying these ideas is enhanced awareness of a direct correlation between technology and structure and the realization that technological innovation rests on and requires administrative adaptation as well. As Masherov told the 1971 Party Congress, "It is impossible to 'squeeze' the revolution in science and technology into the framework of old methods and organizational forms of work."[6] Indeed, to attempt to put the research-to-production cycle into traditional forms is, according to some specialists, "like trying to use a steamboiler to harness atomic energy."[7] Accordingly, qualitative changes in organization and management are said to be "becoming a precondition for and a result of progress in science and technology."[8]

[3] *Pravda*, June 13, 1970.

[4] Gvishiani, *Organization and Management: A Sociological Analysis of Western Theories* (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1972), 172.

[5] *Sovetskaia Belorussiia*, February 5, 1976.

[6] *XXIV s"ezd KPSS* (fn. 1), I, 179-80.

[7] P. Danilovtsev and Yu. Kanygin, *Ot laboratorii do zavoda* [From Laboratory to Plant] (Novosibirsk: Nauka 1971), 40.

[8] Boris Z. Milner, "Organization of the Management of Production," *Social Sciences* (Moscow), VII, No. 3 (1976), 48. See also Nikolai S. Kalita and German I. Mantsurov, *Sotsialisticheskie proizvodstvennye ob"edineniia* [Socialist Production Associations] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1972), 3-4.

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Experience has demonstrated the difficulties of applying new techniques of planning and management—including computerized information systems—in established institutions without organizational reform. Indeed, computers can simply "mechanize" deficiencies that are rooted in basic structure and administration. Because of this danger, some members of the elite emphasize, "At the basis for improving the system of management must lie not techniques of information processing but the organization of administration."[9] The troubles encountered in the introduction of computer technology and methods in the U.S.S.R. exemplify, in fact, an old lesson: institutions may struggle to cope with problems of applying powerful and sophisticated methods, and yet fail to improve effectiveness, sometimes even reduce it, and often damage the credibility of the technique in the process, because they have not been able to deal with organizational deficiencies rooted in established administrative arrangements and structural forms. These deficiencies have been exposed by new techniques but cannot be dealt with at the level of technique.

More and more, then, there is movement in the Soviet Union toward the view that "structure follows strategy"—that organizational forms, to be effective and sound, must adapt to changes in technology. A critical organizational lag and managerial gap is an integral part of the perceived technological gap. At issue, thus, are really two kinds of innovation—technological (hardware) and organizational (software and know-how) in the broad sense or, as some specialists prefer, administrative. The latter type of innovation deals with changes in the methods of running business operations that make more effective use of resources. They may include changes in structure, procedure, policies, or personnel management. However, the prospect of organizational change and administrative restructuring immediately raises a host of complex questions: On what basis? According to what principles? Toward what ends? Significantly, some Soviet analysts are beginning to address these problems and to offer some new responses and solutions.

## Organizational Design: A Newly Evolving Field in the Soviet Union

In the course of the 1970s, organization emerged as a subject of inten-

[9] Georgy Arbatov, "Proektirovanie organizatsii krupnykh proizvodstvenno-khoziaistvennykh kompleksov i upravleniia imi," [Designing the Organization and Management of Large-scale Economic Production Complexes], *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 5 (May 1975), 26. For a discussion of the deficiencies in designing computer information sys-

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sive theoretical and applied research, along with other modern disciplines in social science, such as management science and systems analysis. Such studies have evolved as explicit aids to Soviet policy makers and change strategists. Organizational design—the systematic and purposive modeling of structures and decision processes to maximize organizational effectiveness—is itself becoming a distinct and important area of expert analysis and management specialization. This newly emerging field is regarded in some Kremlin circles as one of the main keys to building the management superstructure of tomorrow. More effective structuring of organization and decision processes is a way of preparing for—indeed designing—the future, and of ultimately mastering the STR.

To be sure, Soviet leaders have long had a penchant for organizational engineering. Almost by reflex, they have reached for reorganization as an all-purpose cure. Khrushchev in particular was enamored of reorganization as an end in itself, often without organizational studies and consultation. Until well into the 1960s, the political command simply did not see any need to do anything about organization, to think about structure, much less to think through to a new structure. The principles and purposes of organization had become, in effect, frozen. This not only inhibited creative thinking about structure and the development of new approaches to organizational change; it also contributed to and reflected the growing ossification and bureaucratization of Soviet institutions. The ruling elite became captive to organizational principles and structural forms with which it had grown familiar and which it was fearful of abandoning. The escape into structure and system was psychologically comfortable and politically reassuring.

In general, Leninist elites have long respected the power of organization and the use of technology in the pursuit of political goals. Political development under Leninist regimes has also mainly consisted of organization building. Basically, however, organization and technology have figured prominently as instruments of policy and agents of change in society during the transformation and consolidation stages of socialist development, to use Ken Jowitt's words.[10] Until relatively recently,

tems, especially the failure to link their introduction to organization and decision processes, see Boris Z. Milner, "Kak sproektirovat' organizatsiiu?" [How Should an Organization Be Designed?], *Izvestiia*, May 13, 1973.

[10] Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (September 1974), 1171-91; Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," *World Politics*, XXVIII (October 1975), 69-96.

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they were not accorded a central place in the functioning and management of mature socialist society. On the contrary, the ideological emphasis on the ultimate withering away of the state and on self-administration by the masses, which found renewed support under Khrushchev, led to the neglect and devitalization of state agencies and of public administration. Only with their belated discovery of the contemporary scientific revolution have the ruling elites come to appreciate the role of science, technology, and organization in modern society, and their potential for building and administering developed socialism.[11]

In view of this background, it is not surprising that growth of the Soviet administrative structure has been in many ways a disorganized and disorganizing process. Little thought or analysis has been given to organizational design and development. There has been little conceptualization, measurement, or assessment of organizational effectiveness. For the most part, organizations have simply "evolved," largely in an unplanned and unsystematic fashion. The creation of new and the revamping of old structures have "relied more on experience, analogy, conventional schemes, and finally intuition than on any firm scientific methods of organizational design."[12] Formal considerations have dominated design decisions, including criteria such as "no more" or "no less" than in other structures, "prescribed" or "not prescribed" units and subdivisions, "this hasn't been done before" or "nothing of this sort exists elsewhere," and so forth.[13] Frequently, the interests of an entrenched management staff, rather than organizational goals and final results, have determined the extent and shape of structural adaptations.[14] Old managerial forms have been mechanically carried over to new organizational models without eliminating their deficiencies or examining their suitability under changed conditions and objectives. The tendency has been not to transform the basic building blocks, but simply to move them around, sometimes almost constantly, to produce

[11] For a more general discussion of these issues, see Cocks, "Retooling the Directed Society: Administrative Modernization and Developed Socialism," in Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks, eds., *Political Development in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger 1977), 53-92; also, Fleron's introduction to Frederic J. Fleron, ed., *Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism* (New York: Praeger 1977), 1-67.

[12] Boris Z. Milner, ed., *Organizatsionnye struktury upravleniia proizvodstvom* [Organizational Structures for Managing Production] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1975), 5.

[13] Milner (fn. 9).

[14] Boris V. Gubin and Nikolai G. Kalinin, *Organizatsiia upravleniia promyshlennostiu v usloviiakh dvukh- i trekhzvennoi sistemy* [The Organization of Industrial Management in Conditions of a Two- and Three-Link System] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1977), 5; E. P. Torkanovskii, "Programmno-tselevoe upravlenie" [Programmed-Goals Management], *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 3 (March 1978), 30.

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different but not qualitatively new configurations. Further, the job of designing management schemes has frequently been entrusted to people who are responsible for supervising staff discipline, reflecting the extent to which conceptions of organization have narrowed to essentially an instrument of control.[15]

Gradually, however, a new attitude is beginning to penetrate and shape Soviet thought. Boris Milner, one of the leading authorities on industrial design and management in the U.S.S.R., represents this new style of thinking. The careful design of organizations, he stresses, is just as important a task as the development of new technology or the planning of production. Moreover, to perform this task today, Milner insists, "trained organization specialists are needed, not just reorganizers who are able only by intuition to put together new combinations from old administrative elements."[16] Indicating there is political support for this view, Brezhnev has also accented the need for a more scientific approach to organization building and administrative restructuring. Speaking about these issues in Alma Ata in March 1974, he said, "We must act not by eye, not by intuition, but be led by experience, experiments, and the conclusions of modern management science."[17]

Above all, a change of focus is called for. In the past, those who worked on problems of structural design concentrated on unchanged functions instead of changing tasks. They dealt "in statics, not in dynamics," as Milner puts it. Structures were regarded more or less "as a permanent collection of line and staff services, formed over a period of thirty years, without showing any developmental tendencies or the need to take into account new tasks." "The basic focus," he adds, "was on the differentiation and specialization of functions, not on their integration and joint actions with respect to common goals."[18] In short, Soviet structural design had become locked into an iron law of hierarchy and the traditional administrative pyramid. Monolithic organizational perspectives rather than multi-institutional views dominated management theory and practice, resulting in structural rigidity and low adaptability.

The "new school" of organization theorists, on the other hand, has adopted a systems approach to structural design. Its adherents see struc-

[15] Milner (fn. 12), 5.
[16] *Ibid.*, 4; see also Arbatov (fn. 9), 21.
[17] *Pravda*, March 16, 1974.
[18] Boris Z. Milner, "Formirovanie organizatsionnykh struktur upravleniia" [Forming Organizational Structures of Management], *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva*, No. 6 (November-December 1975), 4-5.

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ture not as an aggregate of universal functions carried out by separate and distinct units, but as a means for achieving organizational goals. Goals, then, are the chief determinant of both structure and process, and the principal means by which tasks are allocated and performance is motivated, rewarded, and controlled. As Milner succinctly puts it, "Thus, in the beginning is the goal; then comes the mechanism for achieving it." Management activities are the guidance and control processes of the organization. The task of management is "to combine, 'to fuse' the various parts of the organization into a single whole." Similarly, the focus of decision making is not on each function performed separately, but rather on the interaction and integration of functions. In addition, the orientation in designing structures must be mostly toward change rather than control and permanency of relationships. "The task is to ensure dynamism, flexibility, and adaptability in the systems of management," writes Milner.[19]

Organizational development has not kept pace with the growing complexity of the situations with which Soviet planners and administrators are faced. Significantly, as conventional approaches to organization have become ineffective in dealing with problems, the "systems" view has emerged as a way of coping with complexity and change. Because it focuses attention on interrelationships, interdependencies, and integration, the systems approach is regarded by many to be a more viable conceptual framework for analyzing and solving issues of structural design and development. Its emphasis on study of organization of the research-to-production cycle as a total system is new and underscores the emerging broader view of organizational structure as a means of facilitating decision making, motivation, and control.

The new systems approach to organizational design distinguishes, in fact, between two separate but interrelated concepts: the *process* and the supporting organizational *structure* for performing that process. Indeed, Soviet organization studies today are generally giving increased attention to the importance of processes in decision making and administration. Alongside their traditional focus on "structural principles" and "administrative methods," textbooks on management now frequently contain chapters on organizational processes dealing with communications, information flows, and policy making. This new focus reflects an awareness that many problems today cannot be solved by means of improving the formal structures and techniques of management alone. As the Director of the Center for Management Problems

[19] See Milner (fn. 12), 5, 6, 16-17, 37.

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at Moscow University explains, "Process is becoming more and more not simply a necessary consequence of structure but something that significantly supplements, corrects, and improves structure."[20] The persistence of "departmental barriers" in blocking both technological and organizational innovations has revealed the constraining role of structure in effecting institutional change. It has been shown all too clearly that structure influences, if not dictates, process.

## New Dimensions in Structural Design: project management and matrix organization

Rising interest in structural design has brought to the fore the problem of what an organization should be, rather than simply how to get the best results from an existing organization. The task facing organizational planners and administrative reformers today revolves in large part around how to design structures that will maximize organizational performance for achieving given objectives. In the process of addressing this task, they are beginning to take a new look at traditional organization charts and generally accepted principles of specialization, span of control, responsibility, authority, and accountability in the assignment and allocation of decisions. New definitions of centralization and decentralization are being sought as the search continues for ways to build more flexible and responsive structural forms.

With the growing size and complexity of the Soviet economy, two principles of design in particular are being singled out by the modernists as necessary for achieving organizational flexibility and managerial effectiveness. Both principles address major structural deficiencies of existing institutions. The first is the need *to separate strategic and coordinating functions from operating management and control*. According to Milner, the failure of existing managment structures to incorporate and maintain this division of tasks has caused them "to freeze the development of technology and the efficiency of production." In practice, both strategic and operational functions are concentrated at the highest levels of management. Consequently, the command channels become overloaded as problems are constantly referred upward in the hierarchy for resolution. Decisions are delayed and their quality is reduced. Top executives become absorbed in current questions, and diverted from strategic and policy concerns that only they have the right and the power to decide.[21]

[20] Gavriil Kh. Popov, ed., *Organizatsiia protsessov upravleniia* [Organization of Management Processes] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1975), 31, 44-45.

[21] Milner (fn. 18), 8; Milner (fn. 12), 7.

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Second, there is the need *to formalize and expand horizontal patterns of management as well as to combine vertical and horizontal channels of administration*. At the bottom of this principle lies a growing realization of the limitations of organizing strictly by function and by hierarchy. Structures built exclusively along vertical and functional lines are especially inappropriate for solving complex problems where work is fragmented and responsibility for final results is divided among many subdivisions. Under these conditions, Milner notes, *any* question—no matter how trivial—of a complex and crossfunctional nature must almost always go to the highest level. Integration can take place only at the apex of the organizational pyramid. Thus, top management becomes heavily involved in securing horizontal joint actions and in coordinating goal achievement by various functional units at lower levels. Again, the result is the overload situation described earlier, and the failure of organizational leaders to conduct strategic planning and decision making for the future. Because the number of complex problems demanding joint efforts is growing daily, numerous attempts have been made by industrial enterprises and associations to create special bodies responsible for coordinating and harmonizing lateral ties at all levels of management. However, they have generally proved to be ineffective, Milner points out, "because they try basically to adapt the traditional line-and-staff structure to solve tasks for which it is not suitable." Such problems can be solved most effectively, he maintains, "within the framework of a special structure, one that cooperates with a line-and-staff structure, supplements it, but is not identical to it."[22]

Interestingly, the recent Soviet structural response to these twin needs has been to follow, by and large, the pattern of organizational adaptation in the United States. During the 1960s, many American business firms found that conventional structural designs and management shapes were inadequate in coping with problems of advancing technology and complexity. They faced many of the same kinds of pressures and design problems that preoccupy the Kremlin today. Similarly, interest in the design of strategic planning systems mushroomed as ways were sought to free top executives from operational worries. Concepts of differentiation and integration were applied to structural design in order to achieve greater organizational flexibility and effectiveness. Additional managerial roles were created to provide coordination on a horizontal basis across functional lines and vertical flows of authority.

[22] *Ibid.*, 7, 8, 16, 108; Milner (fn. 18), 8-9. The kind of new structure he has explicitly in mind is the "matrix organization" which we discuss below.

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Among the most important structural innovations to emerge out of the 1960s were project management and matrix organization.[23]

These same two concepts lie at the basis of Soviet structural refinements and managerial reforms in the 1970s. According to Milner, they provide for a more flexible and dynamic system of coordination and subordination of different subsystems in organizing for goal accomplishment. The project approach molds organization around a specific task and makes the project leader the focal point for synchronizing and integrating functional activities from start to finish. The project manager becomes "the integrator of horizontal ties."[24] The use of a project team breaks down intraorganizational fences in the pursuit of common goals, and thus avoids the basic weakness of functional structures.[25]

The matrix structure is an extension of the team principle; it seeks to combine both functional and project organizational forms. Basically, it consists of horizontal project groups overlaid on a vertical functional hierarchy. The result is a kind of "compromise" organization that tries to balance conflicting objectives, such as resource utilization and goal achievement, with conflicting principles of management, such as efficiency and flexibility. Just as it does in the United States, the matrix structure seems to offer organization designers in the Soviet Union "a way out of a fix and an answer to some real needs."[26] According to K. I. Taksir, this "fundamentally new type of structure is distinguished by flexibility and adaptability, by the ability to adjust to new tasks and to ensure a high level of specialization with maximum effectiveness of operations."[27] The main advantage of matrix organization, E. I. Gavrilov explains, is that it makes possible the transfer of operational management to lower levels and thus permits top organizational leaders

[23] For general discussion of the evolution of organizational design in the West, see Derek Newman, *Organization Design: An Analytical Approach to the Structuring of Organizations* (London: E. Arrold 1973); Jay R. Galbraith, "Matrix Organizational Design: How to Combine Functional and Project Forms," *Business Horizons*, XIV (February 1971), 29-40; Peter Lorange and Richard F. Vancil, *Strategic Planning Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1977); Gene W. Dalton, Paul R. Lawrence, and Jay W. Lorsch, *Organizational Structure and Design* (Homewood, Ill.: R. D. Irwin 1970); Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig, *Organization and Management: A Systems Approach* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1970); David I. Cleland and William R. King, *Systems Analysis and Project Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1975); Stanley M. Davis and Paul R. Lawrence, *Matrix* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1977).

[24] Milner (fn. 12), 108, 110.

[25] Kim I. Taksir, *Nauchno-proizvodstvennye ob"edineniia* [Science-Production Associations] (Moscow: Nauka 1977), 85.

[26] Kenneth Knight, ed., *Matrix Management* (New York: PBI-Petrocelli Books, 1977), 1.

[27] Taksir (fn. 25), 81-82.

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to step out of day-to-day decision making and to concentrate on the development of strategy.[28] In short, "the matrix system of management to a large extent corresponds to the conditions of decision making dictated by scientific and technical progress."[29]

It is not surprising, therefore, that these new types of structures have begun to find application largely in the development and introduction of new technology. In no area of activity is organizational flexibility as important as in innovation. In the United States, too, the initial impetus for new design concepts in organization and management came largely from the aerospace and other industries pushing the state of the art in developing technical hardware. The creation of new prototypes, retooling of production, and raising of product quality are all complex problems that are not easily handled within existing functional structures in the U.S.S.R.[30] Indeed, it is in the area of science and technology that the rigidities of bureaucratic structure are being particularly felt. As Gvishiani readily admits, "[Soviet] science has, so to speak, an excess of stability and even of conservatism." Hence, one of the main demands on science policy today, he stresses, is to make R&D organizations more flexible and responsive to rapid changes in organizational environment and purpose.[31]

Suffice it to say that the so-called "science-production associations," which have evolved since the late 1960s as special institutional forms for accelerating the innovation process, have become crucibles for Soviet experimentation with these new modes of management. Some major production associations, notably the giant Kama River Truck Complex and the Urals Electrical Heavy Machine Building Association (URALELEKTROTIAZHMASH) in Sverdlovsk have been designed and organized according to these concepts. In addition, project management and matrix organization are being introduced at higher levels of the administrative ladder as part of the ongoing process of ministerial restructuring. The radio, chemical, and electrical equipment industries are on the frontiers of experimentation in this area.[32]

[28] Evgenii I. Gavrilov, *Ekonomika i effektivnost' nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa* [Economics and Effectiveness of Scientific-Technical Progress] (Minsk: Vyshaia shkola 1975), 280. Also on the advantages of the matrix structure, see Nikolai E. Drogichinskii, ed., *Sovershenstvovanie mekhanizma khoziaistvovaniia v usloviiakh razvitogo sotsializma* [Improving the Management Mechanism in Conditions of Developed Socialism] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1975), 169-70.

[29] Mikhail M. Kreisberg, *S Sh A: Sistemnyi podkhod v upravlenii* [The USA: The Systems Approach to Management] (Moscow: Nauka 1974), 192.

[30] Milner (fn. 12), 108, 117.

[31] Dzherman M. Gvishiani, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Scientific Problems," *Social Sciences*, 1 (January-March 1972), 55-56.

[32] See Taksir (fn. 25), 80-93; Milner (fn. 12), 110-15, 121; Valerii I. Kushlin,

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It is difficult at present to assess the impact and the future of these new dimensions in structural design. Information is lacking about the actual practice and results of project and matrix management in the U.S.S.R. Evidence suggests, nonetheless, that these organizational innovations are not easily or rapidly assimilated. They challenge the way organizations are structured and the way people are managed. Fundamentally, the conflict and ambiguity they build into organizational relationships and roles go against the grain of the principles of unity of command and strict superior-subordinate relations that are enshrined in democratic centralism and organizational Leninism.

Indeed, the remarks of a project manager at URALELEKTROTIAZHMASH help put these recent developments into perspective. At the Association, new systems approaches to management have been introduced and exist alongside old administrative forms. "When any serious situation arises, however," he notes, "top management prefers to go by the old ways." Though project management has been established by statute, it has not yet in practice received the "right of full citizenship." Many in the organization regard the project manager as some kind of "geographical novelty." "The main difficulties," we are told, "are neither organizational nor technical, but purely psychological." Over a span of more than 40 years, certain traditions, mutual relations, and simple notions have developed with respect to the duties and behavior of officials and subordinates. Accordingly, a kind of "inertia by style" exists that makes it very difficult to change anything.[33] The conversion to matrix-style management and more complex organizational forms will necessarily be slow and difficult.

## Putting Organization Theory into Practice: Institutional Restructuring and the Planning Process

Organizational design and development are of interest not only to theorists and model builders in ivory towers. These issues have become a major concern of the political leadership in its drive to accelerate

*Uskorenie vnedreniia nauchnykh dostizhenii v proizvodstvo* [Accelerating the Introduction of Scientific Achievements into Production] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1977), 133-36; Dzherman M. Gvishiani, ed., *Voprosy teorii i praktiki upravleniia i organizatsii nauki* [Questions of Theory and Practice in the Management and Organization of Science] (Moscow: Nauka 1975), 14-17.

[33] See A. G. Vel'sh, "Effektivnost' upravleniia povysilas'," [The Effectiveness of Management Has Risen], *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva*, No. 6 (November-December 1975), 36-37. V. S. Rapoport, who favors more extensive study of matrix organization and American experience with these types of management designs, also observes, "Uralelektrotiazhmash shows how difficult is the transition to new management structures, how high are the psychological barriers." See his comments in *EKO*, No. 2 (March-April 1978), 165.

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technological innovation and administrative improvement. Brezhnev has repeatedly and forcefully hammered on this theme throughout the 1970s. He told the Central Committee in December 1973 that, of all the ways to improve planning and management, better structuring of administration and decision making was the most important and the most urgent. Obviously with Khrushchev in mind he noted, "In our time we justly condemned the unwarranted tendency for organizational restructuring which took place in the past." "But at the same time," he insisted, "it is impossible to allow the ossification of organizational structures."[34] At the 25th Congress, the General Secretary again emphasized, "The Central Committee is against hasty, ill-conceived reorganization of the managerial structure and of established methods of administration. It is necessary, as the saying goes, to measure the cloth not seven times, but eight or even ten times before cutting. But once we have done the measuring, once we have understood that the existing economic mechanism has become too tight for the developing economy, we must fundamentally improve it."[35]

Additional practical importance is attached to organizational planning because the basic building blocks of Soviet science, technology, and industry are gradually being reshaped into larger structures and more integrated associations. The formation of these new "complex organizations" has indeed become a phenomenon, if not a fad, of the times. "Nowadays, calling a research institute merely an institute or a plant merely an enterprise somehow seems clumsy, an admission of one's backwardness."[36] In the era of the scientific and technological revolution, institutional nameplates must be changed to keep pace with the times. Meanwhile, however, many of the new complexes and associations have failed to take the intended "structural leap." Instead of being unified and integrating "organic systems," they are frequently little more than mechanical aggregations of autonomous units that bear the strong imprint of pre-existing organizational forms and manuals of operation.

These unsuccessful efforts at organization building are due in part to the failure of ministries to take a modern systems approach to problems of design. Research and production associations of all kinds have

[34] Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Ob osnovnykh voprosakh ekonomicheskoi politiki KPSS na sovremennom etape: rechi i doklady* [On Fundamental Questions of Economic Policy of the CPSU at the Contemporary Stage: Speeches and Reports] (Moscow: Politizdat 1975), II, 355-56.

[35] *Pravda*, February 25, 1976.

[36] G. Ivanov and G. Yakovlev, "Pod novoi vyveskoi" [Under a New Nameplate], *Pravda*, March 26, 1978.

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sometimes been put together without any systematic diagnosis of design questions or any criteria for evaluating performance and progress. Little consideration has been given to their place in the context of future directions and the needs of the branch as a whole. In the absence of clear guidelines from the center, ministerial authorities have created associations as they see fit, often obliterating the boundaries between different kinds of research and production complexes. In general, a trial-and-error method and *pro forma* approach have prevailed, sometimes resulting in an interminable process of reorganization upon reorganization or, in the Soviet vernacular, "administrative troop movements." Sometimes associations have been formed on the assumption that "in time everything will work itself out and fall into place." When this does not happen, even after several years of waiting and unending efforts to get an organization moving, "no one in the ministry wants to admit the mistake, since such an admission would make it necessary to name specific parties responsible for such an unsuccessful experiment."[37]

Clearly, not everyone has yet realized that these new institutional forms are not simply the sum of their parts, but represent qualitatively new types of organizations. Indeed, all the difficulties encountered in getting these new structures to work effectively reflect the underdevelopment of organizational design as a distinct form of activity, and the impoverishment of creative thinking in this whole sphere. These difficulties also show the extent to which the regime has become captive to a constraining organizational legacy.

Issues of organizational modeling have also acquired special importance because each ministry was obliged during the Tenth Five-Year Plan to draw up a master plan for modernizing and streamlining management for the branch as a whole by 1980. The focus of organizational design and reform has finally moved to the top of the administrative pyramid. From the mid- to late 1960s, the enterprise was the center of attention. As the feeling grew that this was too small and inadequate a unit upon which to base the Soviet Union's technological modernization—in large part due to its traditional separation from the world of scientific research and development—the focus shifted to the new basic building blocks, the research and production complexes and associations, and to the intermediate levels of the administrative ladder, notably the industrial associations that are replacing the former chief administrations or *glavki* in many sectors. Since the mid-1970s, how-

[37] *Ibid.*

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ever, there has been growing realization that reorganization of individual links of the system alone cannot give the proper result.[38] One cannot approach and design each level separately and autonomously. The starting point must be an overall conceptualization of the organization and structure of industry as a dynamic hierarchical system. Any other way amounts essentially to a piecemeal approach to structural problem solving, and results in much wasted motion, not to mention considerable redesigning exercises, as demonstrated by recent Soviet experience.[39]

Though ministerial offices are busy with reorganization studies, it is difficult at this time to see where all this activity will lead and what results it will have. A. S. Vain, the principal architect of the general management scheme for the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, considers the current master plan only the first step. "The development of [Soviet] economic potential in the 1980s and 1990s requires radical improvement of existing forms and the creation of qualitatively new forms of industrial organization," he writes. Thus, the need arises to think about the shape of management not only today but toward the year 2000 as well.[40]

Meanwhile, it should be emphasized that organizational planning is an entirely new direction in Soviet economic activity. Only recently has it come to be seen as an integral and essential part of the planning of both production and technology. The absence of organizational planning in the past is now believed to have been a serious deficiency of Soviet policy and long-term programs, especially as regards the development and delivery of technology.[41] Yet, very little research has been done on the host of complex and interrelated problems involved in such forecasting and modeling. A methodology for designing internally dynamic organizations still does not exist. Adequate indicators and norms have not yet been devised for evaluating the effectiveness and benefits of the new structures. There are still very few specialists skilled in the analysis of organizational problems and policy, and limited facilities exist for training organization designers.[42] For that matter, management science more broadly, which began to emerge in the

[38] Gubin and Kalinin (fn. 14), 35.

[39] A. S. Vain, "Formy organizatsii promyshlennosti," [Forms of Industrial Organization], *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR*, seriia ekonomicheskaia, No. 5 (1977), 61-62.

[40] *Ibid.*, 59-60, 62.

[41] See Gavriil Kh. Popov, *Effektivnoe upravlenie* [Effective Management] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1976), 35.

[42] See Fedor M. Rusinov, "Organizatsionnye problemy upravleniia sotsialisticheskim proizvodstvom" [Organizational Problems of Managing Socialist Production], in Viktor G. Afanas'ev, ed., *Nauchnoe upravlenie obshchestvom* [Scientific Management of Society], IX (Moscow: Mysl' 1975), 163-75.

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U.S.S.R. over a decade ago, is said to be "still living through its formative period."[43]

Hence, most of these special plans should be seen as experiments in organizational design rather than as mature formulations and viable models. The whole field of organizational design and engineering is new and still evolving; its shape and potentiality are far from settled, and its problems far from solved. As regards the management of giant economic complexes and organizational systems, one high Soviet official admits, "We are essentially only beginning work."[44]

In view of this situation, it is not surprising that increasing attention has been devoted recently to the need to raise the level of organization of administrative rationalization, to organize the reorganization planners and new systems designers. As one observer emphasizes, "It is impossible to do systems analysis of management without a system."[45] Another specialist notes that the improvement of organization and management is fast "becoming a mass movement."[46] Though this formulation seems premature, it is clear that both the volume and the importance of work in this policy sphere have grown appreciably since the decision of March 2, 1973, to reform the Soviet ministerial structure. In some branches of the economy, 5 to 8 percent of the funds allocated to scientific research and development are being channeled into R&D on management improvement. According to estimates by GOSPLAN, in 1975 there were nearly 300,000 people engaged in drawing up management modernization programs in various branches and regions of the U.S.S.R. The level of effort involved amounted to annual wages totaling not less than 600,000 rubles.[47]

As part of this general movement, centers of organizational analysis

[43] Dmitrii Pravdin, "Osobennosti formirovaniia nauki upravleniia sotsialisticheskoi ekonomikoi" [Particular Features of Forming a Science of Management for Socialist Economy], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 1 (January 1978), 59. For background information, see Robert F. Miller, "The New Science of Administration in the USSR," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, XVIII (September 1971), 247-55.

[44] Vadim A. Trapeznikov, "Upravlenie naukoi kak organizatsionnoi sistemi" [The Management of Science as an Organizational System], in Dzherman M. Gvishiani, ed., *Osnovnye printsipy i obshchie problemy upravleniia naukoi* [Fundamental Principles and General Problems of the Management of Science] (Moscow: Nauka 1973), 25.

[45] Ivan Syroezhin, "O kompleksnoi organizatsii sovershenstvovaniia upravleniia proizvodstvom [On the Integrated Organization of Improving Management of Production], in G. Kh. Popov, ed., *Problemy organizatsii sovershenstvovaniia upravleniia sotsialisticheskim proizvodstvom* [Problems of Organization in Improving the Management of Socialist Production] (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo Universiteta 1975), 33.

[46] E. N. Bliokov, "Model' sistemy 'nauka-proizvodtsvo' i reshenie zadach planomernoi organizatsii nauchno-tekhnicheskogo i ekonomicheskogo razvitiia" [A Model of the "Science-Production" System and Solution to the Tasks of the Planned Organization of Scientific, Technical and Economic Development], *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR*, seriia ekonomicheskaia, No. 2 (1978), 58.

[47] Popov (fn. 45), 51, 55fn.

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and policy planning have been created at different levels of the administrative structure. Some ministries have formed special subdivisions under various names: a Department for Improving the System of Management (ferrous metallurgy); a Department of Organization on Management Systems and Processes (electrical engineering); and an Administration for Computer Technology and Organizational Structures (coal industry). In general, they are to serve as special departments of innovation, handling organizational and structural change at all levels of the branch hierarchy. In the majority of ministries, however, there is still no single group or office in charge of organizational development and innovation-related matters. These activities are found under different departmental jurisdictions. Each unit tends to deal with change in terms of the viewpoint of its own area of influence and interest. Because of the absence, in fact, of any structural subdivision concerned exclusively with these issues, most ministries have had to create special commissions or *ad hoc* working groups to develop and draft the management master plans called for by central authorities. Much of this work has, in turn, been subcontracted out to different research facilities. However, many of the institutions engaged in organization and management studies are not scientific organizations and are not really qualified to deal with specific problems.[48]

Though detailed information is lacking about the final shape of the ministerial reorganization in process, evidence suggests that the reform plans fall short of any radical systems change. By the middle of 1977, 36 industrial ministries and departments had worked up drafts of their management master plans. Each had approached administrative restructuring in its own way. Basically, however, two approaches had been taken. One group of ministries developed rather comprehensive plans that projected fundamentally new management modes and major structural transformations throughout the branch. The other group adopted individual and partial measures aimed at improving planning and management, touching on only a few elements of the branch system.[49] In short, diversity of method and multiple approaches have prevailed.

On the national level, too, a systems approach to administrative rationalization is visibly lacking. The three main avenues of activity—research, management training, and the application of research results (including the diffusion of successful organizational experiments and

[48] See Gubin and Kalinin (fn. 14), 121-23.
[49] *Ibid.*, 37-38.

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innovations)—are conducted in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner. Different functional agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, incomplete mandates, and conflicting interests participate in various aspects of the total disjointed enterprise. The main arena for working out the general management plans and modernization programs for the ministries has been the Interdepartmental Commission of GOSPLAN. Because of its subordinate status, however, this commission and GOSPLAN in general have not been able to wield decisive influence in these matters and to cut through the heavy crust of bureaucratic politics and ministerial resistance surrounding institutional reform.

Since the late 1960s, several proposals have been made to centralize responsibility for this increasingly important issue area and to create a supraministerial body in charge of administrative rationalization—a kind of blue-ribbon commission on executive reorganization—near the apex of the power structure directly under the Council of Ministers or even the Politburo. Such an organ, it is suggested, could take the form of similar bodies that have been established in recent years in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary. Or, as others point out, a combined Party-State agency could be re-established along the lines of the Central Control Commission and Workers and Peasants Inspection, which served as the main modernizing arm of the Soviet Party leadership in this area during the 1920s and early 1930s.[50] Because of the general reluctance of the Brezhnev regime to do major battle with the bureaucracy, however, these recommendations have not found full support among the political high command.

Recently, however, some measures have been taken to strengthen action in this sphere. In July 1978, Premier Kosygin revealed that a permanent "commission on current questions" had been formed under the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Though the exact powers and purview of this new body are not known, priority issues related to organization, planning, and management—especially with respect to major interbranch problems—presumably fall within its competence.[51] Interestingly, a standing commission has also been newly

[50] See *ibid.*, 179-80; Mikhail I. Piskotin, *Nauchnye osnovy gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v SSSR* [Scientific Principles of State Administration in the U.S.S.R.] (Moscow: Nauka 1968), 134-35; G. Kh. Popov, *Problemy teorii upravleniia* [Problems of Management Theory] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1970), 173; G. V. Atamanchuk, *Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie: Problemy metodologii pravovogo issledovaniia* [State Administration: Problems of Methodology in Legal Research] (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura 1975), 198-200; Viktor G. Afanas'ev, D. M. Gvishiani, V. N. Lisitsyn, and G. Kh. Popov, eds., *Upravlenie sotsialisticheskim proizvodstvom: Voprosy teorii i praktiki* [Management of Socialist Production: Questions of Theory and Practice] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1975), 637-51; Popov (fn. 45), 10; Popov (fn. 41), 141-42.

[51] Its specific function, Kosygin said, "is to examine and resolve current questions of

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created under the council of ministers in Estonia (and headed by one of its deputy chairmen) explicitly to oversee and coordinate all administrative rationalization activity in the republic.[52]

Management training has limped along for more than a decade in a very ineffective and fragmented fashion, but here too, important developments have occurred recently at the highest level of both the government and the Party structures. In October 1978, the newly established U.S.S.R. Academy of the National Economy, which functions directly under the Council of Ministers, opened its doors. V. I. Dolgikh, the CPSU Secretary in charge of heavy industry, presided over the official inaugural ceremonies. He noted, "With the formation of the Academy, the whole business of training economic management is raised to a new and higher level."[53] A month before, Politburo member Suslov officiated at the opening of the newly reconstituted Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee. The new Academy is an amalgamation of the old Academy of Social Sciences, the Higher Party School, and the Higher Party Correspondence School; it also represents, according to Suslov, "a qualitatively new higher Party educational institution," which bears primary responsibility for training the top Party elite in the requisite leadership skills, attitudes, and techniques for meeting the challenges of the STR.[54] Though the words of Dolgikh and Suslov may ultimately ring hollow, these institutional changes point, nonetheless, to the continuing concern of the ruling group about the issue of modern management training, and possibly an enhanced determination to do something about it.

For research, a new instrument has also been created to assist Kremlin authorities in measuring and redesigning the administrative machinery. In the summer of 1976, the Institute on Systems Research was established; it reports both to the State Committee for Science and Technology and to the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. This Institute is the brainchild of Gvishiani, its director, who has long had a keen interest in modern organization and management. The new center is to serve as the principal "think tank" for research and analysis on organizational issues, advising government agencies and ministries on problems of structural design and administrative change. What Georgy

economic construction and to exercise systematic control over the fulfillment of the state plan and budget." In his report on the new law on the USSR Council of Ministers, Kosygin also noted that questions dealing with interbranch problems and programs were absorbing more and more of the Council's attention. See *Pravda*, July 6, 1978.

[52] Popov (fn. 45), 146.

[53] *Pravda*, October 3, 1978.

[54] *Ibid.*, September 2, 1978.

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Arbatov has done for American studies in the U.S.S.R., Gvishiani seems determined to do for organization studies. During the 1970s, Arbatov and his Institute have been instrumental in informing Soviet leaders about the United States and in framing Soviet foreign policy. In the 1980s, Gvishiani and his colleagues may perhaps play a similar role in shaping the Kremlin's perceptions and actions in domestic management and technology policies. The USA Institute has helped the political leadership become aware of and deal more effectively with international complexities; the Institute on Systems Research has a similar mission, it seems, with respect to domestic complexity and change. Like Arbatov a decade ago, Gvishiani in putting together a staff is raiding various institutions—including the USA Institute—for the best experts he can find. Boris Milner, who headed the Department on Systems Management at Arbatov's Institute, has himself moved over to Gvishiani's center. A new and important institution appears to be in the making.

Admittedly, the end results of this still evolving field of policy analysis and planning are not yet apparent. Developments nonetheless seem to reflect the following underlying assumptions and expectations with respect to institutional adaptation in the future: The requirements for innovation and efficiency must be more explicitly and effectively translated into structural terms. Organizations must be deliberately designed for change, and for the ability to steer change. If administrative structures are to become and remain effective, they must change; and this change must as much as possible be by design rather than by default.

## Innovation and Change: The Complexities of Passage

The scientific and technological revolution has posed the issue of governmental effectiveness in new terms. In the 1970s, the U.S.S.R. has placed increasing emphasis on the urgency of administrative improvement for national development, and on the need to enhance managerial capabilities in coping with problems of advancing technology and complexity.

On the one hand, the old structural forms and administrative ways have become too rigid and cumbersome to be effective. The difficulties of trying to manage with an organizational structure designed for an earlier era have become apparent. Soviet leaders have come to recognize that the problems of economic growth and technical progress must be solved rather than just endured. They have also come to realize that

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the inadequacies of existing institutional arrangements are so great that —at least in some areas—a major reorganization, involving more complex and flexible structural designs, is needed rather than simply an improvement of conventional forms and methods.

On the other hand, the new institutional configurations and organizational innovations that have emerged in recent years have not yet acquired, for the most part, what in the American terminology of political science is called "enabling effectiveness." They are still largely experimental, untried, and distrusted structures and methods, coexisting with the old—and not always peacefully. Until they gain status and legitimacy, borne of the experience of their usefulness, these new organizational designs will inhibit as much as they enable innovative and effective action. The conversion to complex structural forms, like matrix management, takes time; and change does not come easily. Both old and new structures, then, are "transitional organizations." At present, the whole Soviet architecture of linkage between science and industry is in transition and in motion, even if slow motion.

Through new or at least modified institutional frameworks it is hoped that organization can be made a force that fosters rather than impedes innovation and change. In view of the heavy stress on organizational issues and approaches, in fact, the key to innovation seems at times to be simply "management by structure." Yet there are important complexities and constraints at work in the system, which necessarily limit the efficacy of structural solutions.

Indeed, all the problems met in creating economic complexes and in disseminating successful organizational experiments serve as a reminder that the effectiveness of an organizational change depends not only on the nature of that change, but also on other non-organizational features of the system.[55] The problems of innovation in the U.S.S.R.—and elsewhere—are fundamentally human problems. Behind the so-called "departmental obstacles" are invisible psychological barriers. Organizational engineering requires a corresponding behavioral remolding and attitudinal change. Above all, fundamental problems of power and politics constrain institutional adaptation. Many basic problems remain unresolved and incapable of solution by organizational weapons alone.

Solutions to complex problems are themselves usually complex. Although this fact is not always understood or appreciated, some Soviet analysts are fully aware of the difficulties of effecting change. Milner

[55] Joseph S. Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press 1976), 146.

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himself has articulated the basic dilemma that the leadership faces today in rethinking the organizational weapon. There is no doubt, he says, that modern systems approaches and more sophisticated techniques make planning and management more difficult. They bring it "into a new class, into a new situation." "But it is not possible by any other way," he maintains, "to solve the new and complex problems of development of the national economy, which have no precedent in our past experience."[56] Appearing in a publication designated "for official use only" and circulated in just 500 copies, these words were not meant simply for foreign consumption.

Generally speaking, the Soviet regime under Brezhnev has moved toward the idea of change as a *process*. The gradual shift from a phase-dominant and disjointed model of technological innovation to a process-and-systems view underpins the drive to create integrated complexes for research and development. These new associational forms are intended to give institutional expression and coherence to the research-to-production cycle. They reflect enhanced awareness that it is necessary to *organize* for innovation. The innovation cycle must be structured and managed as a process, which it has not been in the past. Significantly, in the 1970s one of the Soviet leadership's major discoveries about innovation has been the importance of the "management connection," together with the realization that action must be negotiated and mediated throughout the activity chain. Some Soviet specialists prefer, in fact, to speak in terms of a "research-management-production cycle," because it conveys a more adequate image of this complex process. Such phraseology also explicitly identifies and emphasizes the critical management function and linkage.[57]

As regards organizational innovation, too, Brezhnev and his colleagues have repeatedly stressed the notion that administrative improvement is a dynamic and continuing process. Change is not a single action. A situation cannot be radically altered by political fiat or by one structural blow of the organizational cudgel. Consequently, the regime

[56] Boris Z. Milner, "Sovershenstvovanie organizatsionnykh struktur upravleniia" [Improving Organizational Structures of Management], in *Sovremennye metody upravleniia narodnym khoziaistvom* [Modern Methods of Managing the National Economy], II (Vilnius: Litovskii Nauchno-Issledovatel'skii Institute Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoi Informatsii i Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskikh Issledovanii 1974), 22.

[57] V. I. Berlozertsev, "Soedinenie nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii s preimushchestvami sotsializma" [Combining the Scientific and Technological Revolution with the Advantages of Socialism], in *Problemy soedineniia dostizhenii nauchno-teckhnicheskoi revoliutsii s preimushchestvami sotsializma* [Problems of Combining the Achievements of the Scientific and Technological Revolution with the Advantages of Socialism] (Voronezh: Izd-vo Voronezhkogo Universiteta 1974), 11-12.

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has adopted an essentially experimental and incremental approach to change. Various administrative experiments using new planning and management techniques, incentive systems, and structural arrangements have been organized to effect improvements that would set examples for the rest of the system. The focus of reform strategy has come to center on organizational experiments at the microlevel, as a prelude to and precondition for any broader systems-engineering and macrolevel change.

To be sure, there is an important political rationale for this piecemeal and cautious approach. It is quite appropriate for a ruling oligarchy that is strongly apprehensive about any major and arbitrary assault on the status quo and entrenched bureaucratic interests. Organizational experiments on a "local" and limited basis provide a proving ground for new ideas. They tend to reduce fears of risk and feelings of uncertainty about change, and help to convince conservative critics of the correctness and benefits of innovation. Programs of management training and executive development—which form an integral part of this approach—provide opportunities to both Party and government cadres for learning and retooling, and thus diminish fears while increasing familiarity with modern concepts and techniques. In fact, one may say that, given Soviet conditions, this strategy is the only politically feasible one open to reform-minded authorities, and it has permitted the Brezhnev administration to survive, if not to succeed at raising administrative performance and capacity appreciably.

At the same time, however, one may argue that a kind of general "learning experience," which also contributes to this experimental and incremental perspective, seems to have taken place among the ruling elite. The Khrushchevian legacy made Soviet leaders not only weary but also wary of hasty, ill-conceived, and sweeping reorganizations. Through his frequently uninformed and forced interventions, officially dubbed "adventurist and harebrained schemes," Khrushchev sometimes made things different but not always better. Though his successors still grasp at panaceas and simplistic solutions, a new level of sophistication is evident in their wrestling with the issues of technological progress and management improvement. There is greater awareness of the multiplicity of factors involved in innovation, along with greater appreciation of the importance of effective coupling throughout the process. Steps forward have invariably turned out to be only half-steps. All the official acclaim about and accent on the need for a systems approach notwithstanding, there does seem to be increasing realization that perhaps there are no simple and total solutions, only partial

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remedies for the problems at hand. The complexity of Soviet society and the difficulty of effecting change in any one issue area have become steadily apparent and seem to defy, if not deny, any rapid and radical systems engineering.

The focus of Soviet politics and policy, therefore, has moved away from "change"—perceived and defined in rather broad and sharp systems terms (and often associated with whole stages of development)—to "adaptation," which captures the idea of within-system change as a dynamic process of gradual steps and adjustments. Adaptation also stresses the relationship between organization and environment, and the need for institutions to fit themselves to their complex surroundings.[58] Stated somewhat differently, the emphasis in development strategy and tactics has shifted from "major changes" to "marginal improvements"—to the accumulation of limited changes as the most appropriate means of producing ultimately extensive transformations. In the process, the level of elite expectations (and fears) has been lowered with respect to social engineering. At issue, then, is a kind of evolutionary development that stresses differences of degree rather than of kind. More and more, the dialectic of development assumes the form, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. Thus, a different kind of drama appears to be at work. Change through adaptation is more subtle, more ambiguous, more difficult to define, detect, and measure than the arbitrary wrenchings of the system and abrupt turnover of institutions, individuals, and policies that marked the movements of the regime in the past.

In light of the foregoing, a change of perspective and of language also seems to be in order with respect to the study of the Soviet Union by Western analysts. We, too, have long tended to think of change in starkly defined terms and simple dichotomies, like "degeneration" or "transformation," "petrification" or "pluralism."[59] Such a perception of the problem can make us insensitive to marginal adjustments, evolving experiments, and creeping innovations within the system. By posing developmental issues in predominantly "either/or" terms, we sometimes forget that reality is much more complex and resembles rather

[58] For an insightful discussion of the general problems of adaptation and change, see Herbert Kaufman, *The Limits of Organizational Change* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press 1971). For a look at the Soviet experience from what is predominantly a perspective of adaptation, see Karl W. Ryavek, ed., *Soviet Society and the Communist Party* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1978).

[59] See, for example, the seminal articles by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" *Problems of Communism*, XV (January-February 1966), 1-15, and Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" *Problems of Communism*, XXI (March-April 1972), 25-45.

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a "both/and" condition. Processes working both for and against change are always present, and the balance of forces between them is constantly shifting. A strongly exclusivist approach yields not only essentially static and excessively rigid models of the Soviet system, but causes us to lose sight of the very dynamics and dilemmas, the conflicts and choices, that underlie Soviet development and the political process. Just as the new reality, named the era of the STR, is generating adaptation and change in Soviet cognitive processes and attitudes, so it also makes it incumbent upon Western Sovietologists to sharpen their conceptual lenses and tools of analysis. We need, in particular, to become more aware of and to appreciate the growing complexity of Soviet society and the implications of this complexity for policy and change in the 1980s and beyond. Soviet authorities increasingly seem to recognize this dominant condition—even if grudgingly and slowly. It is important that we do so as well.

## The Soviet System in a Systems Age

What are we to make of this commotion about the so-called contemporary scientific and technological revolution, which seems to have become the Kremlin's frame of reference in the 1970s for organizing both domestic and foreign policy? With the "systems approach" fast becoming the last word in Soviet discussions of planning and management, are we indeed on the threshold of an era of change and a remaking of the Soviet system, if only with a more modern technological lining? Do recent developments portend the displacement of the *apparatchik* by a new Soviet organization man, the *sistemshchik*? Or, is all this talk mere rhetoric, the new jargon coined for purposes more of image-making than of policy-making?

There are, it seems, at least two ways of approaching these questions and of gaining some perspective on the significance of the current concern with systems. One way is to focus on the battery of new analytical and administrative techniques that are being developed to resolve problems attending the processes and consequences of development. This task involves examining the "modernization of technique" and assessing the effectiveness of new managerial devices for improving executive performance, such as Soviet-style matrix structures, project management, network planning, cost-benefit analysis, and computerized information systems. The basic problem with this approach, however, is that "effectiveness" is not easily measured and evaluated. The trouble lies not only in a lack of information about the actual practice of these

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innovations; there are also severe conceptual and methodological obstacles. It is exceedingly difficult to disentangle technique from a host of other factors with which it interacts—to "disembody" technology from the larger system of which it is an organic part.

On balance, it appears that the new management approaches and methods—when judiciously applied—do contribute to better performance. The improvements have been only marginal, however. The actual gains are much less comprehensive in scope and uneven in distribution than they are generally said to be. As a rule, innovations in technique tend to be greatly oversold—perhaps a necessary condition for getting attention and approval in the first place. Technique has become a fetish, and exaggerated expectations are the result. In the course of practical application, initial hopes invariably give way to disappointment, to a sobering of estimates, and ultimately to a new line of organizational panaceas and technological fixes upon which everything is supposed to depend. That is the perennial story of all Soviet reforms.

Alternatively, it is possible to look not at the new managerial tool kit in the making, but at the underlying problems to which the quest for improved technique is addressed. From that perspective, the significance of the U.S.S.R.'s belated awakening to the modern systems age is the discovery by its rulers that the Soviet system is, in fact, not a system in the sense of a well-integrated assembly of parts pulling together in the same direction. On the contrary, compartmentalization of activity and fragmentation of government stand out as dominant features of contemporary Soviet society. A confusing array of piecemeal approaches, programs, and structures exposes all too clearly the many "holes in the whole" and serious deficiencies in integrative capabilities. The rising stress on systems terminology and technology suggests a unity, coherence, and wholeness that are lacking in reality. Indeed, the systems approach is being used to a large extent as a rhetorical device for advocating comprehensive efforts at redesigning and improving the parts on which the regime relies, but which continue to disappoint in their performance.[60]

Similarly, the main theme that implicitly pervades studies of Soviet organization is the "disorganization" of policy and administration. The increasing burden of rigid and unresponsive institutions underlies the attention that is being given in the sphere of organizational design to

[60] For an excellent discussion of systems concepts and applications, though in a different context, see Ernst B. Haas, "Is There A Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes," *International Organization*, XXIX (Summer 1975), 827-76.

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the creation of dynamic, flexible, and adaptable structures. More and more, it is the bureaucratic features of the Soviet system that have come to the fore and pose the greatest challenges for the future. The Kremlin's real basis of concern, therefore, is growing realization and fear that the U.S.S.R. lacks not just modern hardware but, more important, the management software for mastering the contemporary STR.

At issue here are fundamental questions of power and leadership. In general, there has been a gradual erosion and diffusion of executive authority throughout the administrative structure since Stalin's death. Integrative capabilities, both analytical and managerial, are particularly lacking for large-scale, multi-ministerial projects that cut across organizational boundaries. Problems of science and technology as well as the development of regional resources are good examples of such "interbranch" projects. The importance of this class of problem is increasing, due to the forces of economic growth and the requirements of technical progress.[61] The crux of the matter is that the scale of these priority problems exceeds the competency of any agency to deal with them. As a result, they tend to fall victim to disaggregated and fragmented solutions. By their nature, such complex problems require close lateral relationships, joint collaboration, and strong coordination. Traditional management approaches, which emphasize hierarchy or informality, are hardly adequate for the task. A major aim, therefore, of the systems movement is to develop managerial devices that will facilitate effective patterns of interaction and integration.

The underlying deficiencies are to a certain extent faults in organizational design or in the adaptability of institutions to meet problems and opportunities. At the same time, however, they also appear to signify, if not the failure of leadership, then the failure of execution somewhere below the top. All the trappings of sophisticated technique aside, the core problems behind the professed need for a modern systems approach to planning and management basically involve issues of the effective distribution of power, responsibility, and accountability. As

[61] Mikhail P. Ring, a leading expert on science policy, writes: "The solution of interbranch, interregional, and national economic, scientific, and engineering problems determines on the whole the development of science and technology in the epoch of the STR." See "Problemnoe upravlenie v nauke: pravovye aspekty" [Problem-oriented Management in Science: Legal Aspects], *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR*, No. 7 (July 1976), 12-13. Professor Popov, Dean of the Economics Faculty at Moscow University, similarly notes, "Today virtually all questions of any importance—above all, the key problems of scientific and technical progress—have become interbranch in nature. That is why improvement of the mechanism of interbranch coordination is one of the core problems of management." See Popov, "Kakova nadezhnost' stykov?" [How Reliable Are the Interfaces?], *Pravda*, July 27, 1976.

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one prominent Soviet systems enthusiast acknowledges, "In itself, this approach is nothing new. It always appears where there is good management."[62]

It is therefore not accidental, writes M. P. Ring, that methods and forms of project management are at present being expanded, especially in the area of science and technology. Though the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has long used so-called "problem coordinators" to direct some of its major research programs, these individuals generally have only advisory authority. Similarly, chief designers are appointed in various branches of machine building, as are chief technologists or chief chemists in the chemical industry, to oversee the development of certain kinds of products and equipment. Because of their insufficiently defined powers and juridical status, however, they are frequently unable to carry out their functions. What is needed, according to Ring, are effective forms of project management which explicitly identify leadership roles and responsibilities. The alleged advantage of such administrative innovations is that they "combine the authority of power with the power of scientific authority, official responsibility with personal scientific duty, and the management of projects with direct participation in projects." Ring notes further that "the task is to put under this activity the necessary organizational foundation, to combine in an optimal way executive and advisory authority." The U.S.S.R. can no longer afford to base planning and management of some of its most important programs on essentially voluntary and informal methods.[63]

The call for modern systems or project management is a demand for greater personalization of power and authority and for the creation of more viable forms of "one-man command" for interbranch projects. More than any other kind of decision problem, these projects are subject to the practices and pathologies of interagency bargaining, committee decision making, and collective leadership. Behind the criticism of existing policies and procedures, one can sense a longing for a strong

[62] G. Pospelov, "Sistemnyi podkhod" [The Systems Approach], *Izvestiia*, March 21, 1974.

[63] Ring, "Problemnoe upravlnie v nauke" [Problem-oriented Management in Science], *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR*, No. 8 (August 1976), 34-35. In the past, scientific leaders of national priority programs were often powerful individuals who wielded considerable authority: Igor Kurchatov in nuclear industry, S. P. Korolev in the space program, and Trofim Lysenko in agriculture, were all strong "project managers" in their respective areas. As one knowledgeable observer writes, they "were able to force some ministers to resign if they found them inefficient in the management of the 'state-important' scientific programs." See Zhores Medvedev, *Soviet Science* (New York: Norton 1978), 130-31. In general, though, this kind of broad systems-management capability has been lacking in Soviet civilian-oriented research and development programs.

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administrative hand and leadership, to break through the labyrinth of bureaucracy.

The notion of "the organizational weapon" embodies the amalgamation and use of power and technology in the pursuit of political goals. The basic predicament confronting the Soviet rulers on the eve of the 1980s is that they appear to lack both the power and the technique for dealing with the complex problems of the present era. The administrative arsenal, built largely for purposes of propelling the Soviet Union into the steel age, is hardly adequate for moving it into the computer age. New organizational weapons are needed to break the new barriers of complexity.

How the leaders respond to these conditions of heightened complexity will be a key factor in the decade ahead. They may learn to live with, and to cope with, complexity and its constraints in a creative way along lines suggested by Boris Milner and other analysts. Such an attitude may lead them to seek not only more flexible organizational models and sophisticated management techniques, but new definitions of administrative and political rationality as well. On the other hand, the ruling group may come to feel overwhelmed by change and complexity. Those who remain skeptical of the relevance of advanced management methods to the problems at hand may grow in number and influence. Reorganization planners who, like Milner, press for restraint in the face of complexity, and change strategists who champion an incremental and experimental approach, may increasingly be seen as counselors of despair. Growing impatient and dissatisfied with the marginal returns of limited reforms and complex solutions, some members of the ruling establishment may hark back to a more heroic tradition and radical approach to systems engineering—with greater reliance on raw power, rapid changes, and strong personal leadership to work the needed improvements in the bureaucracy, economy, and society.

Though it is difficult to foresee the particular mix of power, organization, and technique in the offing, we can reasonably assume that at least the immediate future will not entail an "age of discontinuity." Political dynamics and systemic inertial forces militate against any comprehensive and fundamental systems change. Indeed, the machinery of rule bears the heavy stamp of past reorganizations that have resulted in considerable bureaucratic layering. Administrative echelon has been piled upon administrative echelon in an unremitting quest for coordination and order. The crazy-quilt pattern of Soviet administra-

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tion with all its crosscutting jurisdictions and interests aggravates the difficulties of making changes in organizational structures, procedures, and policies. Although almost every issue seems to cry out for a systems approach, conditions make comprehensive solutions both impossible and undesirable. Moreover, the growing complexity and interdependency of society impose their own kinds of constraints and require greater differentiation as well as integration in policy making and execution. Existing deficiencies cannot be easily eradicated—and certainly not by misleading holistic terms and the use of modern systems phraseology by the Kremlin.

The extent to which the Soviet political command is able to bring the perspectives and techniques of space-age management to bear, not just in the military sphere but on its civilian problems and programs, will provide the real test of leadership in the next decade. The dominant issues of today and tomorrow challenge the adaptive capabilities of the administrative system and force attention to the need for more imaginative and effective management approaches and methods. Herein lies the significance of recent Soviet efforts to rethink the organizational weapon.

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# COALITION MAINTENANCE IN THE SOVIET UNION

By DENNIS ROSS

OBSERVERS of the Soviet scene often describe Soviet decision making in terms of the interplay of elite factions. Although analysts as diverse as Robert Conquest and Alexander Dallin refer to the formation and dissolution of coalitions at the apex of the Soviet regime, no student of Soviet decision making has ever attempted to apply coalition concepts in a more serious and systematic way to the Soviet political universe. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that no one has ever attempted to apply any aspect of coalition theory to Soviet decision making.

For a long time, the dominant totalitarian model of analysis ruled out the play of politics and therefore made the application of any such theory irrelevant. Even now, however, when most analysts accept a play of politics sufficient to justify a coalition approach,[1] the inherent difficulty of acquiring information about the dynamics of Soviet decision making tends to limit the use of more theoretical approaches to explain the Soviet polity. Still, the difficulty with access does not (and should not) rule out informed speculations about Soviet decision making; it should therefore not rule out efforts to make these speculations more systematic and based on more explicit assumptions.

In this regard, the use of either aspect of coalition theory—that is, formation or maintenance—intuitively seems to be useful. Indeed, the formation aspect of coalition theory poses questions that provide a basis on which to organize the study of decision making and crises of succession. In whose interest is a particular change? Who are the natural allies and adversaries? What resources do individual actors possess? Which actors are most important to the success of the coalition? What are the payoffs? Concepts of coalition formation should thus be useful, in these more narrow cases, in both an analytical and a predictive sense.

Rather than to apply concepts of coalition formation to narrow or historical cases, however, I prefer in this essay to look at Soviet decision making more generally. I propose to do this by relating the elements of coalition maintenance to the Soviet polity to see how and why they

[1] For a contrary view—i.e., one that emphasizes the continuing utility of the totalitarian model for interpreting Soviet reality—see William E. Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," *World Politics*, XXVIII (July 1976), 542-67.

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operate in the Soviet setting. Because the Soviet decision-making structure and political system appear to be remarkably stable, the use of that aspect of coalition theory which focuses on coalition preservation and asks what political myths, factors, and mechanisms exist to minimize elite conflict, should offer important clues to the functioning of the Soviet decision-making process.

With this in mind, I will proceed to indicate how the general features of the Soviet political landscape correspond to concepts of coalition maintenance; to identify the socioeconomic and political changes that make it possible for principles of coalition maintenance to describe the Soviet decision-making process; to trace the emergence of this rule of coalition maintenance in the Soviet Union; and finally, to assess the implications of this rule for future political development in the U.S.S.R.

## THE RELEVANCE OF COALITION MAINTENANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION

In order to determine the relevance of concepts of coalition maintenance to the Soviet Union, it is necessary to outline those elements that contribute most to the maintenance of coalitions in general. The most important factor is the actors' fear of the alternative.[2] Specifically, their fear that the breakup of the equilibrium or coalition may occasion possibly devastating results provides them with the single strongest incentive to maintain the coalition.

However, extreme fear of the consequences of a breakdown is not sufficient by itself to preserve a coalition. Though it may make actors more amenable to compromise, it does not necessarily reduce their basic conflicts of interest or the propensities for dissatisfaction that can destroy a coalition over time. Consequently, coalition theorists have suggested that, for a coalition to endure, there must not only be fear of the alternative, but also methods that both reduce conflicts within a coalition and increase the coalition's capacity to handle the remaining disagreements.[3] These methods or mechanisms have been identified as: (1) the operation of a unanimity rule in decision making (all members must give their consent or agree before a decision on any significant question is made); (2) the existence of a real power broker (an actor able to offer incentives or impose sanctions powerful enough to induce the other members to compromise); and (3) the partial exclusion of

[2] See, for example, William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1962), 174-82; John Schwartz, "Maintaining Coalitions: An Analysis of the EEC with Supporting Evidence from the Austrian Grand Coalition," in Sven Goennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1970), 235-49.

[3] *Ibid.*, 240.

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issues (the avoidance of decisions on issues that are inherently so polarizing as to make compromise very difficult).[4]

On the whole, these elements tend to relate roughly to the Soviet political context. For example, the "fear of the alternative" seems to fit especially well into the reality of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, in the Soviet political arena, any breakup of equilibrium and resultant conflict among the elite vitiates the system's key ideological myth—namely, the existence of total unity, harmony, and homogeneity in the service of the ultimate political and social goals. As a consequence, any such conflict must render the underpinnings of the system less tenable, undermine the legitimacy of the leadership's claim to power, erode the individual security of elite members, and even threaten to convulse the whole society by possibly involving previously quiescent elements. Separately and in combination, these threats serve to instill in members of the Soviet hierarchy the sense that the disruption of equilibrium or of the existing coalition poses a risk to them all, and thus needs to be avoided.

At least some of the mechanisms or conditions necessary to forestall or cope with conflict are also a natural part of the Soviet political landscape. For example, as indicated above, ideological demands and requirements of legitimacy have always dictated a general rule of unanimity in the conduct of Soviet political decision making. What has facilitated and enhanced both adherence to and operation of the unanimity rule is the functioning of the Soviet power broker—the General Secretary. His power of patronage, his ability to intervene in the work and monitor the activities of institutions other than the Party, his capacity to exploit and play off the differences among the institutional and Party leaders, together with his professional background in the Party apparatus that conditions him to assume such a role—especially since his success seems to hinge on it—makes the General Secretary a natural power broker.

The existence of unanimity and a power broker—in combination with the foreboding sense of the consequences of a coalition breakdown—suggests that the conditions for coalition maintenance are present in the Soviet Union. More than just existing, however, the operation of coalition maintenance has become necessary, and perhaps even ensured, by ideological and developmental factors. On the one hand, because ideological and legitimating myths have denied the possibility of conflict among an infallible, monolithic Party, fully authoritative provisions for resolving conflict have been lacking. On the other hand, the

[4] *Ibid.*, 245-46.

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logical development of multiple interests and the emergence of competing power centers have made the existence of conflict a certainty. Although a struggle for power among a very narrow circle of leaders is inevitable in a system that provides no institutional means for the transfer of power, the fact that the different leaders have come to represent competing interests rather than just themselves makes any conflict a threat to the system—and thereby necessitates the operation of coalition maintenance in the Soviet Union.

What I am really suggesting is that the emergence of a kind of oligarchic rule has assured that a decision-making process characterized by coalition maintenance would evolve in the Soviet system. With the development of what Robert Dahl might call a competitive oligarchy[5]—that is, competition among a narrow plurality of strategic elites and their leaders at the apex of the system—the concept of coalition maintenance has increasingly come to describe Soviet reality. Oligarchical rule has reinforced the need to hide conflict or to cope with it, and as a consequence has made the alternative to coalition even less acceptable.

In addition, oligarchical rule has necessarily made the need for unanimity more meaningful politically; it has forced the General Secretary to become more of a "broker" and less of an "initiator," and even fostered the advent of a technique of exclusion. For example, especially in the post-Khrushchev period, discussion of contentious issues has increasingly been delayed and the content defused by the Politburo's deliberate use of *ad hoc* committees to cope with divisive problems.[6] (To the extent that these problems have not lent themselves to easy solution or compromise, the post-Khrushchev team has simply chosen to postpone difficult decisions in order to avoid sharp clashes.)[7]

In short, it might be said that in the Soviet context, oligarchy naturally fosters a process of coalition maintenance; the more competitive the oligarchy, the greater the need for a mechanism to control the competition. In order to trace the emergence of this competition, and at the same time further justify the characterization of the Soviet decision-making process in terms of coalition maintenance, I will briefly describe the development of multiple power centers (and oligarchical rule) in the U.S.S.R. I will also discuss the emergence of a decision-making style that is characterized by lowest-common-denominator or rule-by-

[5] Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1972).

[6] Dmitry Simes and Gordon Rocca, "Soviet Decision-Making and National Security Affairs," *Georgetown CSIS Memorandum* 20-KM-12-4 (January 1974), 10.

[7] Frederick Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 224.

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committee principles—the natural by-products of an oligarchial process dependent on unanimity and a power broker.

## THE ADVENT OF OLIGARCHY IN THE U.S.S.R.

In the simplest sense, the emergence of multiple power centers and strategic elites grew directly out of the process of industrialization. As in the general case where modernization breeds complexity and differentiation of function, and where "no single strategic elite can know all there is to know,"[8] so in the Soviet Union: economic development produced technical-administrative specialization that led to differentiation among the top leaders. Although functional bureaucracies and strategic elites did develop under Stalin, it would be wrong to characterize them as real power centers; rather, these entities are better described as the instruments of Stalin's rule. That is, because he used his massive machinery of terror constantly to purge personnel and to enable himself to intervene arbitrarily at any level of the administrative hierarchy, Stalin kept what amounted to the institutional pillars of the regime—the Party *apparat*, the state-administrative organs, the economic-industrial managers, the military establishment, and the secret police—in a perpetual state of insecurity and disarray. He was thus able to use these institutions to enhance his personal power and that of the state without becoming excessively beholden to any of them.

After Stalin's death, the leaders of the various functional elites agreed to end the use of massive terror. They recognized that the public craved a period of relaxation, and that further societal development required a sense of routine and stability. In addition, the leadership itself demanded a high level of personal and bureaucratic security.

The relaxation of terror and the related advent of "political death" under Khrushchev (that is, the loser in a contest for power dies politically but remains alive physically, often with a pension or an office devoid of political significance)[9] made the various strategic elites and their leaders not only more secure, but also more assertive in pressing their interests. Indeed, as the exigencies of power and the complexities of governing a modernized society tended to erode the Party's position further, the role and importance of the other major bureaucratic actors increased.[10] These actors became more resistant to Khrushchev's per-

[8] Quoted in Milton Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill 1969), 4.

[9] Alexander Yanov, *Détente After Brezhnev*, Special Studies Monograph (University of California, Berkeley, March 1977), 8.

[10] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," in Richard Cornel, ed., *The Soviet Political System* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970), 370.

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sonal control, more conscious of their institutional interests, and increasingly capable of supporting their own divergent claims.

Even the appointment of Khrushchev's "own men" to positions within the varying strategic elites could not stem the tide of emerging oligarchical interests and thus could not guarantee continuing subservience. In characterizing this phenomenon, Alexander Yanov observes that as soon as "terror disappears and the elite becomes differentiated, it becomes apparent that [its members], even though they are the 'master's men,' personally selected by him, are members of their social groups first and functionaries second. As Khrushchev's experience shows, the interests of the group they represent are infinitely more important to them than the master's interests."[11]

Though the elimination of mass terror made the leading institutional actors more independent and secure (and also denied Khrushchev the wherewithal to become a dictator), it may have contributed directly to the development of oligarchical rule in another way. Without the use of terror, it became impossible, in Richard Lowenthal's words, to carry on "new revolutions from above," designed fundamentally to transform the social structure of the U.S.S.R.[12] Lowenthal notes that, with the Party's declaration in its 1961 Program that the "building of communism" was henceforth to be defined in terms of steady improvements in productivity and the standard of living and not in terms of structural change, it became clear that the Soviet Union had ended its commitment to imposing basic societal change. As the purpose of the regime became more and more to administer the results of the revolution rather than to carry it out, the leading institutions of the state (1) staked out and defended their functions and "oligarchic privileges,"[13] (2) manifested ever more "satisfaction with the established political setting," and (3) became increasingly resistant to change.[14]

To overcome the deepening bureaucratic rigidity and the general resistance to change of the major power centers in the regime, Khrushchev undertook a number of actions that ranged from shaking up the administrative structure and personnel to publicly bringing pressure on his opponents in the central leadership. However, Khrushchev's reforms, rather than overcoming bureaucratic ossification and oligarchic resistance, were often vitiated.[15]

[11] Yanov (fn. 9), 41.

[12] Lowenthal, "The Revolution Withers Away," in Cornel (fn. 10), 190.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Brzezinski (fn. 10), 371.

[15] This was particularly true of Khrushchev's attempts to change the investment priorities in heavy industry from steel to chemicals, and to execute organizational and structural reforms in the party and governmental apparatuses.

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Khrushchev's eventual ouster demonstrates the deepening and growing force of oligarchic rule in the U.S.S.R. After all, Khrushchev was ousted as much for his style of leadership as for disagreement over the directions of policy. It could be said that he was deposed largely because the actions he undertook in order to reintroduce a social and economic dynamism into the Soviet polity seemed designed to enhance his own personal power at the expense of that of other leaders and their institutional bases. By threatening the institutional prerogatives of almost every other major actor, and by violating the norms of collective leadership (bringing outsiders to meetings of the Central Committee plenum and, in some cases, the Presidium; announcing in advance the agendas of these meetings; sending members of his personal coterie on diplomatic missions), Khrushchev seemed determined to rid himself of the constraints imposed on him and to replace collective rule by a far more personal one. His inability to undermine the collective decision-making structure, however, suggests that the oligarchic pattern of rule solidified in the "non-terrorized" Khrushchev period.

If the Khrushchev era witnessed the rise and consolidation of rule by oligarchy, the post-Khrushchev epoch has witnessed attempts to secure it more firmly. Not only has the virtue and importance of collective leadership been constantly extolled,[16] but every attempt has been made to entrench the ruling elites more firmly. Khrushchev's appeal for a "circulation of elites" has been replaced by calls for "trust in cadres"—trust in officialdom. Demands for attaining unprecedented results have been replaced by a recognition of the need for more modest targets. Continuing public obeisance is paid to "scientific management"—a euphemism for increased regularity and routine of consultation among leaders and experts in order to guarantee the more efficient management of society. In brief, the post-Khrushchev period has been characterized by a growing routinization of function, heightened sense of bureaucratic order, greater leadership stability, and general normalization of the decision-making process.

The extraordinary decline in turnover throughout the elite, together

[16] One especially good example of this is provided by Ia. P. Riabov's speech at the 25th Party Congress. Riabov praised the collective character of the Politburo (and implicitly its decision-making process) by observing that activity in the Politburo constituted a "good example of precise, smooth, and collegial work combining principled demandingness with necessary attention, respect, and trust in cadres." *Pravda*, February 27, 1976. (All translations from the Russian are by the author.) For a discussion of this theme, see George Breslauer, "The 25th Party Congress: Domestic Issues," in Alexander Dallin, ed., *The 25th Party Congress* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press 1977), 7-26.

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with the growth in the apparent recognition of the status and power of each institutional group, graphically reflects the growing institutionalization of an oligarchical rule in the current period. Alexander Yanov refers to the extremely limited turnover in the elite by taking note of the remarkable "stability [among the ranks] of Central Committee or Politburo members, province Party committee apparatchiki, ministry staffs, and even enterprise and institute directors."[17] Unlike the periods of succession after Lenin and Stalin, in which turnover was nearly total in the Central Committee and the Politburo, the post-Khrushchev period has produced only minimal changes in these two decision-making organs. For example, the inner sanctum of the Politburo—Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Suslov—has remained intact. (Even Podgorny's eventual ouster after 13 years does not detract from this observation. Indeed, the fact that he endured so long without having any institutional base tends to confirm rather than to contradict the principle of stability and routinization of this elite.) Moreover, 81 percent of the living Central Committee members elected in 1966 were "re-elected" in 1971, and 89 percent were re-elected in 1976.[18] This stability has also been reflected in leading government organs like the Council of Ministers, where only 1 of the 11 First Deputies has been replaced, and only 4 of 57 ministers or State Committee Chairmen have been replaced over the period of the last two Party Congresses.

The absence of turnover and the apparent long tenure in high-level positions goes hand in hand with the increased recognition of the "rights" and status of each major institutional actor; although individuals as such are not appointed to the Central Committee, the jobs they occupy—within the various institutional-bureaucratic entities—are appointive and fill out the Central Committee. In this connection, Robert Daniels argues plausibly that there exists an "unwritten code which allocates to each functional hierarchy and Union Republic a proportion of Central Committee seats corresponding to the imputed status and importance of the particular institution or region."[19] To the extent that this is true, it means that the special interests of the leading bureaucratic actors are probably advanced or defended by their representatives in the leading decision-making councils, that the institutional weight of each functional or territorial unit is recognized and at least broadly

[17] Yanov (fn. 9), 8.

[18] Jerry Hough, "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System," *Problems of Communism*, XXVI (March-April 1976), 3.

[19] Daniels, "Office Holding and Elite Status," in Paul Cocks, Robert Daniels, and Nancy Heer, eds., *Political Dynamics of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1976), 87.

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defined, and that moves against individual members of the Central Committee are likely to be interpreted in institutional rather than in personal terms. Because the focal point of decision making—the Politburo—has also been characterized by an increasingly representational pattern, these same general implications may also apply to the top decision-making body. As a result, the reason one has seen, in Jerry Hough's words, "no frontal assaults on major power centers of the type noticeable prior to Khrushchev's fall,"[20] is rather clear: the major power centers have staked out their interests and are in better positions to defend them.

The current Soviet political process could thus be described as a pluralism of elites and an oligarchical structure of rule. With the further entrenchment of the various strategic elites, politics and policy making in the post-Khrushchev era (at the apex of the regime) has increasingly amounted to rule by committee—where the committee's first goal is its preservation, where the rules of interaction are upgraded and routinized, and where, ineluctably, the most powerful interests in the country are mediated.

In such an environment one would expect a kind of lowest-common-denominator mentality and range of policies to emerge, and in Brezhnev's Soviet Union that is precisely what we have seen. Khrushchev's major foreign and domestic policies have been continued (even his presumably "hare-brained" Virgin Lands Program has been pursued with only modest changes);[21] no important vested interests associated with these policies have been threatened. In the course of pursuing policies favorable to each elite, the leadership has necessarily forsworn the re-arranging of basic budgetary priorities and has given in to the various "elites' desires for incremental annual increases in appropriations."[22] The specialized policies that are pursued seem to be those that each of the functional elites might be expected to favor (given the prevailing distribution of funds); thus, military policy is close to that favored by the military, the function of the Party is close to that favored by the Party *apparat*, economic policy is close to that favored by the dominant economic administrators, educational policy is close to that favored by the educators, and so on.

In short, the Soviet rule by committee has ensured not only that each major sector will grow incrementally, but that all the most powerful

[20] Hough (fn. 18), 5.

[21] Richard M. Mills, "The Virgin Lands Since Khrushchev: Choices and Decisions in Soviet Policy-Making," in Cocks, Daniels, and Heer (fn. 19), 179-91.

[22] Jerry Hough, "Soviet Succession," *Washington Post*, April 17, 1977, p. 15.

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interests in the system will be taken into account when broad policy is made. That the principle of weighing all major interests has become a central norm of the decision-making process is further suggested by its application in the making of immediate policy choices or decisions. For example, as the Czechoslovak crisis reached its high point, and as opinion varied within the Politburo as to what to do, the members of the Politburo travelled as a body to the Czechoslovak border (Cierna) to meet with Dubeck and his associates.[23] Similarly, during the 1974 SALT talks in Moscow, direct U.S.-Soviet meetings had to be recessed so that the Politburo could be convened, apparently in order to decide as a group what the next step in the negotiations should be.[24]

Even on less weighty matters, collective decision making (as well as collective responsibility) has been the rule. Mohamed Heikal—in an account of a meeting between Nasser and his delegation and the Soviet leadership in June 1970—provides an example of just how routinized collective decision making had become:

> There was one rather odd incident during this meeting in the Kremlin. At one point the door opened and a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into the room and gave a piece of paper to Vladimir Vinogradov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Vinogradov gave the paper to Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who read it, got up, and took it to Kosygin. Kosygin read it, and gave it to Brezhnev. Brezhnev read it, and gave it back to Kosygin. Kosygin then gave it to Podgorny. Podgorny read it, and gave it back to Kosygin, who gave it back to Brezhnev. Then, Brezhnev signed it, and gave it to Kosygin who signed it too. Then Podgorny signed. Then Podgorny gave it to Gromyko, who gave it to Vinogradov, who gave it back to the Foreign Office official. The official then left the room.
>
> The whole transaction took, I suppose, about five minutes. It had begun while Nasser was speaking, but when he noticed that everyone was taken up with something else, he stopped. When it was all over, Brezhnev saw that the whole Egyptian delegation was staring at him, and presumably felt that he ought to give some sort of explanation. "This is something that concerns you too," he said. "We have received information that there will be an attempt at a coup d'état against General Siad in Somalia tonight. We have accordingly decided to send him a telegram of warning. Now we have seen this telegram and approved it."[25]

The natural conclusion is that the Soviet Union has evolved over time

[23] Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision-Making and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, VIII (Spring/Summer 1975), 147-73.

[24] Thomas Wolfe, *The SALT Experience*, Rand Report R-1686-pr (September 1975), 190.

[25] Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Ballantine Books 1976), 90.

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from a system where one interest (namely, Stalin's) governed its collective behavior, to a system where the country's major interests (as embodied in the central institutional actors) meet at the apex of the regime, to be mediated and minimally satisfied. In sum, a kind of pluralism of elites and a related oligarchical rule has evolved from the totalitarian dictatorship as terror has been abandoned and revolutionary changes engineered from above have been forsaken. Because of the ideological underpinnings of the system and the resulting non-provision of fully authoritative and legitimate means for resolving conflict, coalition maintenance and a kind of general incrementalism have come to characterize the most recent phase of Soviet decision making. Before we attempt to determine whether coalition maintenance can last in the Soviet environment—and indeed what the broad implications of its endurance might be—we must remind ourselves that, because of the operation of coalition maintenance, the Soviet Union has become an incremental polity. In concrete terms, the functioning of coalition maintenance in the Soviet decision-making process guarantees that change will be of a limited nature: since the accommodation of the demands of one elite group very often requires restriction on another's, any changes must be gradual and incremental.

In theoretical terms, the Soviet political system also seems to live up to the conditions that characterize incrementalist polities. The hallmark of an incrementalist decision-making approach is, according to Charles Lindblom, agreement on "the fundamentals": he notes that, because "great ideological issues" are no longer being decided, widespread consensus on fundamental values and widespread agreement on the general direction and character of social change, as well as the general preference for incremental as opposed to drastic social change, allow for the kind of mutual adjustment that is the essence of incrementalism.[26] In the Soviet Union, an elite that has ceased to be revolutionary has agreed to the need to:

—avoid conflict
—substitute pragmatism for utopianism
—guarantee a more certain routinization and recognition of roles
—assure personal and bureaucratic security.

Under these circumstances, drastic social changes are feared and rejected; the only changes that are tolerated and accepted are those brought about by incremental policy growth.

Because incrementalism allows for only gradual—indeed marginal—

[26] Lindblom, "Policy Analysis," *American Economic Review*, XLVIII (June 1958), 301.

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change, the polity may not be able to cope with broad Soviet problems. Certain issues may not be amenable to marginal adjustments. In fact, some socioeconomic problems in the Soviet Union may require drastic changes in policy that will amount to frontal assaults on the interests of important institutional actors. Should this happen, the consensus (or the agreement on fundamentals) that underpins Soviet incrementalism is likely to fall apart.

To put it another way: as current policies become less satisfactory, and as the available means (economic and political) for dealing with this problem diminish, the Soviet consensus may well break down. In that event, the process of coalition maintenance, and the institutional distribution of power which it ensures, may not endure.

What are the problems that threaten consensus? What will spur them on? How could they be remedied? And what does all this tell us about the future development of the Soviet polity and the duration of its current decision-making process?

## CONSENSUS-THREATENING PROBLEMS AND DEMANDS

In the U.S.S.R. (as elsewhere), increasing systemic demands are being made on an economy whose growth rates are steadily declining. Before explaining why this combination of circumstances is likely to be especially serious in the Soviet setting, and from where the demands on the system are coming, we must identify why the Soviet economy is facing severe growth problems.

Technological lag, poor efficiency, and low labor productivity have been endemic to the Soviet Union's command economy, but the latest and by far the most detrimental element in its economic equation is the decline in the expansion of the labor force. Starting around 1970, the U.S.S.R. began to run out of its plentiful reserves of labor—the mainstay of Soviet industrialization and modernization. Whereas industrial employment grew by 3.7 percent annually between 1950 and 1970, the rate declined to 1.3 percent between 1971 and 1975; it is expected to fall below 1 percent in the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan, and is not expected to grow at all in the 1980s.[27]

This diminution of the labor force is a threat to the Soviet economy because economic growth in the U.S.S.R. has traditionally been dependent on the use of mass reservoirs of manpower to compensate for shortages of capital and low factor productivity (labor and capital). In order to sustain economic growth during a period of declin-

[27] Gregory Grossman, "An Economy at Middle Age," *Problems of Communism*, XXVI (March-April 1976), 18-19.

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ing availability of labor, the Kremlin will have to substitute capital for labor and raise general factor productivity.[28] However, the Soviets have never demonstrated the ability to do either, and their capacity to do so now or in the near future, without the implementation of necessary reforms or "help" from the West, is particularly poor. The reason is that, in order to perform either of these tasks, the Soviet Union would have to accelerate the pace of capital formation (the investment in this area is already extremely high) and increase material incentives. These steps would be extremely expensive, could cause other strains in the economy, and would not even guarantee success.

As if this problem were not severe enough, the U.S.S.R. may also be facing a shortfall of oil production in the mid-1980s. The C.I.A. has predicted that in this period Soviet oil production could fall off by 2 to 3 million barrels per day, and that the increase in overall energy output might be only a little more than 1 percent annually.[29] Since energy consumption in the Soviet Union has traditionally increased in close parallel with the growth of the economy, a sharp slowdown in energy production could signal a serious constraint on economic growth. Cutting back on fuel exports (and perhaps even becoming a net importer) might satisfy the U.S.S.R.'s internal needs; but fuel exports are the country's largest source of hard currency and are necessary to finance the acquisition of Western technology. The latter has become increasingly necessary not only for the extraction and exploitation of difficult-to-reach natural resources, but also for increased capital productivity in industry and the economy in general.

The foregoing suggests that the Soviet Union may find it very difficult to generate more than limited economic growth in the mid-1980s. Yet, because of ideological claims and legitimating requirements, as well as rising demands from a number of areas in society, high rates of economic growth must be fostered and sustained.

Although ideology has certainly diminished as a legitimating agent, it should not be discounted; at the very least it still colors assumptions and expectations about the Party and the regime. However, to the extent that ideological dynamism has declined, it has been replaced by a new legitimating requirement—the need to satisfy popular welfare. In this respect, the masses are oriented toward the system's output and have come to expect that the state will provide not only health care and universal education, but, more importantly, a gradual increase in

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects*, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (August 1977), 6.

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consumer goods, improvements in housing and diet, and income increments accompanied by stable prices. Although the "delivery of the goods," so to speak, has bred support for the regime, it has also raised expectancy; if unfulfilled, this expectancy can be a source of real danger to the system. Indeed, the occurrence of violent civil disturbances in Novocherkassak in 1962 after an increase in food prices lends credence to Andrei Amalrik's speculation that "an abrupt slowdown in the growth of prosperity, a halt or a move backwards, would evoke strong outbursts of dissatisfaction, combined with violence as would previously have been impossible."[30]

The 1970 and 1976 riots in Poland—which were triggered by increases in consumer prices—have undoubtedly served to remind the Soviet leadership that the possibility is very real. Indeed, Khrushchev observed in his memoirs that, unless the situation for Soviet consumers improved, riots like those in Poland in 1970 might take place in the Soviet Union.[31]

That Soviet elites are aware of the danger of not satisfying mass expectancy appears beyond question.[32] A recent Soviet emigré has even gone so far as to say that the leadership understands that in order to preserve its privileges, it must "buy off the people by providing them with food, clothing and shoes, solving their housing problem, giving them automobiles . . . giving them the opportunity to have a European standard of living."[33]

Buying off the masses, however, even at a very gradual and incremental pace, will not be cheap; in fact, as time goes by, it will become a significant drag on investment as infrastructures for certain consumer products will have to be developed to engender continued growth. Satisfying the expectations of the masses in order to protect the system's legitimacy and the elite's security should thus be seen as one major area where the system itself is producing rising demands on the economy. These demands can only be met by solid economic growth.

Other rising demands on the economy emanate from the needs of the National Republics, the new problems of raw material acquisition, the requirements of agriculture, and the incremental growth expectations

[30] Amalrik, "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" *Survey* (London) (Autumn 1969), 61.

[31] Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: Last Testament*, trans. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown 1975), 146.

[32] See, for example, Walter Conner's discussion of the elite's realization of this factor in "Generations and Politics in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, XXV (November-December 1975), 20-31.

[33] Yanov (fn. 9), 32.

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of the various institutional-elite actors. The growing economic pressures from the National Republics have taken a number of forms, such as demands for quickening the pace of local industrial development; modernization of the local economies to replace their segmented (in some cases monofunctional or monocrop) character; and the expansion of welfare services, ranging from massive provision of housing to better employment opportunities.[34] When linked to their traditional resistance to russification and their frustration over the fact that Russians occupy the most desirable (and steadily less available) administrative, technical, and skilled positions, these concerns carry the prospect—as indicated in the recent riots in the Georgian Republic[35]—of serious local unrest. In order to ameliorate this local unrest, an influx of development-investment monies will be required.

However, because resource-acquisition and agricultural needs are also imposing strong demands on development-investment monies, there is reason to believe that such funds will not be channeled to many National Republics. Investment in new projects is guided by All-Union rather than local needs and interests; most new investments are being directed toward two specific regions—Siberia and Central Asia—in order to cope with the depleted mineral and energy resource base and to reclaim large tracts of land for further agricultural development. Thus, many of the National Republics will simply not have their monetary needs met; moreover, the size of the new investments also indicates that funds available for more general capital formation and investment throughout the rest of the economy will be reduced.

As monies for new investment become more difficult to find and to generate, it will become more difficult to satisfy the incremental growth demands of all of the leading bureaucratic actors. Indeed—given the tautness of the budget—attempts to satisfy even the minimal demands of the elites, the general masses, the National Republics, as well as the system itself (for example, replacement of depleted energy resources), must inevitably force unwelcome and unequal sacrifices on at least some sectors of the elite. Hence, in an era when lagging economic

[34] Grey Hodnett, "Technology and Change in Soviet Central Asia," in Henry Morton and Rudolph Tokes, eds., *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970s* (New York: Free Press 1974), 97-106.

[35] In April 1978, some twenty thousand Georgians demonstrated (at times violently) against proposed provisions that would have emphasized the use of Russian in place of the Georgian language throughout the Republic. In June, 1978, protests against Georgian dominance in Abkhazistan led to demonstrations that may have involved ten to twelve thousand protesters. See Craig Whitney, "Georgians Protest Dropping of Language, "*New York Times*, April 15, 1978, p. 3, and "Dispute in Caucasus Mirrors Nationality Problems," *New York Times*, June 25, 1978, p. 3.

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growth rates will be outstripped by systemic demands, it will be increasingly difficult to sustain the satisfaction (and therefore agreement) of the strategic elites.

### COALITION MAINTENANCE AND THE FRUSTRATION OF NECESSARY REFORMS

The only practical way to satisfy both the various elite actors and the greater demands on the system is to expand the Soviet economic pie more rapidly; this kind of growth could be realized, but in the Soviet context it would call for some fundamental reforms. While capital goods and technology from the West can help to support needed capital formation, increase capital productivity, and perhaps even prevent the Soviet economy from falling technologically further behind Western economies, such importation is at best a stop-gap measure. It cannot significantly affect labor productivity, and it can neither cope with the chronic inefficiency of Soviet industry nor make innovation and the development of new technologies more likely in the Soviet economy. To achieve these necessary changes, a reordering of investment priorities and a basic structural overhaul of the economic administration would probably be required.

In the first place, a reordering of investment priorities in favor of consumer and light industries is probably essential for increasing labor productivity. Such a change in investment priorities would provide Soviet workers with something to buy with their money, and thus would make material incentives meaningful. At present, because of the poor quality and general scarcity of desirable consumer goods, material incentives have little meaning for the workers; indeed, since there is not much to buy with bonuses or the like, extra money is apparently merely siphoned off into savings accounts. The existence of a high volume of unsold goods and the tremendous growth in private savings seem to confirm this point: liquid savings accounts have grown from 10.3 rubles per capita in 1950 to 357.4 rubles per capita in 1975.[36]

Second, in order to overcome the woeful bottlenecks, the irrational assortment of products, and the slow pace of technological change in the Soviet economy, the centralized material-technical supply network will have to be altered to allow for more local autonomy and more normal supply relationships.[37] Soviet economists have focused espe-

[36] Gertrude Schroder and Barbara Severin, "Soviet Consumption and Income Policy in Perspective," in U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (October 1976), 629-30.

[37] See Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economic System* (London: Allen and Unwin 1977), 60-67.

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cially on the need to rationalize economic administration. While never overtly challenging the ideologically sancrosanct principle of centralized planning, they have called for more local input and initiative, for more lower-level autonomy and freedom from ministerial interference, and for more logical relationships between complementary enterprises —that is, "enterprises that are interconnected by cooperation [should not be] subordinate to different main administrations or even different ministries, [even though] located in different oblasts and rayons."[38]

Implementation of any of the above reforms would, however, violate the traditional ideological norms of the system and also frontally challenge the interests of important sectors within the regime. On the one hand, giving priority to consumer-related investments—even though indirectly enhancing growth—runs counter to the deep-seated communist belief that consumption is, at best, a by-product of growth, and that growth-oriented goals (which are defined in terms of heavy industrial power) cannot be sacrificed on the altar of consumer interests. On the other hand, because structural reforms would increase local autonomy, they would not only threaten to undermine hierarchical and horizontal political controls, but would also endanger the institutional prerogatives and overall power of those responsible for exercising these controls and managing the economy.

In short, because important vested interests would be seriously threatened if either reform was fully executed, it is difficult to see how, in a coalition maintenance or an incrementalist political setting, forceful moves in favor of these reforms can be made.

Indeed, the fact that the system requires these reforms, and that some leading actors even favor them,[39] probably explains why they have been attempted at all; yet it is important to bear in mind that the attempts have been tentative, partial, characterized by compromise, and even subject to reversal. Attempts to streamline the economic administrative structure and to introduce more lower-level autonomy (in the enterprise reform measure of 1965 and the production association reform measure of 1971) have been largely frustrated. The 1965 plan was to be implemented by 1970, but it was never completed and in fact was eventually superseded by the call for production associations in 1971. Similarly, the implementation of the 1971 administrative measure has

[38] V. D. Shtundyuk, "Ispol'zovanie Oborudovanija v Assotsiatsiyakh" [The Utilization of Working Capital at Associations], *Den'gi I Kredit*, No. 8 (August 1977), 5.

[39] For Kosygin's advocacy of and role in the economic reform movement, see Abraham Katz, *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger Special Edition 1972), 111-40; Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin* (New York: Viking Compass 1969), 437-39.

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run far behind schedule; designed to have been completed by 1975, its fulfillment has now become part of the 1976–1980 Five-Year Plan. In addition, the attempt to reorder investment priorities—written into the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971–1976)—was not realized, and was, in fact, subsequently reversed.

Why have these reforms been sidetracked? The answer lies in the coalition maintenance, or rule-by-committee, process of decision making; that is, each reform is clearly the product of basic trade-offs and compromises, and the compromises themselves have essentially cancelled out the reforms. For example, though the reforms mandated that profits would become a criterion of success for enterprises and associations, this attempt at relying on market mechanisms was balanced and largely offset by the decision to maintain the central pricing mechanism —which ensured the continuation of the very production disproportions that the reforms were designed to ameliorate. (It seems apparent that a general compromise was struck: while the use of profits was designed to satisfy the economic reformers, the maintenance of the traditional pricing policy was a response to the wishes of members of the party apparatus and the more orthodox "engineering types" in the state and economic bureaucracy.)[40]

In addition to being self-defeating, the compromises also caused the reforms to be subject to distortion and resistance. Distortion was often due to the fact that the reforms themselves were only half-way measures; that is, even when local economic units followed the new guidelines, they found that the supply organs, banks, railroads, and ministries with which they worked were being judged by nonprofit, gross output indicators. Many enterprises and associations—although subject to criticism—thus found it difficult not to do business in the old way (*po staromu*).[41]

Some directors of enterprises and associations sought to do things in the old way in order to avoid the new demands and added responsibilities dictated by the reforms. Taking note of this behavior, a Soviet writer observes:

> To accept the conditions of the experiment [the reforms] without reservation meant to admit that there would be no peaceful life. Whereas

[40] Katz (fn. 39), 140-48, 155-70.

[41] Working according to old procedures and general bureaucratic resistance was scored in the Soviet press. For example, an editorial in *Pravda* (April 29, 1966), reported that "unfortunately old habits had not everywhere been overcome." Similarly, Kosygin declared that "the Party and the government demanded the decisive end of any attempts at renewing the narrow departmental approach to business, formalist administration, or the petty regulation of activity of the enterprise." *Izvestiya*, April 9, 1966.

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> earlier [the directors'] wisdom was reduced to saying "no" to the plan which approached them from above, now they themselves had to adopt a stepped-up assignment, to provide themselves with more powerful equipment, to re-equip the repair base—thousands of worries! That was the very case when psychology came to the forefront in the economy.
>
> The standard of thinking is cultivated by years, if not by decades. Is it any wonder that it is most difficult of all to break it?[42]

What made it easier for those at the lower levels not to break their "standard of thinking" (and thus to resist the reforms) was the existence of regional party and higher-level economic administrative units that were also reluctant to give up doing things *po staromu*. These units vitiated the reforms by gradually restricting the bounds of local autonomy and by slowly re-imposing traditional indicators of success on enterprises and associations.

For essentially similar reasons, opposition to the reforms came from the regional Party apparatus and the central state and economic ministries: both saw fundamental institutional prerogatives being threatened. The central economic ministries feared that the reforms would not only transfer ministerial functions to actors at a lower level[43] but, even worse, would limit the ministries' functions to research and development and the setting of broad guidelines for supply. In so doing, the basis of ministerial power and control—the centralized supply network—would be largely negated.[44]

Similarly, diminished control and the potential emergence of market mechanisms at the regional level threatened the institutional strength and well-being of the regional Party *apparat*. It must be understood that much of the power of the regional Party *apparat* has derived from the need to bring order to the chaos of the provincial economy. In the absence of economic market mechanisms to regulate relationships of supply and demand, the regional Party *apparat* has assumed the role of a superarbiter—that is, the distributor of supplies to industrial enterprises and associations on the basis of perceived political value or need.[45] If they are denied this role, they are denied much of their power.

One manifestation of the regional Party *apparat*'s far-reaching dis-

[42] Alexander Nezhnyy, "Tocbka priknove n'iya: Odobrosovestnost i ichestnosti v provedenii eksperimenta'" [Point of Rest: On the Purity and Integrity of the Experiment], *Ekonomika I Organizatsiya Promyshlennogo Proizvodstva*, No. 8 (1978), 180-81.

[43] Alice C. Gorlin, "Industrial Organization: The Associations," in *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (fn. 36), 181-83.

[44] See Katz's discussion (fn. 39), 197-203.

[45] Yanov (fn. 9), 26. For a partially contrary view, see Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1969), esp. 285-87.

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cretionary power has been its ability to shift materials from light to heavy industries arbitrarily in order to make up for shortages. Given the traditional emphasis of the plans and the deeply engrained biases of the Party *apparatchiks*, the "robbing" of consumer and light industries to satisfy heavy industrial needs and targets has become a natural way of doing business.

Not surprisingly, Soviet economic managers, in their explanations of the causes and remedies of the failure of an enterprise, apparently refer to such robbing. For example, one Soviet commentor states, "it is one thing when an enterprise receives a *plan . . . when the plan is not protected by anything from above or from the side* . . . and it is something completely different when, like a precise map, one is faced with both the plan . . . and . . . with the certainty that the *plan has the force of law*."[46]

The fact that "robbing" has become a way of life probably does much to explain why the attempt at the other basic or necessary reform—that of reordering allocative or investment priorities—was also frustrated. This reform was attempted at the 24th Party Congress, when Brezhnev declared that the main task of the economy was to "create the fullest possible satisfaction of the people's material and cultural needs."[47] The rate of growth of consumption was, for the first time in Soviet history, to be favored over the rate of growth of production; this intent was reflected in the 1971-1975 Plan, which called for consumer-goods industries to grow 48.6 percent and producer-goods industries 47 percent. Though the difference was obviously small, it was not realized, and the traditional relationship continued. Between 1971 and 1975, consumer-goods industries actually grew 37 percent, while producer or heavy industries grew 46 percent.[48] Diversion of materials from the resources devoted to light industrial development is probably what circumvented the reform.

Moreover, this reform was actually reversed at the 1976 Party Congress. The tenor of Brezhnev's remarks had changed: the "main task" had become that of adding to the "further buildup of the country's economic might . . . and ensuring the stable, balanced growth of heavy industry—the foundation of the economy."[49] Accordingly, the 1976–1980 Plan restored the traditional favoring of producer goods over con-

[46] Nezhnyy (fn. 42), 177; emphasis added.
[47] *Pravda*, February 26, 1971.
[48] Grossman (fn. 27), 27.
[49] *Pravda*, February 26, 1976.

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sumer goods, albeit at a declining ratio of advantage: the former were to grow 38-40 percent and the latter 30-32 percent over the next five years.[50]

This reversal may signify that while all major actors are minimally satisfied according to the principles of coalition maintenance, some interests are "more equal than others," have been favored longer, and perhaps have more of a veto power over changes that might affect them. Thus, when it comes to changing priorities, the military, the defense-heavy industries, and the regional Party *apparat* nexus, having enjoyed a favored position for so long, are probably sufficiently powerful to frustrate or distort, and perhaps even to veto, necessary changes.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

From the foregoing, one thing is clear: in the current Soviet environment of coalition maintenance, changes that might spur economic growth and expand the economy cannot be expected to take place. However, without the needed changes, the elite consensus that underpins the process of coalition maintenance is not likely to persist for long; indeed, it may break down—either because it cannot continue to satisfy all the essential institutional interests, or because of the danger that results from frustrating the expectations of the masses. Under these conditions, the *fear of the alternative to elite equilibrium* may be replaced by the *fear of the consequences of stagnation*—thereby forcing the dissolution of the ruling coalition of oligarchs.

If that occurs—and I believe the problems the Soviets face make it increasingly possible—what will replace the former ruling coalition? Two broad alternatives, with various shadings in between, represent distinct possibilities. One possibility is the return of a dominant leader of some kind. Without necessarily being as arbitrary as Stalin, a dictator could cut through the impediments of bureaucratic opposition and inertia to execute necessary changes and restore a sense of purpose and dynamism to the Soviet system.

This alternative seems to be in accord with Robert Michels's prescription for getting positive socioeconomic change; namely, reliance on the charismatic leader who can cut through the inherent conservatism of organizations by exciting the masses to support his great objectives. In the Soviet context, there is a major problem with this possibility; it is difficult, although not impossible, for anybody to develop the kind of authority or charisma necessary to be successful. Indeed, it appears, as George Breslauer has persuasively argued, that that is precisely what

[50] Grossman (fn. 27), 27.

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Khrushchev attempted to do with his assaults on Party-state bureaucracies, his call for a circulation of elites, his declaration of a "state of the whole people," and his attempt to use mass organs to challenge the traditional structure.[51] He failed, however, and his failure may indicate that charisma without terror simply does not count for much in the Soviet setting. Moreover, without the use of terror it is difficult to see how one-man rule could be sustained for long; other members of the elite may simply not submit to it.

Nevertheless, problems could become severe enough (or one set of interests could become desperate enough), to foster the re-emergence of a really dominant leader. In that case, one could expect a growing cult of personality intended to build authority and charisma, and thereby making it dangerous to oppose the leader. In addition, sequential assaults against the leadership of other institutional actors, the replacement of leading personnel with people identified with the Party boss, the General Secretary's use of the Secretariat as his own tool, and the emergence of a very powerful personal secretariat, would be likely to occur sooner or later.

Even with this buildup, a one-man rule would probably not last much longer than the sense of crisis that produced it. Rule by oligarchy might eventually re-emerge, possibly establishing a repeating pattern of longer-term oligarchical or coalition-maintenance periods followed by or devolving into relatively shorter periods of one-man rule to overcome stalemate and stagnation.

Another broad alternative for the future is possible, however; it would emphasize a new consensus and presumably a change in the institutional distribution of power. The new concensus would most likely be based on an agreement that solving the problems of economic modernization must take precedence over other tasks in the system. As a result, managerial and consumer interests could be expected to gain political power at the expense of the more orthodox defense and producer factions. The resulting emphasis on building communism internally—justified in terms of pressing internal needs and a secure and relaxed external environment—would be accompanied by a change in priorities, and by a set of basic structural reforms designed to provide a more rational basis for development.

In such a case, coalition maintenance could conceivably serve as a mechanism for control of the leadership, but it is more likely that a stronger legal basis would be sought to increase the security and author-

[51] Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," *Problems of Communism*, XXVI (September-October 1976), 18-33.

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ity of those in the top positions. Consequently, certain political formulas might be altered and some recognized basis for changing leaders, broadening the bounds of elite recruitment, and resolving disputes might be developed. Although these steps certainly represent some liberalization of the system, they might simply provide more solid ground for the efficient management of society. Hence, they would probably not change the relationship of the masses to the elites, but would serve to engender a more legitimate, and perhaps a more certain and "legal," basis for conflict and competition among the elites.

Despite the fact that these changes might not seem important to a Western observer, they would amount to a mini-revolution in the Soviet context, and are difficult to imagine in the U.S.S.R. we know today. They could be spawned by internal crisis or stalemate, but if they were to occur at all, they would probably come only after the current generation of leaders have left the scene.

In the meantime, more muddling through and more stop-gap measures are likely to characterize Soviet politics. However, as economic pressures mount and as Brezhnev and the current geriatric leadership die off, basic choices will have to be faced, the elite consensus may break down, and the rule of coalition maintenance in the Soviet Union may come to an end.

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# *Review Articles*

# RESEARCH ON KOREAN COMMUNISM:

## Promise versus Performance

By SAMUEL S. KIM*

Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh, *Socialist Korea: A Case Study in the Strategy of Economic Development*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, 422 pp., $16.50.

Chin O. Chung, *P'yŏngyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958–1975*. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978, 230 pp., $15.00.

Ilpyong J. Kim, *Communist Politics in North Korea*. New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1975, 140 pp., $15.95.

Joungwon Alexander Kim, *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–72*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975, 471 pp., $15.00.

Byung Chul Koh, Se-Jin Kim, Jae Kyu Park, Young-Ho Lee, and Chang-Yoon Choi, *Pukhan Oekyo-ron* [On North Korea's Foreign Policy]. Seoul: Kyong Nam University Press, 1977, 254 pp., ₩2,500 ($5.17).[1]

Wayne S. Kiyosaki, *North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945–75*. New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1976, 154 pp., $17.95.

### Introduction

SINCE the cold-war tendency to view the Soviet experience as coterminous with communism was first challenged by Togliatti's formulation of polycentrism and later shattered by the Sino-Soviet conflict, Western scholarship on contemporary communism has rescued itself from becoming obsolete or irrelevant by establishing a new field of inquiry known as "comparative study of communism" or "studies of comparative communism." Scholars in this field have striven toward greater conceptual and methodological rigor by making use of "value-neutral" models and theories developed in the social and behavioral

* I am grateful to Richard A. Falk, Young W. Kihl, Young C. Kim, and Guy Oakes for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I wish also to acknowledge a faculty research grant from Monmouth College, which supported the preparation of this paper.

[1] Transliteration of Korean into English throughout this paper follows the McCune-Reischauer system, except for the names of prominent Koreans whose personal preferences are known: Syngman Rhee, Kim Il Sung, Park Chung Hee, as well as the authors of *Pukhan Oekyo-ron*, do not follow the McCune-Reischauer system of romanization.

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sciences.[2] Work on both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) may obviously be subsumed under the comparative study of communism and/or communist area studies. Yet, in the allocation of research funds and the distribution of rewards in the academic community, the field of Korean studies is the weaker partner in this intellectual "alliance system."

Indeed, research on Korean communism has become the pursuit of an avocation, meandering off the mainstream of contemporary social science. Most students of Korean communism have come under the influence, in varying degrees, of the lingering legacy of Kremlinology and the advancing model of Chinese studies. Following the general lines of development in Chinese studies in the 1960s and 1970s,[3] research on Korean communism has shown an uneven advancement. On balance, research and knowledge concerning North Korea's domestic politics and economy have developed more rapidly and significantly than the study of its foreign policy, which has remained neglected and underdeveloped.

The monumental two-volume work *Communism in Korea*, by Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, has been generally acclaimed as a landmark in the study of North Korean politics. Although the book makes a significant contribution to our knowledge of North Korean society and culture, its theoretical and methodological value is minimal. Despite the authors' declared purpose of analyzing "the contemporary North Korean Communist system, using selected social science methods and various comparative data," and of wedding "history and the social sciences,"[4] there is no discernible linkage between empirical data and theoretical concepts. Furthermore, the objectivity of the work is marred by the pronounced ideological bias displayed by authors.[5]

However, the most serious weakness of the Scalapino-Lee study lies

[2] See Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., ed., *Communist Studies and Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1969); Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1970); Robert E. Kanet, ed., *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (New York: Free Press 1971).

[3] See Chalmers Johnson, "The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 256-71; Andres D. Onate, "The Case for the Integrity of Social Science Research in Chinese Studies," *Asian Forum*, VIII (Spring 1976), 50-72; Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy: A Workshop Report," SSRC *Items*, XXXI (March/June 1977), 1-3.

[4] Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972), vii.

[5] For a detailed critique, see my "Research on Contemporary Communism: The Korean Case," *Journal of Korean Affairs*, V (April 1975), 52-68.

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in its treatment of foreign policy issues. In a book of 1,533 pages, the authors have failed to assign a single chapter to foreign policy. The subject is only tangentially discussed as a by-product of changing Sino-Soviet relations, revealing in the process more about the authors' own assumptions and predilections than about the DPRK's foreign policy. However, as I have argued elsewhere in analyzing this work from the perspective of the developmental problems of research on Korean communism, this study should be greeted as the opening salvo of a grand debate on the critical questions of sources, methodology, and theory construction on contemporary communism in general, and on North Korean communism in particular.[6]

## Controlling Bias: Values versus Facts

The intrusion of the cold-war politics of external powers has not only perpetuated the division of the country; more importantly, it has so thoroughly penetrated and polarized the superstructure of the Korean polities as to generate continuing fratricidal warfare and ideological recrimination. The politics of the two Koreas have become intractable due to their clashing world views. The legitimacy of one side has come to be dependent on the delegitimization of the other. Because of the high degree of ideological polarity and perceptional distortion surrounding the politics of the two Koreas, any claim of a value-neutral approach is suspect.

Some may argue that values and facts can—and should—be treated as two separate and independent domains. The dominant bias in contemporary social science against a study that employs a normative framework as a way of defining and evaluating social phenomena to be researched is predicated on the assumption that such a distinction between facts and values is logically possible, theoretically necessary, and axiologically essential. There is a sense in which this point of view represents a healthy departure from the ideological pollution of cold-war scholarship. However, there is another sense in which social science research which claims to be value-neutral constitutes a value judgment of sorts; it may serve, whether intentionally or not, the perpetuation of status-quo values.

In practice, the decision to study a particular social or political reality (subject) in any particular way (methodology) is seldom guided by an abstract interest in following the canons of scientific inquiry—that is, in complete detachment from one's value commitment. Rather, it is

[6] *Ibid.*, 67.

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determined by the scholar's underlying assumptions and penultimate social goals. Thus, the camel's nose of normative judgment creeps into the tent of the "value-free" paradigm. Moreover, a so-called value-free approach leaves a number of questions unanswered.

For example, a value-neutral approach is complicated by the problem of separating the researcher's normative "prejudgments" from "facts." Any value-neutral approach in social science is plagued by the possibility of reciprocal interaction between the status and image of the actor and the values and perspective of the observer. It has even been suggested that "the actor must have no physical characteristics, such as clothing, beard, long hair, color, stigmata, the like, that could affect the labeling process apart from the act itself."[7] Likewise, a crosscultural study of aggression has shown the meaninglessness of describing one culture as more or less aggressive than another, given the difficulty of establishing a value-free external criterion of evaluation.[8]

The authors of *Socialist Korea*—Ellen Brun, a Danish specialist in Third-World problems, and Jacques Hersh, a French-American writer on international affairs—are refreshingly candid in making their normative posture and framework explicit at the outset: "In this presentation of the development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the authors have been guided by one fundamental principle: to contribute to the struggle against economic underdevelopment." They further argue that "today, it is more vital than ever before not to remain on a descriptive level which exposes merely the roots of the evil and promote the search for solutions" (p. 11). *Socialist Korea* also proves that the observers' values influence the choice of methodology: Brun and Hersh treat the DPRK as *sui generis*, rejecting what they call "a strange methodological procedure that makes advanced bourgeois society the standard of comparison" (p. 409). Employing instead a socialist or Marxist framework for normative analysis, they present a glowing portrait of North Korea's social and economic growth and development independent of the capitalist process. They thereby demonstrate the practical difficulty of segregating "values" from "biases": what emerges as the end-product of this study is an *amicus curiae* brief.

In contrast, I. P. Kim's main objective, in *Communist Politics in North Korea*, is "to analyze the developmental processes by which the

[7] James T. Tedeschi and others, "A Reinterpretation of Research on Aggression," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 81 (September 1974), 557-58.

[8] See R. T. Green and G. Santori, "A Cross Cultural Study of Hostility and Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research*, VI, No. 1 (1969), 13-22.

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North Korean leadership attempted to transform a traditional and backward society into a modern socialist industrial society" (p. vii). In the pursuit of this objective, the author shies away from "the value-ridden scholarship of the cold war era" (p. vi), by which he means the application of the "totalitarian model" in Kremlinology. Instead, he promises to employ as a framework for analysis a combination of Robert C. Tucker's "cultural approach" and John Kautsky's "model of communism as a system of forced modernization." He then adds a methodologically confusing note: "I hope this book may be characterized as what Arend Lijphart calls an 'interpretative case study' in that I apply some generalization to the specific case of North Korea with the aim of throwing some light on it, but the conclusions and propositions of this work are not intended to generate any hypothesis" (p. viii). Obviously, I. P. Kim is in search of a value-neutral approach. But he does not say why or how his approach—or combination of approaches—possesses a greater descriptive, explanatory, and predictive power, or how it might assure greater freedom from the value-ridden scholarship. Be that as it may, his descriptive and uncritical work seems to assume that the policy pronouncements of the DPRK can be accepted at their face value. Like Brun and Hersh, he succumbs to the temptation of accepting much of the DPRK's rhetoric as real.

J. A. Kim's *Divided Korea* makes no theoretical, methodological, and normative pretense. His comparative study of developmental politics in the two Koreas starts from the same cultural and historical base in 1945, and focuses on "the roles played by leaders, the contrasting uses of political tools, the relative influence played by factors from both within and without the society, and the contrasting processes of consolidation of power by the new political elites and the institutionalization of two distinct political systems" (p. 1).

However, the author's normative orientation can be easily inferred. He is well connected with the ROK, and draws on personal interviews with leading political figures ranging from President Park Chung Hee, Kim Jong Pil, and Chung Il Kwon to such opposition leaders as Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Lee Chul Seung (p. x). His study is carefully reasoned, well researched, well organized, and well balanced; it comes to the somewhat surprising conclusion that many points are common to the politics of both Koreas: "External factors played a crucial role in both systems, both in supporting and opposing the political consolidation efforts of the leadership groups" (p. 335). It is remarkably free of bias in its treatment of the most sensitive issue in the poli-

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tics of the two Koreas—namely, the elusive search for political legitimacy at home and abroad.

The remaining three books under review—plus *The Foreign Policy of North Korea* by B. C. Koh[9]—represent the sum total of the book-length scholarly output on the DPRK's foreign policy published in the United States and the ROK in the last three decades. As a pioneering work, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea* has exerted a rather substantial influence on the remaining three books; hence Koh's treatment of normative issues is worth noting.

Koh is intellectually honest in making his own predilections explicit. Having first defined his norms as "a wholehearted commitment to the values of human dignity," he writes: "I believe, however, that the Government of the Republic of Korea, notwithstanding its disturbingly numerous failings and shortcomings, offers the best hope there is for a brighter Korea—a Korea which is genuinely free, democratic, independent, and unified." He then presents the predictable thesis that "North Korea's foreign policy, underpinned by the ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism alike, has vigorously pursued the strategic objectives of modernizing North Korea and Communizing South Korea."[10]

Koh's influence is most clearly pronounced in *North Korea's Foreign Relations*. The author, Wayne Kiyosaki, states at the outset that "the theoretical claims of this book are minimal." He merely wants to add "to Koh's study by expanding on his coverage" (p. ix), employing "the basic method of Kremlinology" (p. xii). Unfortunately, this book has all the earmarks of an undisciplined and unedited doctoral dissertation. Much of the work is marred by puerile prose and tendentious scholarship. Theoretically, methodologically, and substantively, the work adds little to our present knowledge about North Korean foreign policy.

Chin O. Chung, in *P'yŏngyang Between Peking and Moscow*, shows no concern of any theoretical, methodological, and normative nature. Instead, he is primarily interested in "the examination of North Korea's attitude in the dispute and of why and how the North Korean regime has reacted to the specific issues and events in Sino-Soviet relations from 1958 through 1975" (p. 1). Even this modest promise seems to have exceeded performance, as he takes a journalistic or "let-the-facts-speak-for-themselves" approach. He simply records the events in chronological order. As a result, much of the work reads like a compendium of newspaper clippings. Apparently, the author subscribes to the unac-

[9] Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea* (New York: Praeger 1969).
[10] *Ibid.*, viii, xx.

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ceptably naive theory that social reality is constituted by the events that can be captured by a foreign observer in a value-free manner. However, an accumulation of empirical data isolated from significant normative issues and theoretical concepts can provide only a low-level guide to social reality. The sole value of this work lies in its broadening of our data base for future research.

Among the studies under review, *Pukhan Oekyo-ron* [On North Korea's Foreign Policy] is unique in the application of a normative approach to international relations research. It is a "collaborative" work of five prominent Korean political scientists, all with Ph.D.s from leading American universities. Apparently, the five authors agreed in advance on a common organizing theme and framework for the book and then divided up their chapter assignments according to their respective interest and specialty in the field. The work has no editor nor is there collective authorship; even the preface and the conclusion are individually written. Yet, all nine chapters are so tightly structured and composed that they cohere well as an integral whole.

*Pukhan Oekyo-ron* is significant because it is the first book published in South Korea (and in Korean) on the subject of North Korean foreign policy (p. 12). This fact alone suggests the weight of the normative commitment and constraints of South Korean scholarship on North Korean politics in general, and on its foreign policy in particular. Why did it take so long for South Korean scholars to come up with a book-length volume on a subject that should be of general interest as well as of critical concern to students and policy makers alike? What eventually served as a midwife for the birth of this book? Perhaps a simple answer to the first question lies in the term *pukkoe* [northern puppet], the South's widely used journalistic term for its Northern brother. To write a book on the foreign policy of the northern puppet may have appeared to many as a foolish exercise at best, or a risky challenge to the legitimacy of political order in the South at worst.

The image of the North as *pukkoe* had already received a setback by the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict and by the independent and neutral course of action pursued by North Korea in the 1960s. The Southern sense of insecurity was intensified in the early 1970s by several major changes in world politics: the growing trend toward détente, the Sino-American rapprochement, the American disengagement from Indochina, and the globalization of North Korea's diplomatic and economic activities. Faced with this "menacing" reality in the international environment, President Park Chung Hee responded with dual policies:

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"external accommodation" (the opening of a South-North dialogue) and "internal regimentation" (imposition of the *Yushin* system).[11]

Although the South-North dialogue quickly became deadlocked, it served as a catalytic agent for Southern research on North Korea—the political and intellectual climate in which *Pukhan Oekyo-ron* was conceived and brought to fruition. As a result, the work's distinct normative and strategic thrust is aimed at knowing the enemy well so as not to be outmaneuvered in the politics of competitive legitimization. The authors state in the preface, for example, that "diplomatic struggle between the two Koreas will continue to evolve around two critical domains: expansion of military support and recognition of legitimacy; hence, research on North Korean foreign policy inevitably becomes the most important part of the research on North Korea" (p. 14).

As well-trained political scientists, however, the authors are aware of the conceptual and methodological problem of distinguishing the analyst's values from the actor's values. The incompatibility between the requirements of objective scholarship and the requirements of ongoing anti-North and anti-Communist education and propaganda throughout the South is acknowledged (p. 12), but the authors fail to provide ways and means of overcoming or minimizing this problem. Instead, they willingly bear the burden of unquestioned assumptions. As a result, "North Korea's strategy of Communizing the Korean peninsula" becomes both the implicit framework and the explicit conclusion of the book (p. 235). The logic and the implications of including North Korea's Southern strategy in the book (chap. 1) may escape some readers, but the authors provide the rationale that North Korea's diplomatic offensive abroad really pivots around its struggle against the South; hence, an analysis of its Southern strategy is conceptualized as an integral component in the study of North Korean foreign policy (p. 15).

Despite its obvious ideological bias and strategic rationale, *Pukhan Oekyo-ron* may become a landmark in the study of the DPRK's foreign policy. It uses all available sources in Korean, Japanese, and English—including intelligence data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul—in dealing with such previously unresearched areas in Pyongyang's foreign relations as Eastern and Western Europe, the United

[11] See Chae-Jin Lee, "South Korea: The Politics of Domestic-Foreign Linkage," *Asian Survey*, XIII (January 1973), 94-101. In response to increasing internal opposition as well as to a rapidly changing international situation, Park Chung Hee abruptly proclaimed martial law on October 17, 1972, and subsequently called for the preparation of a new constitution. The latter was euphemistically called *Yushin* (revitalizing reform); hence the *Yushin* Constitution or system.

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States, Japan, Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and Africa. Numerous tables on diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural activities in Pyongyang's relations with these regions partially compensate for the lack of analysis of functional issues.

## Problems of Source and Methodology

Scientific development of any academic field or discipline is intertwined with the availability of relevant data. In the case of Korean studies, a strong argument can be made that methodology has lagged behind the data, rather than vice versa, as is customarily and defensively asserted by most analysts. For example, the authors of *Pukhan Oekyoron* compare the study of North Korea to the art of putting together a jigsaw puzzle (p. 11). Viewed in this light, research becomes intelligence work primarily concerned with the pursuit of missing pieces, with the implicit methodological assumption that no theory-specific approach can be taken until and unless all the puzzle pieces are found. Such an approach is misleading. The researcher cannot possibly know what puzzle pieces are missing or which pieces to look for without having a theory-specific reference—that is, the idea of the whole picture in the above analogy. Theory, in addition to providing us with an organizing device for selecting, categorizing, ordering, simplifying, and integrating the raw materials of knowledge, can also perform data-generating functions. In social science research, theory serves as a conceptual map with which to make some coherent sense out of a great melange of confusing and contradictory information.

The problems of source and methodology that plague research on the DPRK raise the following questions: What are the types of available primary sources? What are the principal strengths and weaknesses of each of these sources? What methodological pitfalls should we avoid in the use of these sources? What methodological skills and approaches promise the most fruitful exploitation of these sources?

The first and most prominent category of primary sources is represented by official and semi-official materials from the DPRK—documents, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, a yearbook, books, and (monitored) radio broadcasts. Brun and Hersh may not be too far off the mark in saying that "the DPRK probably has the biggest per capita distribution of newspapers and magazines of any country in Asia" (p. 291). For those without command of the Korean language, the DPRK even publishes an English-language weekly, *The Pyongyang Times*. In addition, the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Pyong-

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yang issues a substantial body of materials in English. In absolute terms, Pyongyang's output compares favorably with that of Peking; in relative, per capita terms, Pyongyang's output greatly exceeds that of Peking.

It may seem superfluous to say that special methodological caution is required in the use of official sources so as to avoid constructing "reality" based on rhetoric. Yet many students of North Korea fall into the common methodological trap of selectively accepting and often amplifying the DPRK's rhetoric as real, and its policy pronouncements as policy performance, to suit their individual prejudgments. In attacking those who caution that Pyongyang's words do not necessarily bear any relation to its deeds, Robert Scalapino writes that such thinking

> . . . is based on the type of dual standards that are coming under increasing criticism by concerned Americans. The premise is that while Cold War terminology and inflammatory calls to revolution are wrong for countries like the United States and South Korea, since they have an adverse effect on the citizenry and undermine the psychological climate for peaceful coexistence, their use by states like North Korea can be ignored or accepted as natural and—presumably—having little effect.[12]

Relying on official DPRK sources, Scalapino arrives at his central thesis: "The Korean Communist leaders have never hidden the fact that their primary goal is the 'liberation' of the South, with unification merely an aspect of that policy."[13] Yet, in the face of the DPRK's five-point peace proposal announced on March 16, 1973, Scalapino discards his own "words-bear-relation-to-deeds" thesis, saying:

> *If read without reference to the actual situation prevailing*, including the current military capacities of the two parties, those of their allies, and pronouncements of the North relating to the need to further the revolutionary movement in the South by all means, they seem reasonable, even far-sighted. *Placed in the context of the real world*, including that of the North's "liberation" plans, they are both unrealistic and strongly biased against the South.[14]

That is not to discard Pyongyang's official sources as being completely useless or unreliable, but merely to caution against a too selective or haphazard use of them. Verbal symbols are indispensable data in research on international relations. Pyongyang's official sources can be tapped for delineating the theoretical side of its polity after taking

[12] Robert A. Scalapino, "The Two Koreas—Dialogue or Conflict?" in William J. Barnds, ed., *The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs* (New York: New York University Press 1976), 75.
[13] *Ibid.*, 72.
[14] *Ibid.*, 68; emphasis added.

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the public-relations factor into account. Policy and editorial statements, both substantive and hortatory, can be put to a number of uses: (1) they may serve as an ongoing expression of Pyongyang's world outlook that motivates and guides its domestic and foreign policy, as in the studies by Brun and Hersh and by I. P. Kim; (2) they may be used for diachronic analysis on a specific issue, as in Chung's work; (3) they may provide a data base for comparative study, as in the volume by J. A. Kim; and (4) they may represent one side of the coin for probing discrepancies between policy pronouncement and policy performance, as in *Pukhan Oekyo-ron*.

However, content analysis promises a more reliable method if we are to minimize any vagueness or bias resulting from the normative predilections of analysts and to enhance empirical accuracy by making methodological procedure more exact and replicable. This method provides a systematic and rigorous use of verbal symbols in mass or official communications (or even in interviews), employing an explicit conceptual scheme for assembling, typologizing, and measuring the content of communication as indicators of an actor's basic ideals, perceptions, concerns, and prescriptions. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that we may find a high degree of correlation between the frequency and distribution of key words and themes and the level of importance attributed to them by the actor. In research on international conflict, scholars have made use of content analysis to demonstrate how decision makers' images, attitudes, values, beliefs, and personal needs can become components of a definition of the situation.[15]

Unfortunately, none of the studies under review have made use of content analysis even though the data needed for content analysis on the DPRK's polity could be drawn from official documents, statistical reports, newspapers or magazines, literature, and Kim Il Sung's speeches, writings, and interviews. I would suggest five types of data as being particularly well suited for content analysis: (1) Kim Il Sung's annual addresses from 1946 to the present; (2) the reports of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) to the first five Party Congresses (August 29, 1946; March 28, 1948; April 23, 1956; September 16, 1961; and November 3, 1970); (3) *Rodong Sinmun* [Workers' Daily], the organ of the KWP, or *The Pyongyang Times;*

[15] See Robert C. Angell and others, "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (December 1964), 329-491; Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1969); Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York: Knopf 1927); Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Symbols of Internationalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1951).

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(4) the speeches or statements of the DPRK's representatives in the United Nations General Assembly as recorded in U.N. documents; and (5) Kim Il Sung's interviews with foreign journalists (see below).

A second category of primary sources consists of interviews with former cadres or residents of the DPRK now residing in the South. The study by Scalapino and Lee relied extensively on interviews conducted in 1967–1970 with 34 former North Koreans, most of whom "were either defectors or captured enemy agents who had decided to abandon the Communist cause."[16] Close examination reveals that these informants were mostly minor functionaries; none of them, for example, ever sat on the Central Committee of the KWP, or was elected a delegate to the SPA (Supreme People's Assembly). As a result, they cannot be regarded as a representative sample of political elites in the DPRK. It is not even clear whether they constitute a representative sample of all the defectors or captured agents.

Hence, the perspective offered by this particular category of primary sources is limited and distorted. Even their present status in the South (that is, whether they are in captivity or free) is not specified, which raises serious questions about the motives, the veracity, and the completeness of their eyewitness accounts. At best, they provide a supplementary source; yet most of the accounts or scenarios constructed in the Scalapino-Lee study based on these interviews remain uncorroborated by other sources. Finally, there is a logistics problem since these defectors are not readily available to the researcher. The average researcher without official sponsorship or a KCIA connection may have difficulty in tapping this primary source, which therefore cannot be compared to Chinese refugees in Hong Kong who are available, in great numbers and without constraints, to students of Chinese politics.

A third category of primary sources—the definition of primary sources is stretched here to accommodate this borderline case—is represented by eyewitness reports or on-the-spot studies of a more reliable nature, generated by foreign scholars who have visited the DPRK in recent years. Brun and Hersh's study is based in part on their two-month stay in North Korea in 1971, which "took the form of a systematic investigation, including numerous visits to institutions and enterprises, as well as extensive talks and interviews with highly placed functionaries and experts in planning, management, and economic construction" (p. 21). Sinologist D. Gordon White visited North Korea in 1974; his articles shed much light on the function of nationalism in

[16] Scalapino and Lee (fn. 5), x.

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North Korea in a comparative perspective, and on the extent to which *chuch'e* (a principle connoting "autonomy" and self-identity" which will be more fully defined and evaluated later) has become the cornerstone of its domestic and international policies.[17] Young C. Kim's interviews with officials and scholars of the DPRK in the summer of 1973 have produced a perceptive first-hand report showing the North Korean elite's preoccupation with reunification policy.[18]

To be sure, these visits suffer from superficial contact as well as from limited (and possibly distorted) perspective, influenced by the observer's own values. However, these limitations and constraints can be partially overcome if the visitor is thoroughly knowledgeable about the subject, self-critically conscious of the vantage point of observation, and properly prepared for the visit by a sharp conceptual focus. Because of the present paucity of resources in the field of Korean studies, the accounts of visiting scholars—whether in the form of primary or secondary sources—cannot and should not be dispensed with in the research on Korean communism.

A fourth category of primary sources emanates from President Kim Il Sung. A substantial number of his writings and speeches have been incorporated in *Kim Il-sŏng sŏnjip* [Selected Works of Kim Il Sung] in six volumes (1960–1966), and *Kim Il-sŏng chŏjak sŏnjip* [Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung] in five volumes (1967–1972). In addition we have, in English translation, a two-volume collection of Kim Il Sung's important speeches made from 1931 through 1974, focusing on the principle of *chuch'e*,[19] and two separate anthologies containing Kim Il Sung's speeches and interviews with foreign journalists, which focus on the theme of independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.[20]

The significance of this particular type of primary source lies in the fact that Kim Il Sung has completely dominated the political life of the DPRK from its inception to the present, and that he commands a cult of personality that even Mao or Stalin might have envied. Given this political reality, it is somewhat surprising that no one in the field of

[17] See White, "Report from Korea: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Through the Eyes of a Visiting Sinologist," *China Quarterly*, No. 63 (September 1975), 515-22, and "North Korean Chuch'e: The Political Economy of Independence," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (April-June 1975), 44-54.

[18] Young C. Kim, "North Korea's Reunification Policy: A Magnificent Obsession," *Journal of Korean Affairs*, III (January 1974), 15-24.

[19] Kim Il Sung, *On Juche in Our Revolution*, 2 vols. (New York: Weekly Guardian Associates 1977).

[20] Kim Il Sung, *For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea* (New York: International Publishers 1975); Kim Il Sung, *For the Reunification of Korea* (n.p.: Spark Publications, n.d.).

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Korean studies has yet produced a comprehensive biography of Kim Il Sung. The works under review do not attempt any systematic and rigorous examination of Kim Il Sung's voluminous writings.

The publications containing Kim Il Sung's words can be tapped for several studies with varied methodologies, linking up the leadership and the political system of the DPRK. First, there is a need for a solid "historical and political biography" of Kim Il Sung that relates the development of Kim's own revolutionary and political career to the developmental politics of North Korea. Jerome Ch'en's *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (1967) could serve as a fitting model for this kind of study. Second, there is a need for a study that specifically addresses itself to the substance and style of Kim Il-Sung's political leadership and to the extent to which he has managed to transform the North Korean political culture in his own image. Stuart R. Schram's *Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (1963) and Richard H. Solomon's *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (1971) provide competing models for this approach. Third, the need for a study that would diachronically examine Kim Il Sung's struggle to shape and reshape North Korea's destiny in the face of the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict and other major changes in the international system, as exemplified by John Gittings's *The World and China, 1922–1972* (1974), should receive serious consideration.

For scholars with a more rigorous methodological inclination, "cognitive mapping" as an approach to analyzing Kim Il Sung's belief system and its impact on the decision-making process as well as on its outputs (policies) offers a potentially fruitful methodology.[21] Based on the premise that the domestic and foreign policies of any given state are strongly influenced by the belief systems of its key decision makers—a premise that is particularly difficult to rebut in the case of the North Korean political system—cognitive mapping may help us by answering such questions as: What are the belief systems of decision makers? How do such belief systems influence the determination of policy choices? What will happen if there is an increase or decrease in certain variables or properties of the decision makers' cognitive maps?

A fifth and last category of primary sources may be called "empirical and behavioral referents" generated by "target parties" of the DPRK's diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, technological, and even legal practices. Target parties may be classified as: (1) states with which

[21] See Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976); Jeffrey A. Hart, "Cognitive Maps of Three Latin American Policy Makers," *World Politics*, xxx (October 1977), 115-40.

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Pyongyang maintains diplomatic relations (which increased from 15 in 1962 to 48 in 1971, and to 90 in 1976); (2) states with which Pyongyang has trade relations only; (3) the United Nations, in which Pyongyang has participated as an observer since 1973; (4) functional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the United Nations system in which Pyongyang participates as a full member; and (5) the Nonaligned Movement and the Group of 77 as political and economic arms of the Third World, in which the DPRK is a member, and in whose periodic conferences and activities it participates.

The DPRK's participation in or interaction with these actors in both bilateral and multilateral contexts has generated *new* and *independent* empirical and behavioral data. *Pukhan Oekyo-ron* has made an important contribution in this respect by revealing a substantial body of empirical data embedded in Pyongyang's expanding bilateral diplomatic relations, especially data relating to diplomatic, commercial, and cultural exchanges with different geographical areas.

Several approaches may be suggested for the use of this particular category of primary sources. A systematic and disciplined analysis probing discrepancies between Pyongyang's foreign policy pronouncements and its actual behavior is now feasible. Pyongyang's foreign policy in the 1970s makes it possible to take a global approach in describing and explaining how various world-order issues fit into North Korea's hierarchy of values. A behavioral analysis of North Korean foreign policy, focusing on its adaptive (or maladaptive) role in response to demands, constraints, or stimuli in the international environment, could break away from the present dominant approach which sees North Korean foreign policy purely from Pyongyang's point of view. *Calendar of Diplomatic Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1945–1975*, by George Ginsburgs and Roy U. T. Kim (1977), in which Pyongyang's 1,465 bilateral agreements with partners from 107 different states, as well as other multilateral and plurilateral agreements, are recorded, provides a basis for a normative and/or empirical analysis of the DPRK's legal behavior in the family of nations.

## Substantive Concerns

What are the areas of substantive strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in our present knowledge about the North Korean political system as shown in the studies under review? In this section I will discuss, in broadest stroke, the domains of domestic and foreign policy of the DPRK that are covered by the studies under review, shying away from

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any criticism of minor points. I shall then choose and discuss at some length two substantive issues of crucial normative and policy importance to both North and South Korea as well as to both domestic and foreign policy.

On the whole, coverage of substantive issues of domestic policy is more thorough, competent, and comprehensive than that of foreign policy. Brun and Hersh, I. P. Kim, and J. A. Kim collectively provide an adequate basis for our understanding of developmental politics. They also arrive at a broad consensus that the strategy of superstructural transformation plays a decisive role in Pyongyang's developmental process. Like Mao, Kim Il Sung has stressed the importance of the transformation of man's world outlook as the key prerequisite to the transformation of society—a view apparently based on his belief in the malleability of human nature (Brun and Hersh, 228-29; I. P. Kim, 32, 81; J. A. Kim, 289; Kiyosaki, 49).

No doubt, developmentalism is a major goal common to both North and South Korea and deserves serious treatment. Unfortunately, what is left out in this common focus on developmental politics is a set of structural and functional issues related to the working of the North Korean political system, but also common to all political systems. J. A. Kim's comparative study of developmentalism in the context of the evolution of the two separate political systems in the North and South partially corrects this omission. Still, the major weakness of all three works on North Korean domestic politics lies in their failure (or neglect) to delineate the boundaries, functions, and stability of the DPRK's political system.

The major substantive strength of the books on foreign policy lies in their thorough and detailed descriptions of North Korean foreign relations. As already noted, *Pukhan Oekyo-ron* makes an important contribution by covering all the previously unknown areas of Pyongyang's foreign relations with different countries in different regions of the world. Chung's case study, though weak in conceptual and explanatory power, produces an impressive amount of raw data on the evolution of Pyongyang's foreign policy in the context of the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict. Kiyosaki's work has only a modicum of substantive value.

The functional issues and sectors of Pyongyang's foreign policy have not received any scholarly attention, and therefore constitute the most salient gap in the research on Korean communism. A large amount of speeches, writings, and even interviews with foreign journalists is now

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available; it provides an adequate documentary basis for delineating Kim Il Sung's image of world order, which can serve as a conceptual framework for probing functional domains in Pyongyang's foreign policy. The books under review make little reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pyongyang, let alone its functions and organization. Other important functional issues left uncovered (or covered only in a tangential manner in *Pukhan Oekyo-ron*) include foreign trade, cultural (people-to-people) diplomacy, arms control and disarmament, military and strategic doctrines related to various weapons systems, international law and treaty practice, Third-World diplomacy, functionalism (theory and practice) as revealed in Pyongyang's participatory behavior in the specialized agencies, and in U.N. parliamentary diplomacy.

Sino-Soviet polemics on war and peace in the early 1960s must have presented some challenge for Kim Il Sung to define his own stand on, or response to, this crucial issue of our times. However, the studies under review hardly mention it. Nor do we get any clear description or analysis of Kim Il Sung's conceptualization of the international system. For example, in what way or to what extent does Kim Il Sung agree with Mao's three-world theory? What does Pyongyang's entry into the global community signify? Does it show a reformulation or reordering of foreign policy goals and objectives, or does it merely indicate Pyongyang's blind search for legitimacy anywhere and everywhere? What does Pyongyang have to say or offer in the global underdogs' elusive search for a more just and humane world order? These and other related functional issues and questions remain to be answered.

*Chuch'e* provides an important substantive domain for our discussion here; it has now been proclaimed as the official ideology of the North Korean political system, guiding both domestic and foreign policy. However, treatment of *chuch'e* as a substantive area of research is uneven in the books under review. The three works on foreign policy make only smattering references to *chuch'e*, but the three studies on domestic or developmental politics treat it more extensively and seriously. On this criterion alone, the study of domestic policy shows a greater substantive maturity than that of foreign policy. Still, no single work provides a complete or even adequate description and analysis of *chuch'e* in all its dimensions—its meanings, origins, evolution, and symbolic or substantive significance.[22]

[22] For a comprehensive analysis of *chuch'e*, see Kim Kap-chŏl, *Pukhan chŏngch'i iteolroki punsŏk—"chuch'e sasang" ŭl chungsimuro* [Analysis of North Korean Political Ideology with Emphasis on Chuch'e Ideology] (Seoul: Sŏhyangkak 1977).

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In Korean, *chuch'e* literally means "subjectivity" or "self-identity." The official media of the DPRK used to translate the term as "self-identity" or "national identity" in English publications, but have abandoned this translation in recent years as being either inadequate or incomplete; instead, they simply use the transliterated form spelled *Juche* (not *chuch'e* as in the McCune-Reischauer romanization system). In a very broad sense, *chuch'e* conveys the yearning for national pride, self-identity, and independence. It is not surprising, then, that *chuch'e*, as a rich evocative symbol of nationalism, was caught up early in the vortex of competitive legitimization in both Koreas.

After Park Chung Hee and his colleagues had carried out the military coup d'état in 1961, they lost no time in using the term to legitimize their seizure of power. In a book published early in 1962, for example, Park deplored the lack of "national consciousness": "We must grasp the subjectivity (i.e., *chuch'esŏng*) of the Korean nation, restore the spiritual pillar of Korean history and establish a critical but receptive posture for the introduction of foreign culture."[23] In February 1963, *minjokchŏk chuch'esŏng* (national self-identity) was proclaimed as one of the foremost objectives of the newly organized Democratic-Republican Party (DRP), which has ever since dominated the political life of South Korea as the ruling political party.

In the context of North Korean politics, *chuch'e* represents Kim Il Sung's Koreanization of Marxism-Leninism—that is, a synthesis of alien ideology and Korean reality. In the course of Kim Il Sung's "dialectical struggle" to define and elaborate an official doctrine for superstructural (ideological) transformation in the face of changing political realities at home and abroad, however, the Marxist-Leninist element in *chuch'e* suffered a progressive symbolic and substantive slippage. For reasons that are not difficult to infer, analysts of North Korean politics on both the right and the left have generally avoided stating this nationalistic aggrandizement in the evolution of *chuch'e*.

Kim Il Sung's first known reference to the term *chuch'e* is contained in his speech to party propaganda and agitation workers on December 28, 1955. After deploring dogmatism, formalism, and "the lack of Juche" as the principal shortcomings in ideological work, he went on:

> What is Juche in our Party's ideological work? What are we doing? We are not engaged in any other country's revolution, but solely in the Korean revolution. Devotion to the Korean revolution is Juche in the ideological work of our Party. Therefore, all ideological work must be

[23] Cited in B. C. Koh, "*Chuch'esŏng* in Korean Politics," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, VII (Spring/Summer 1974), 89.

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> subordinated to the interests of the Korean revolution. When we study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of the Chinese revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, it is entirely for the purpose of correctly carrying out our own revolution.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> I noticed in a primary school that all the portraits on the wall were of foreigners, such as Mayakovsky and Pushkin, but there were none of Koreans. If children are educated in this way, how can they be expected to have national pride?[24]

If we accept this speech as the beginning of Kim Il Sung's self-reliance (*chuch'e* can also be translated as "self-reliance" or "go-it-alone") policy, then *chuch'e* preceded Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign. More significantly, *chuch'e* preceded China's self-reliance policy by more than two years, for Mao Zedong stated in his secret speech of January 30, 1962, at an Enlarged Central Work Conference, that the decision to go it alone in China's development—the policy of self-reliance (*zili gengsheng*)—was made in 1958.[25]

The late 1950s and 1960s witnessed a generalizing process of *chuch'e*. At the Fourth Party Congress of the KWP in September 1961, *chuch'e* was established as the major party principle. By 1965, *chuch'e* was pronounced to be a comprehensive policy guideline for both domestic and foreign policy, as shown in Kim Il Sung's lecture at the Ali Archam Academy of Social Sciences of Indonesia: "Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-sustenance in the economy and self-defense in national defense—this is the stand our Party has consistently adhered to."[26] Finally, *chuch'e* was canonized and codified as the guiding principle of the DPRK's politics in Article 4 of the Constitution adopted on December 27, 1972. The Constitution also established the new office of the President (*chusŏk*), endowing it with both symbolic and substantive power. (The day after the adoption of the new Constitution, Kim Il Sung was elected as the first President of the DPRK by the Supreme People's Assembly.)

Given the high content of political and ideological symbolism embodied in *chuch'e*, it is not surprising that there is no scholarly consensus on its functions or significance. Interpretation of *chuch'e* is particularly susceptible to the "parallax effect" of observers' values. Those who have a negative image of the DPRK (or of Kim Il Sung) tend to see it as being more rhetorical than real, or to view its functions more in a negative than positive perspective; for them, *chuch'e* is at best a defen-

[24] Kim Il Sung, I (fn. 19), 136, 139.
[25] *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* [Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought], (n.p., 1969), 416.
[26] Kim Il Sung, I (fn. 19), 428-29.

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sive mechanism or a Machiavellian scheme to make a virtue of necessity; at worst, it is a demagogic instrument for the personal aggrandizement of Kim Il Sung.

Observers who have a positive image of the DPRK (or of Kim Il Sung) tend to romanticize *chuch'e* as a symbol of the successful transition from dependency to independence. It is viewed as a positive force in the modernizing process, making the DPRK a model in the practice of developmental politics, safeguarding national resources and enhancing national independence and legitimacy. There is an element of truth in both interpretations, but each suffers from a limited perspective and selective reading of a rather complex, dynamic, and multifunctional belief system—incurring the methodological problem of the proverbial blind men and the elephant. Still, I would argue that the second or "romantic" school comes closer to the mark. When *chuch'e* is examined as a *system* in all its dimensions—catalytic inputs, substantive components, and policy outputs—it is more real than rhetorical, more positive than negative, and more institutionalized than any other value in the North Korean political system.

Closely related to *chuch'e* is legitimacy, another substantive domain of vital importance in the study of Korean politics. Struggle over legitimacy is the key link between the politics of the two Koreas, as shown by J. A. Kim in his comparative study of developmental politics, and by the authors of *Pukhan Oekyo-ron* in the context of foreign policy. The pursuit of legitimacy is the central concern of both domestic and foreign policy of each of the two Koreas; however, this linkage is not effectively developed in any of the studies under review. The siege mentality exhibited by both Koreas in both domestic and foreign policy stems in large measure from the crisis of legitimacy. The sources of this crisis are identical in North and South Korea: (1) erosion from within; (2) challenge from the other Korea; and (3) subversion from without (foreign control or intervention).

The politics of competitive legitimization of divided Korea started in 1945 from an identical cultural and historical base. Clearly, the most powerful source of legitimacy was to be found in Korean nationalism. Yet, on the eve of Liberation, the Korean nationalist movement was fragmented and without a charismatic hero leading the way for the returning nationalists. The movement had suffered from protracted frustration abroad and had been so factionalized, ideologized, and even internationalized that it would have been impossible for any one nationalist to lead or unify the newly liberated country even if the United States and the Soviet Union had exempted the Korean peninsula from

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their power politics. Except for the negative value of anti-Japanese sentiment that was shared by all, the exiles returned home with foreign sources of legitimacy; they were, in varying degrees, Americanized, Russianized, Sinicized, Communized, or Christianized nationalists.[27] That was the beginning of the legitimacy crisis in divided Korea. Both Koreas soon took separate paths in a nation-building and legitimacy-seeking process.

The absence of a genuine domestic source of legitimacy moved both Kim Il Sung in the North and Syngman Rhee in the South to link their legitimacy to the national political mythology by exaggerating and even falsifying their national revolutionary backgrounds abroad (J. A. Kim, 287, 338). The former's claim to legitimacy, based on his anti-Japanese guerrilla activities in Manchuria (and his adoption of the name of the legendary national hero, Kim Il-sŏng), seemed pale by comparison to Syngman Rhee's record of almost half a century of nationalist activities abroad. However, Rhee's claim to legitimacy was substantially eroded from within because of the corruption and ineptitude of his regime. The overthrow of Rhee in 1960 and the rise of the new military government of Park Chung Hee in 1961 presented a challenge of a different sort to Kim Il Sung's legitimacy.

Kim Il Sung's "magnificent obsession" with national reunification is part of his elusive search for absolute legitimacy. Viewed in this light, what was Park's challenge? "Not only was Park without personal attractiveness," admits such a pro-ROK scholar as J. A. Kim, "but he had no traceable claim to leadership legitimacy. His background involved training by the Japanese in a military academy in Manchuria from 1940 to 1942, and participation in the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria during 1943 through 1945" (p. 230). In short, Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee had been engaged in the same war in the same theater on opposite sides. Yet, Park's assumption of full power within the junta government created a crisis for Kim Il Sung; it also served as the catalytic agent for his missions to Moscow and Peking, where he signed virtually identical defense treaties of "Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" in July 1961. Both treaties adhered to the view that unification should be achieved on the basis of "peaceful and democratic lines and that such a solution accords exactly with the national interests of the Korean peoples and the aim of preserving peace in the Far East" (cited by Chung, 58-59).

[27] For my analysis leading to this conclusion, see "The Developmental Problem of Korean Nationalism," in Se-Jin Kim and Chang-hyun Cho, eds., *Korea: A Divided Nation* (Silver Spring, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs 1976), 10-37.

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Lacking any claim to legitimacy, Park Chung Hee began by shifting its sources from a nationalist stance to economic and military might, from political independence to economic and military "interdependence," and from performance of the past to promise for the future. Specifically, Park's search for legitimacy followed almost single-mindedly the export-oriented strategy of economic development. It has produced an "economic miracle" and a new threat to Kim Il Sung, but its long-term implications for political and economic integrity of the ROK are problematical because of the increasing structural dependence of its economy on external forces.

In what way, and to what extent, can Kim Il Sung be said to have established legitimacy? If we confine the scope of legitimacy to the DPRK as a separate state, there is little doubt that he has been remarkably successful in this respect. The excessive cult of personality, which strikes many outside observers in a negative way, is both a cause and an effect of North Korea's legitimizing process. From the start, Kim Il Sung's task was made particularly difficult by the following problems: (1) the existence of another "legitimate" (Syngman Rhee) government in the South with a stronger affinity to the Korean nationalist movement; (2) the foreign origin of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism; (3) the original imposition of Kim Il Sung's leadership with the support of the Soviet military government; (4) the fratricidal factionalism of competing leadership groups with Soviet, Chinese, indigenous communist, and non-communist nationalist connections; and (5) the need both to maximize allied support in the face of perceived threat from the South and to minimize dysfunctional inputs of allied control.

Kim Il Sung proved to be a superb politician with a Machiavellian sense of timing and exploitation in each of the three major factional eruptions in the history of the DPRK (1945–1948, 1949–1953, and 1956–1958). His struggle to control and eventually wipe out dysfunctional factionalism—and to consolidate his personal power in the process—lasted over a decade. I. P. Kim argues that, "had it not been for his leadership skills and organizational techniques, Kim would have been ousted from his position, no matter how strong his Soviet support, in the struggles for power and policy that have recurred in the past quarter-century" (p. 27). Actually, Kim Il Sung triumphed, not because of Soviet support, but *in spite* of Soviet and Chinese intervention to rescue their respective factions—the Soviet-Korean and Yan'an factions. This last struggle pitted Kim Il Sung and his Kapsan faction against the powerful coalition of the Soviet-Korean and Yan'an factions, involving among other issues the principle of collective leadership.

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Scholars tend to agree that the elimination of factionalism and the triumph of Kim Il Sung's one-man rule facilitated the legitimizing process at home. Koon Woo Nam concludes his study of factionalism in North Korea by noting that the all-out extermination of the factions, though achieved by "dreadful methods, . . . brought about consolidation of the regime and political stability, enabling the regime to carry out a series of welfare measures and further promote economic development."[28] Scalapino and Lee admit that "there is virtually no chance the North Korean state [government?] will be overthrown from within" and that "the regime has undoubtedly attained legitimacy at this point so far as the great majority of its citizens are concerned."[29] Brun and Hersh see Kim Il Sung himself as the decisive factor in overcoming "the weaknesses resulting from Korean communism's history of chronic fragmentation," and conclude that Kim Il Sung both confirms and personifies the vital role of personal leadership in a social transformation of historical dimensions (pp. 407, 413-15).

Another aspect of the legitimizing process in the DPRK (overlooked in all of the studies under review) is the use of language reform as a symbolic instrument to assert a national identity. As early as 1946, Kim Il Sung launched a campaign to purge all Japanese loan words from the Korean language. In September 1948, Pyongyang officially banned the age-old use of Chinese characters (*hanja*), inaugurating a "revolutionary" process of the exclusive use of the pure Korean alphabet, *hangŭl*.[30] In May 1966, the DPRK, following Kim Il Sung's directives, adopted *munhwa-ŏ* (cultural language) based on the Pyongyang dialect as the standard language, replacing *pyojun-ŏ* (standard language) based on the Seoul dialect. The *munhwa-ŏ* movement was designed to nationalize (and thus legitimize) the Pyongyang dialect, with the justification that the Seoul dialect had been so polluted by Japanese, Chinese, and English words as to be devoid of its national character and spirit.

Pyongyang's language reform presents a powerful challenge in the politics of competitive legitimization. The extensive use of Chinese characters, remnants of Japanese loan words, and massive and undisciplined introduction of English words in the printed mass media of

[28] Koon Woo Nam, *The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945–1965: A Study of Factionalism and Political Consolidation* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press 1974), 142.

[29] Scalapino and Lee (fn. 5), 844.

[30] Kim Il Sung himself is believed to be fluent in Chinese, while his command of Russian is marginal. See B. C. Koh, "The Impact of the Chinese Model on North Korea," *Asian Survey*, XVIII (June 1978), 633.

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South Korea can only evoke *sadae-jui* (serving the great or "flunkeyism" in Pyongyang's translation), a delegitimizing symbol of slave mentality in traditional Korea. The Park government recognized the illegitimacy of Chinese characters when it announced, on *Hangŭl* Day of 1968, a plan to legislate the "exclusive use of *hangŭl*" in all printed materials beginning January 1, 1970. As of this writing, however, that plan remains unfulfilled; the average high school graduate in the South has difficulty reading newspapers published in Seoul because of their extensive use of Chinese characters.

The legitimizing process also requires a minimization of dysfunctional inputs of foreign control. The introduction of the concept of *chuch'e* was the beginning of a carefully orchestrated transition from dependency to independence. Kim Il Sung's ability to check Soviet interventionist pressures may be attributed in a large measure to his successful consolidation and centralization of power at home and to his skillful use of this power in raising the costs of Soviet intervention. J. A. Kim argues that "Kim Il Sung was able to consolidate despite external factors which opposed him—using the opposition of these external factors, to prove the nationalist 'purity' of the regime and hence improve his claim to legitimacy" (p. 166). In short, *chuch'e* served the dual purpose of legitimizing Kim Il Sung's consolidation of power at home and the pursuit of an independent foreign policy abroad.

However, the continued existence of a separate political entity in the South represents a threat to Kim Il Sung's search for full legitimacy, and sets the stage for the global competition of the two Koreas for diplomatic recognition and representation. The Korean problem has been complicated by the conflict of two separate *states* in one and the same *nation*. Korea is one nation in the accepted meaning of the term, as a socio-psychological concept referring to a people sharing a common language, religion, history, as well as customs. The division of this one nation has brought about two separate legal entities, two Korean states—a state being a legal concept for a community possessing such attributes as an organized government, defined territory, and a measure of independence in the conduct of foreign relations. The fact that the two Koreas meet the criteria of statehood seems to have produced cross-pressures of both an ameliorating and an aggravating nature in the politics of the two Koreas.

Thanks to American support, the ROK enjoyed what appeared to be an insurmountable edge in diplomatic recognition in the 1950s and early 1960s. As of December 1962, for example, the ROK was officially recognized by 53 countries, as compared to 15 for the DPRK. By June

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1976, however, this diplomatic edge had virtually disappeared as the number of countries recognizing the ROK and the DPRK stood at 95 and 90, respectively (*Pukhan Oekyo-ron,* 161). In the frantic competition for diplomatic recognition in the decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, both Koreas abandoned the "Peking formula" (or Hallstein Doctrine), thereby opening the way for dual or simultaneous recognition. In short, the DPRK's legitimacy as measured by another important criterion, diplomatic recognition, cannot be gainsaid. The countries of the Third World contributed substantially to the DPRK's success in achieving legitimacy in the international system.

Since the United Nations condemned (and thus illegitimized) the DPRK as an aggressor during the Korean War, Pyongyang's attitude toward the world organization cannot be a positive one. Yet, Pyongyang has clearly recognized the collective legitimizing or delegitimizing functions in the U.N.'s symbolic politics. On June 23, 1973, Park announced that he would no longer object to the simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the United Nations as separate member-states. And, although it opposed the two-Korea policy in the U.N. itself, the DPRK has vigorously and successfully lobbied for admission to many of the constituent organs of the United Nations system. It was through its membership in the World Health Organization (1973) that Pyongyang managed to receive official observer status, thus commencing its participation in U.N. politics (Kiyosaki, 100-101). *De jure* representation of the two Koreas as two separate *member states* in the specialized agencies, and *de facto* representation of the two Koreas as two separate *observer states* in the United Nations have, for all practical purposes, institutionalized the DPRK and the ROK as two independent states with separate-but-equal claims to legitimacy in the family of nations.

In sum, then, Kim Il Sung has effectively resolved the legitimacy crisis by removing opposition from within, by neutralizing dysfunctional pressure of external control or intervention through the *chuch'e* policy, and by gaining wide diplomatic recognition and representation in the global community. It may be significant that the 1972 Constitution named Pyongyang (rather than Seoul, as did the former constitution), as the capital of the DPRK. "This change," wrote one astute observer, "would appear to suggest that the DPRK claims jurisdiction over just the northern half of the peninsula it now controls, thereby implicitly recognizing Seoul's authority over its half of the peninsula."[31] This new development—as well as Pyongyang's willingness to

[31] Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," *Problems of Communism* XXII (January-February 1973), 71.

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live with the dual recognition status by 40 countries and with dual representation in the United Nations system, the inauguration of the Pyongyang dialect as the standard language, and the DPRK's repeated pledge in the 1970s to an independent and *peaceful* reunification of Korea—all point to the acceptance of, or at least acquiescence in, the German solution on the Korean peninsula.

## Whither Future Research?

In taking stock of the state of the field, I shall first identify the major maladies that plague the current lines of inquiry into the DPRK polity in general and its foreign policy in particular. I shall then venture, in the interest of advancing political science scholarship on Korea, to outline some alternative methods and approaches for liberating the field from its intellectual isolationism, linking it up with the larger framework of values, concepts, theories, and methods in the social and behavioral sciences, and charting a path toward a cumulative, orderly, and systematic way of building a body of knowledge about Korean communism.

First, there is a need for a thoroughgoing restructuring of our conceptualization of the Korean problem. The dominant approach, as revealed in the four studies on foreign policy, is marred by conceptual and normative frameworks that tend to be too parochial in perspective and too particularistic in heuristic power: the Korea-centric framework that isolates the DPRK as *sui generis* and overdifferentiates it from other global actors; the totalitarian (Kremlinological) framework that exaggerates and oversimplifies one property of the political system but says little about interactions between or among the constituent properties; the East-West framework that repeats the sterile ideological debate of the cold-war era; the regional framework that treats Pyongyang's relationship with Peking and Moscow as the sum-total of its foreign policy; and the dyadic framework that fragments Pyongyang's foreign policy into bilateral aspects.

In substantive terms, the current lines of inquiry have produced an uneven state of knowledge about the DPRK. In part, that is due to the failure to take an interdisciplinary approach or even to make individual attempts to study Pyongyang's polity at different levels of analysis. The DPRK as a political system presents many analytical units and conceptual focuses, all of which can be typologized into four levels of analysis: personal, interpersonal, societal, and (international) systemic. None of the studies under review or in the existing literature have

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employed the personal and interpersonal levels of analysis; few, if any, have attempted the systemic level of analysis; and all, or virtually all, fall in the category of a societal level of analysis—leaving a number of substantive domains uncovered.

In addition, the dominant approach is too fragmented, too atheoretical, and too idiographic; it lacks general linkage and explanatory and prescriptive power. There is little or no attempt at conceptually linking domestic and foreign policy, empirical investigation and theory building, normative analysis and scientific methodology, bilateral and multilateral relations, high politics and low politics, or theory and practice, in Pyongyang's polity. Much of the literature, though written mostly by political scientists, reflects a historical approach excessively concerned with attempts to capture "reality" in full detail. Of course, we must describe before we can explain, much less predict. But mere description without the guidance of normative, conceptual, and theoretical maps can hardly contribute to expanding the frontier of knowledge.

The osmosis between the two putatively separate domains of values and facts points up the dangers. On the one hand, a value-neutral approach tends to be morally naive or deceptive, conceptually elusive, and substantively trivial or policy-irrelevant. It risks the danger of being trapped in straitjacket empiricism, and of losing sight of the ultimate *raison d'être* of social-science research. On the other hand, a normative approach can easily become a polemical exercise. It tends to be methodologically sloppy and empirically suspect, and it always faces the danger of falling prey to a parochial or partisan cause.

A policy-science approach known as "peace research" offers a promising alternative path. Peace research combines the main characteristics of traditional *normative* analysis with the modern *behavioral* approach. While its objective is clearly normative in the sense of striving toward the realization of values, its practitioners argue that global problems of war, economic inequity, and social injustice cannot be explained, let alone predicted or controlled, without first generating a vast amount of reliable empirical and behavioral data employing a rigorous methodology. Of course, peace research in which values and science are merged is more easily promised than performed, but the work of Johan Galtung demonstrates its feasibility.[32]

Despite the lip service paid to "peace" or "peaceful unification" by both Koreas, the dominant approach remains curiously detached from

[32] See Galtung, *Peace: Research, Education, Action*, I (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers 1975); *Methodology and Ideology: Essays in Methodology*, I (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers 1977); *The True Worlds* (New York: Free Press 1979).

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the conceptual, methodological, and normative concerns of peace research. In addition to treating policy-relevant issues in the context of modern social science theories and methods, peace research has the advantage of possessing an explicit set of *transnational values* uncorrupted by the great-power rivalry in East Asia. Hence, it offers an alternative framework that transcends the ideological polemics of the opposing cold-war norms and values in North and South Korea.

The "system development theory" or "systems approach" as embraced by Gabriel Almond and others[33] presents itself as another attractive method in establishing greater conceptual order and clarity in the study of the DPRK polity. This approach satisfies our need for a more comprehensive and general concept that embraces all of the patterned actions relevant to the authoritative allocation of values. It enables us to compare the North Korean political system with other types of political systems by focusing on such conceptually delineated and empirically observable inputs and outputs as political socialization, elite recruitment, role differentiation, interest articulation/aggregation, political communication, rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication. This approach may also yield some predictive power about future trends in the North Korean political system, since the concept of a system presupposes interdependence among the interacting units, with all units being affected by a significant change in any one unit, thus changing the stability (equilibrium) of the system as a whole.

As already noted, content analysis is a particularly useful method in the study of the DPRK polity because of the relative inaccessibility of direct research and observation. Content analysis can compensate for inaccessibility by making use of printed documentary materials. It provides a set of exact and repeatable procedures for assembling, categorizing, coding, measuring, analyzing, and hypothesis testing.

There is a need to examine Pyongyang's foreign policy as a functional system. Studies of perception and cognition at the individual, interpersonal, and organizational (bureaucratic) levels can shed some light on Pyongyang's foreign-policy making process. Specifically, I would suggest as a model Robert Jervis's interdisciplinary approach in the study of decision makers' perception and misperception in foreign policy making.[34]

[33] See Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409; Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960); Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics* (2nd rev. ed.; Boston: Little, Brown 1978); Almond, *Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown 1970).

[34] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976).

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Cognitive mapping is another method that promises to delineate Kim Il Sung's world view and its effect on the policy-making process. Specifically, cognitive mapping might be employed in (1) *describing* what his belief system is, (2) *explaining* why his domestic or foreign policy choices are what they are (based on his particular belief system), and (3) *forecasting* his future course of action, based on our estimate of an increase or a decrease in certain variables affecting his belief system. Cognitive mapping seems to possess normative implications, too, as it may be put to use in *prescribing* what changes are needed on the part of other external actors in order to bring about "preferred" responses from Kim Il Sung.

On the output side, a more disciplined behavioral analysis of Pyongyang's foreign policy is now possible by tapping independent empirical data generated by Pyongyang's target parties in the international system. The influence of Pyongyang's foreign relations can be measured and explained through the response of the target parties. The DPRK presents itself as a fruitful case study to test the tyranny-of-the-weak hypothesis in contemporary international politics. In this context, another neglected theoretical perspective is an investigation of Korean politics as an example of divided polities. Such a focus might yield insights into conditions of regime stability and legitimacy of divided countries, as well as into their alliance relationships. It should be noted here that almost all the warfare and near-warfare in the postwar international system has been concentrated in the divided polities of Germany, Korea, China, and Vietnam.

The World Order Models Project (WOMP) offers an approach for normative macro-analysis of Pyongyang's foreign policy.[35] The WOMP, as a transnational and transdisciplinary enterprise of scholars, provides a normative map, a systemic focus, and a comparative frame of analysis in defining Pyongyang's global policy and assessing the mutual interaction between Pyongyang and the global community. Yoshikazu Sakamoto's recent study, in which the Korean problem was conceptualized and analyzed as a world-order issue rather than an aspect of the East-West conflict (although it is clearly acknowledged as a product of that conflict), stands out as a path-breaker.[36]

[35] The WOMP is a transnational enterprise of scholars that is designed to diagnose global crises and project them over the last quarter of the twentieth century; to build models of preferred futures based on such planetary values as peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance; and to suggest transition strategies of implementing a preferred world order. See Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press 1975); Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: Free Press 1975).

[36] Sakamoto, *Korea As a World Order Issue*, WOMP Occasional Paper No. 3 (1978).

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A final *caveat* is in order. The diversity, unevenness, and relative unreliability and/or inaccessibility of primary sources necessitate a cautious pluralism of methodology. Each of the primary sources discussed has its own strengths and weakness. Its particular use should therefore be guided by the researcher's subject of inquiry, objectives, scope, methodological skills, and level of analysis. Of course, the ultimate test of acceptance or rejection of any of the alternative methods and approaches suggested above would rest not on the promise of any methodology but on its performance.

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# "ROLE THEORY," POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND AFRICAN STUDIES

By ALVIN MAGID

Walter Barrows, *Grassroots Politics in an African State: Integration and Development in Sierra Leone*. New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1976, 265 pp., $25.00.

Raymond F. Hopkins, *Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's First Decade*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971, 293 pp., $19.50.

Robert M. Price, *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 261 pp., $15.00.

## I

THE possibility of constructing social theory scientifically around the concept of "role" has long attracted scholarly interest. Following that lodestar, if not a common research strategy, social scientists in various disciplines have managed to produce a substantial literature under the rubric of "role theory."[1] However, it appears that role theory has some way to go before it can be considered a component of scientific theory. When it finally sheds conceptual ambiguity and includes a unified body of testable and tested generalizations that enhance explanation and prediction of social phenomena, it will legitimately lay claim to that status. Until then, to cite Harry Eckstein's words out of context, "it will call attention to [some of] the 'real forces' in [social life] and to the need for better definitions and operations for dealing with these forces."[2]

In the meantime, the social sciences continue to accumulate numerous studies of role that employ diverse methodologies in a wide range of social contexts. The construct retains considerable appeal for some who still pursue the goal of a unified theory of behavior for the social sciences,[3] and for many others who discern in the role perspective,[4]

[1] Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (New York: Wiley 1966), 383-429; Theodore Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, I (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1959), 223-58; Lionel J. Neiman and James W. Hughes, "The Problem of the Concept of Role—A Re-Survey of the Literature," *Social Forces*, XXX (December 1951), 141-49.

[2] Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1963), 393.

[3] See, for example, J. Milton Yinger, *Toward a Field Theory of Behavior: Personality and Social Structure* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1965), 98-138; Talcott Parsons and

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if not in role theory *per se*, a major source of concepts and insights on which they may draw eclectically for all manner of social research. Indeed, few other single constructs in modern social science have enjoyed such wide use for those two purposes.

While the number and variety of studies emphasizing the role perspective have increased over many years, their distribution, by discipline in the social sciences, has remained strikingly uneven. Role has long had pride of place in sociology and psychology and, to a lesser but significant extent, in anthropology. Political science has been least imbued with the role perspective. This disparity is highlighted, for example, in the extensive bibliography on role theory compiled by Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas.[5] Sociologists and psychologists predominate among the hundreds of authors they cite; only a few political scientists are represented. Although limited in number, these studies by political scientists mirror the wide array of applications encountered elsewhere in the social sciences—ranging from efforts to construct more general theory[6] to individual case studies organized around the concept of role.[7]

## II

At this stage in its development, role theory is more accurately described as a perspective than as a single overarching theory for all the social phenomena it subsumes.[8]

The role perspective stresses that the role performance of individuals is shaped by the expectations and behavior of others. Attention is drawn particularly to the ways in which the behavior of individuals is shaped by the demands and rules of others in society; by the sanctions (negative and positive) that are associated with the conforming or deviant behavior of individuals; and by the subjective evaluation which

Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1959), throughout.

[4] Biddle and Thomas (fn. 1), 4.

[5] *Ibid.*, 383-419.

[6] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409; Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960), 3-64.

[7] See, for example, William O. Chittick, *State Department, Press, and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis* (New York: Wiley 1970), throughout; Roger H. Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus 1969), throughout; Lewis J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1965), throughout; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, and others, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York: Wiley 1962), throughout.

[8] See Biddle and Thomas (fn. 1), 4.

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individuals make of the appropriateness of their own behavior and that of others, generally and in particular social situations. In sum, the role perspective assumes some determinism in social life. Without denying the reality of individual differences, it stresses the social factors that may affect the creation of such differences and the conditions under which those factors will be more or less influential.

Keeping the role perspective in mind, we should expect that every society will evince differences, in some degree, over prescriptions, evaluations, and sanctions for the behavior of its members. Unable to establish unanimous agreement on such matters, a society may then expect that at least some of its members will experience uncertainty and perhaps painful uneasiness in their personal orientation to behavior; and that social dysfunctions are likely to result from the absence of societal consensus. The importance of these matters in the role perspective, and of their possible dysfunctional consequences both for the individual and the social unit, has stimulated among numerous social scientists in all the disciplines a keen interest in the phenomenon of "role conflict."[9]

## III

In African studies particularly, interest in role conflict has usually centered on chiefs, village headmen, and other local officials. Their positions have long been recognized as vital links between different social strata in tribal societies, and between those societies and the higher institutions of government that are a legacy of colonial rule. Africanists have been mindful of role conflict that frequently surrounds the individuals who occupy linkage positions, and of the relationship between such conflict and the integration and stability of the social units in which these individuals participate.[10]

Two main sources of role conflict have been identified by investigators in Africa. The first of these involves conflicting principles of social relations that are intrinsic in many African societies.[11] (I shall refer to this type of role conflict as "endogenous.")

The second source involves conflicting principles of social relations that are associated with the superimposition of European colonial administrations on indigenous political structures. (I shall refer to this

[9] Role conflict involves contradictory expectations that cannot be fulfilled simultaneously by the same actor. The concept is explicated on pp. 320-21.

[10] See the extensive bibliography cited in Magid, *Men in the Middle: Leadership and Role Conflict in a Nigerian Society* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press and Africana 1976), 2, n. 1.

[11] See, for example, Max Gluckman and others, "The Village Headman in British Central Africa," *Africa*, XIX (April 1949), 92-106.

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type of role conflict as "exogenous.") Usually such conflict has been observed at the point(s) where administrative positions in two hierarchies, each with its own pattern of social relations, intersect. Max Gluckman has described these intersections as "inter-hierarchical positions or roles."[12] Under colonial rule, the nexus could often be discerned where a chief who held office at or near the apex of his own tribal hierarchy was also a salaried civil servant at or near the base of the European administrative hierarchy.

Studies of exogenous role conflict may be distinguished by the analytic perspectives they adopt.[13] Some concentrate on the dilemma of the African subordinate of a European hierarchy who is pressured by both the demands and values of his white superiors in the administration and the demands and values of his own people, which are seen by them as conflicting with the former. Other studies view the problem somewhat more narrowly as a conflict between two ethics affecting the occupants of inter-hierarchical positions. The latter group, generally relating to societies in East Africa,[14] draws attention to an indigenous personal particularistic ethic that stresses kinship and often also patron-client relationships; and to its opposite, an alien conception of public administration (the civil service) which in its essential details mirrors the values in the Weberian model of bureaucracy.[15] Investigators view endogenous role conflict as an expression of traditional strains inherent in the personal particularistic ethic; they regard exogenous role conflict as resulting from the superimposition of the civil service ethic on that base.

## IV

It was not until the 1950s that a few political scientists, following the lead of anthropologists and sociologists in African studies, began to demonstrate a serious interest in the role perspective, and particularly

[12] Gluckman, "Inter-Hierarchical Roles: Professional and Party Ethics in Tribal Areas in South and Central Africa," in Marc Swartz, ed., *Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (Chicago: Aldine 1968), 71.

[13] *Ibid.*, 72.

[14] Audrey I. Richards, ed., *East African Chiefs: A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes* (New York: Praeger 1960), throughout; Lloyd A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy: A Century of Political Evolution Among the Basoga of Uganda* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1965), 155ff.; Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief: An Instance from Uganda," *American Anthropologist*, LVII (1955), 290-305; John Beattie, *Bunyoro: An African Kingdom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1960), throughout.

[15] A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, eds. and trans., *Max Weber: Theory of Economic and Social Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press 1947), 329-40; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press 1958), 196-240.

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in role conflict. Perhaps the first one to do so was David Apter. In his seminal work, *The Gold Coast in Transition*, he employs role analysis within a general structural-functional framework to study conflict and change associated with "political institutional transfer" in that former British colony.[16] Since then, and especially during the current decade, other political scientists have produced case studies of role and role conflict in various independent African states. While some of these studies reflect the "tradition" of concentrating on exogenous role conflict surrounding various types of local officials, others deal with similar conflict involving either central-level actors, or relationships between actors at the local and central levels. Because the number and diversity of these studies are likely to increase in the future, they merit description and evaluation as a group. I will pursue those two objectives in the remainder of this article, with particular reference to the works on politics and administration in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania by, respectively, Robert M. Price, Walter Barrows, and Raymond F. Hopkins.

## V

Price, in *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*, sets the stage for his analysis of role conflict surrounding national civil servants by describing how "public bureaucracies in newly emergent states have often appeared to be obstacles to change" (p. 3). In the case of Ghana, he notes how administrative deficiencies—notably in the operations of the Cocoa Board—worked to curb economic development and also to encourage a mood of popular disaffection which contributed to Kwame Nkrumah's fall from power.

The author next establishes a framework that will permit him to connect the macro-level, poly-normative aspects of administrative life in the new states with the micro-level where individual bureaucrats perform their concrete tasks. Having discovered a linkage concept in "social role," Price then explicates the main idea with which his empirical analysis deals: role conflict. For that purpose, he draws on Robert Merton's "role-set." The referent is to the "complement of role relationships which persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status"[17] or position.

A situation of "role conflict" is said to exist, according to Price, when the cross-pressures that surround a person's behavior derive from his

[16] Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1955), throughout.

[17] Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1961), 369.

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membership in more than one role-set. Contrastingly, a situation of "role incongruency" exists when any member of a particular role-set experiences incompatible role expectations or role pressures which originate in that social unit.

Ghana and other transitional societies, Price observes, are more likely than complex modern societies to experience organizational dysfunction as a consequence of role conflict. In modern societies, "role compartmentalization"—the separation of a person's various roles in distinct social spheres—is reinforced both by structural arrangements and cultural norms that either limit the incidence of role conflict or soften its impact. But in transitional societies—particularly in Africa—corporate kinship arrangements work against role compartmentalization by denying to kinsmen individual autonomy in the workplace. Here, the civil servant—unlike his Western counterpart who is expected to favor the bureaucratic organization's abstract rules, universalistic principles, and concrete goals over any personal and familial ties—is expected by his kinship group to act in the opposite manner. So long as membership in the corporate kinship group is highly valued, the civil servant in a transitional society is likely to accede to the role pressures which it exerts upon him—especially if, as is often the case, the kinship group will punish him for any role transgression.

Structural arrangements and general cultural support for compartmentalizing office and family role-sets cannot alone ensure the organizational effectiveness of a modern public bureaucracy. The separation of the civil servant's workplace and hearth, and of the distinctive role obligations that are associated with each, must be positively valued by the members of the organization and by those outside it.

This condition is seldom met in Africa, however; the legitimacy of political regimes is often doubtful and, correlatively, national identity and a popular consensus on transcendent values and goals are often nonexistent or only weakly developed. Under those circumstances, the civil servant may perceive public bureaucracy and his own office not as the focus of his professional commitment, but as a source of economic and status rewards for himself and his corporate kinship group. The status aspect of bureaucratic positions, Price observes, has come to be more highly valued—in a word, institutionalized—than the professional role aspect, both among civil servants at all organizational levels and among the general population.

Price is led to conclude that African social systems experience malintegration at the formal institutional level, but not at the level of the individual. Role conflict is apt to occur, he observes, not where the civil

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servant's interaction with his office and other role-sets is organized primordially around a shared particularistic orientation, but where the universalism of formal bureaucratic organization clashes with the particularism of virtually all role-sets.

The main part of *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana* is taken up with an empirical analysis that is intended as a limited test of Price's theory of the social basis of administrative behavior in transitional societies. The analysis centers on role relationships among civil servants, and between them and their kinsmen and clients outside the organization. Price also draws attention to the way in which administrative corruption cements particularistic bonds between civil servants and the members of their organizational and external role-sets. He administered attitude surveys to civil servants, university students, and ordinary citizens; in role-related questions, respondents were asked to consider the activities of hypothetical civil servants and role-sets in imaginary conflict situations.

Price's study illuminates the frailties of public bureaucracy in the new states, but it is laced with problems and flaws. The more serious ones involve his approach to administrative role conflict generally and in the African context. Because the concept of role conflict is central to Price's theoretical perspective and his empirical analysis, I shall address my remarks essentially to this aspect of his work.

As I observed earlier, many investigators of exogenous role conflict in Africa tend to view the problem narrowly, as one of conflict between an indigenous personal particularistic ethic that stresses the primacy of the kinship factor, and its opposite, the civil service ethic and the Weberian model of bureaucracy on which it draws. Price adopts a similar perspective, defining role conflict as a clash between universalistic and particularistic value orientations embodied in "an individual's roles in two or more [organizational and extra-organizational] role-sets" (p. 17). I find this construction problematical, as it seems to me to confuse theory and fact. Too much stress is placed on a theory of administration which is formed of abstract principles in the civil service ethic, the model of bureaucracy, and (for anglophone Africa especially during the colonial era) the basic texts on indirect rule.[18] Viewing administration essentially as the acting out of general principles, these investigators often seem to miss what probably lies closer to the motivational

[18] See, for example, Frederick D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: Blackwood 1923); Donald Cameron, *The Principles of Native Administration and Their Application* (Lagos, Nigeria: Government Printer 1934).

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core of bureaucratic life in Africa, both under colonial rule and now.

European rule on that continent was a system of power in which conformity to abstract principles was far less important than the push and pull between governor and governed that was reflected daily in their accommodation and adjustment to each other[19]—a political condition that pointed up the mutual adaptation of traditionality and modernity and their reciprocal penetration and transformation as change gradually took place against the background of persistence.[20] To the extent that they were acted upon by white officials and their African subordinates, administrative imperatives such as "efficiency," "economy," and "impersonality" probably had far more to do with political and other exigencies than with the civil service ethic and the model of bureaucracy with which those principles are so closely identified.

Viewing European rule as a system of power, we become more sensitive to the bureaucratizing impulse of administration—that is, to its efforts to expand and consolidate its rule over those whose lives it would regulate. Like institutions generally, European administration in Africa valued its own survival along with the tasks it performed.[21] Those who would acquire power and hold on to it often need to pursue their interests under the cloak of high principle and disinterested service—a truism that appears to have eluded those students of Africa who lay stress upon the clash of universalistic and particularistic ethics or value orientations in exogenous role conflict. Reduced to its essentials, European administration is more accurately seen as an institution in and around which diverse interests collected—all of them particularistic at the core and all (by their actions or their tacit consent) in varying degrees lending support to, or opposing, the bureaucratizing impulse. Bureaucratic life in colonial Africa reflected a tension that was born, as S. N. Eisenstadt describes it, of bureaucracy seeking to extend its spheres of activity and power either in its own interest or that of some elite, tending toward greater regimentation of social life; conversely,

[19] Robert Heussler, *The British in Northern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press 1968), throughout; Max Gluckman, *Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1968), throughout; Hilda Kuper, *The Uniform of Color: A Study of White-Black Relationships in Swaziland* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press 1947), 92-96.

[20] Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1969), throughout; C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), 190-217; Robert Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (London: Oxford University Press 1969), 270-71.

[21] Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Harper & Row 1957), 17, 21.

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other groups in the society sought either to check that impulse or to limit its effects.[22]

Role conflict surrounding officials, white and black, was discernible in colonial Africa wherever there was, in some degree, support for and opposition to the values and interests of the bureaucracy that favored the expansion of its power in social life.[23] With governor and governed each pushing and pulling in their interaction, role conflict was usually resolved not by one side wholly subduing the other, but by mutual give-and-take.

What evidence is there that this relationship between public bureaucracy and its social environment in Africa has been radically altered with the transfer of power to indigenous elites? None, I think. Nor is such a change likely to occur soon. On the contrary, as the size and activities of public bureaucracy both continue to expand in independent Africa—with development, or without—the countervailing forces to bureaucratic power are likely to be, as they were under colonial rule, a major source of role conflict surrounding civil servants. Moreover, if these civil servants and their corporate kinship groups continue, as Price presumes, to favor the status aspect of their offices over the professional role aspect, then social divisions may be expected to intensify—among civil servants and between them, their kinship role-set, and other clamant groups—over the allocation of scarce rewards, material and symbolic. This, in turn, is likely to exacerbate role conflict surrounding civil servants. In either event or in both, governor and governed are likely to try, as under colonial rule, to achieve resolution of role conflict principally by mutual accommodation and adjustment—and not, as some students of Africa maintain, by one side consummately defeating the other or by displacing its universalistic or particularistic interests. With his emphasis upon (1) the primacy of the particularistic status aspect in institutional transfer over the universalistic role aspect, (2) the apparent agreement among role-sets that civil servants should fulfil their particularistic role obligations, and (3) the apparent predisposition of officials to honor those obligations whether or not they involve role conflict, Price seems to draw near to those who tend to regard contrasting principles and behavioral alternatives each as mutually exclusive dichotomies. He takes this stand, ironically, despite the faults that he himself rightly discerns in such a conception (pp. 18-21).

[22] Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization: A Trend Report," *Current Sociology*, VII, No. 2 (1958), 123, and Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV (December 1959), 302-20.

[23] Magid (fn. 10), 9-12.

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Various defects in Price's research design also point up his questionable approach to administrative role conflict. As we shall see presently, two major empirical findings in the study may both be artifacts of a flawed design—viz., that Ghanaian civil servants and their role-sets are predisposed to hold and act upon particularistic role expectations for the behavior of those officials, and that role conflict is likely to occur not at the level of the individual civil servant, but at the institutional level of his bureaucratic organization.

Perhaps the most serious flaws involve Price's use of the concept of the role-set. Only two such social units are identified by him for Ghanaian civil servants: the organizational and the kinship networks. Inexplicably, he makes no effort, either when developing a theoretical rationale for the study or when executing the empirical analysis, to specify possible other role-sets for those officials—for instance, friendship groups and religious affiliations beyond the kinship jurisdiction. Nor, with the exception of some general references to the civil servants' administrative superiors, does he make any attempt to delineate the subgroups that comprise the office and kinship networks, such as generational and functional aggregations; their divergent interests may be a source of role conflict (between role-sets) and/or role incongruency (within a role-set). Significantly, where other kindred studies by political scientists "map" the internal composition of African role-sets in greater detail, they report far less agreement among the members than does Price on any particular role orientation and, correlatively, a much higher incidence of role conflict surrounding those members who occupy political or administrative positions.[24]

Yet another troublesome aspect of Price's study can be found in the operational definition he stipulates for the concept of role conflict. As we shall see, he somewhat confusingly emphasizes the structural arrangement of multiple role-sets holding incompatible role expectations for a particular actor. It should be noted, however, that the literature on role conflict does generally reveal a confusing array of definitions. For example, various definitions of the concept emphasize expectations that are antithetical, incompatible, inconsistent, or discrepant.[25] Superficially, these terms appear to be synonymous; but closer inspection re-

[24] See, for example, *ibid.*, 116-18, 183-89; Barrows, *Grassroots Politics in an African State*, 97-142.

[25] See, for example, Waldo W. Burchard, "Role Conflicts in Military Chaplains," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (October 1954), 528; John Spiegel, "The Resolution of Conflict Within the Family," *Psychiatry*, XX (February 1957), 2, n. 1; Eugene Jacobson and others, "The Use of the Role Concept in the Study of Complex Organizations," *Journal of Social Issues*, VII, No. 3 (1951), 22-23; J. W. Getzels and E. G. Guba, "Role, Role Conflict, and Effectiveness," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (1954), 165.

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veals a significant difference. That difference can perhaps best be illuminated from the perspective of formal logic.

In formal logic, antithesis denotes terms in opposition. However, incompatibility, inconsistency, and discrepancy subsume conflict that may be antithetical or non-antithetical. Clearly, then, definitions of role conflict require specification of antithetical and non-antithetical expectations. Unfortunately, such specification rarely appears in the literature, which tends to be replete with statements that merely imply that role conflict is analogous to antithesis in formal logic.

Pursuing this line of thought still further, it is observed that antithesis subsumes *contradiction* (where $A$ is false, $B$ must be true) and *contrariety* (where $A$ and $B$ can both be false, but never true together).[26] Translated into language for analyzing role conflict, these two principles in formal logic point up the following analogy: contradictory and contrary role situations both involve opposing expectations that cannot be fulfilled simultaneously by the same actor. But the two situations differ in one important respect. Whereas no expectation can be ignored by the actor confronting a contradictory role situation (which I shall refer to here as "role conflict"), all expectations can be ignored and yet another behavioral alternative selected by the actor confronting a contrary role situation (which I shall refer to as "role dilemma"); the latter is thus accorded greater freedom of action in the face of opposing expectations.[27]

Price's definition of role conflict reflects several ambiguities. The first involves his decision to adopt the notion of incompatible role expectations, albeit without explicating it. Is his empirical referent to antithetical expectations held for Ghanaian civil servants by their role-sets, to non-antithetical expectations, or, compounding the confusion, to both? Second, assuming that Price is concerned exclusively with antithetical expectations, are these of the contradictory type (my behavioral denotation for role conflict), of the contrary type (my behavioral denotation for role dilemma), or of both types? If his intended referent is to both types of antithetical expectations, then the confusion is further compounded: as we have seen, role conflict and role dilemma have different behavioral consequences for the civil servants (and perhaps also for their role-sets). Finally, whereas the analytic distinction that Price draws between role conflict and role incongruency is unequivocal

[26] Ralph M. Eaton, *General Logic* (New York: Scribner 1959), 83-85.

[27] Howard J. Ehrlich, "The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police," Ph.D. diss., Department of Sociology and Anthropology (Michigan State University 1959), 7.

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in its structural aspect—that is, the former is seen by him as involving multiple role-sets, the latter as but one role-set—it is ambiguous in its behavioral aspect. Because contradictory and contrary role situations may both arise between the civil servants' role-sets (Price's structural denotation for role conflict) or within one role-set (his structural denotation for role incongruency), it is important that the behavioral consequences that may attach to each alternative be clarified theoretically and empirically.[28]

## VI

The principal elite group in rural Sierra Leone, according to Walter Barrows, comprises the Paramount Chiefs who head local government organizations in 148 chiefdoms. It is on those officials—particularly the 16 in Mendeland's Kenema District—that *Grassroots Politics in an African State* concentrates. Barrows examines the institution of chieftaincy as part of an elaborate system of shifting alliances and coalitions through which political parties and local and national elites, in power and out, vie for political advantage and material rewards. In the process, political linkages are forged between the urban-dominated center and the rural periphery, and a large portion of Sierra Leone's economic resources is distributed throughout the countryside for development and for other purposes.

Not surprisingly, as occupants of nexus positions within the chiefdoms and of positions between those units and the national government in Freetown, the Paramount Chiefs are bound to experience cross-pressures. Since independence in 1961, role conflict surrounding the chiefs has intensified; there are pressures upon them to act as neutral figureheads, as the local agents of national political parties, and as civil servants. Barrows finds that these pressures originate both within the chiefdoms and beyond their jurisdiction.

Barrows intends his analysis of role conflict buffeting the Paramount Chiefs to be an empirical test of two different conceptions of the modernization process (pp. 28-58).[29] On the one hand, there is the "displacement model," which views change as holistic, unidirectional, and inevitably involving a head-on clash between old ways and new. The model further assumes that "traditional" societies are tightly integrated

[28] The four alternatives are contradictory role expectations involving one role-set; contradictory role expectations involving multiple role-sets; contrary role expectations involving one role-set; contrary role expectations involving multiple role-sets.

[29] Barrows's discussion of modernization and of role conflict draws on Whitaker (fn. 20), and S. F. Nadel, *The Theory of Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1957).

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around roles which are individually formed of functionally interdependent attributes, which can neither check the onslaught of new ways nor adapt to them, and which are therefore destined to be displaced by the forces of "modernity."

On the other hand, there is the "synthetic model," which stresses the adaptability of societies and of "traditional" roles. It assumes that change may be sectoral and that therefore it need not spread unidirectionally throughout society. Traditional and modern attributes are seen as able to fuse with one another, to interpenetrate, or to coexist—thereby avoiding a head-on clash that must culminate in displacement. Greater flexibility of action is accorded the individual in this model, provided that such action does not undermine or destroy whatever core attribute(s) inhere(s) in the traditional role. That condition having been met, attributes of the modern role may even be grafted onto the traditional role. Whereas the displacement model anticipates that traditional roles will inevitably be swept away by modern roles, the synthetic model holds out the prospect that a clash between the two types will be muted to the extent that core attributes of the former are able to withstand the pressures of social change.

Inexplicably, *Grassroots Politics in an African State* contains no discussion of the author's research methodology and field experiences. There are occasional footnote references to interviews presumably conducted by him, but these are identified only by number and by date.

Barrows's decision to link the concept of role conflict to the synthetic model of the modernization process is the major strength of his study. Unlike Price, who treats universalism and particularism embodied in interests and roles as essentially irreconcilable, Barrows stresses the potential for their mutual accommodation and adjustment. Accorded greater freedom of action than Price's civil servant, Barrows's Paramount Chief will probably choose from among a wider range of behavioral alternatives as he tries to cope with the role pressures of his office. Yet another strength of the Sierra Leone study can be found in the evidence it adduces of role conflict arising between *and* within distinctive role-sets. Whereas Price concentrates his empirical analysis on multiple role-sets as the source of incompatible role expectations, Barrows points up conflicting expectations also in distinctive spheres—at the chiefdom level and among national elites. Barrows's study is more sensitive to the complex heterogeneity of values and interests that is mirrored in role conflict at every level in Africa.

However, Barrows's study also evinces a certain incomprehensive-

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ness. Preoccupied essentially with preliminaries in the empirical analysis of role conflict, the author is generally content to point out (1) the adaptability of traditional roles under the stress of social change and (2) the diverse sources of role conflict weighing upon the Paramount Chiefs as linkage figures in Sierra Leone. Largely unexamined in the study are the implications that (1) and (2) might have for the concrete behavior of the chiefs as individuals, and for the social units in which they are participants (that is, the chiefdom and the nation).

Barrows's omissions draw our attention to two important aspects of role conflict—one social-psychological, the other sociological.[30] In the former, the major concern is with the psychic conflicts and anxieties that may be produced in the individual either as a result of contradictory expectations that are held for his behavior—whether by persons with whom he interacts or by groups of which he is a member and to which he owes loyalty—or as a result of contradictions inherent in a single role expectation or role pattern. The following questions might be posed concerning the Paramount Chiefs from a social-psychological perspective: What is the content of conflicting role expectations that chiefs perceive others as holding for their behavior in particular situations? How accurate are their perceptions? What assessment do they make of the legitimacy of particular role expectations and of their own obligation to conform to them? What sanctions do chiefs perceive others as attaching to those role expectations? How accurate are their perceptions with regard to sanctions? To what extent, if any, do chiefs have difficulty coping with role conflict? And by what calculation do they resolve role conflict? As long as these questions are left unanswered, we cannot be confident of knowing either the extent to which those local officials actually perceive role conflict and experience difficulty coping with it or the behavioral alternatives they select to resolve such conflict and the personal and social consequences that attend their actions.[31]

Whereas the social-psychological aspect has to do mainly with the psychic problems of the individual who must perforce bear the impact of role conflict, the sociological aspect has to do with the consequences for the society and/or its sub-units. The central question that might be posed here is whether role conflict surrounding the Paramount Chiefs has a functional or dysfunctional significance for the chiefdom and the nation—for instance, for their political development, unity, and stability. Barrows recognizes the importance of this kind of question in the

[30] Magid (fn. 10), 12-19.
[31] *Ibid.*, 122-24, 193-99, 222-28.

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analysis of role conflict: he posits a relationship, on the one hand, between conflict and alliance, and, on the other, between alliance and political development and integration. The burden of his argument is that different types of alliances are fashioned out of social conflict; that those aggregations act in Sierra Leone (along with the institution of chieftaincy) as key linkages in center-periphery relations; and that two important goals are served thereby. The goal of political development (that is, strengthening of linkages between the center and a particular local community) is promoted by identity-based alliances formed as an expression of group solidarity; the goal of integration (that is, strengthening of linkages between the center and local communities generally) is promoted by utility-based alliances formed around shared material interests. (For an examination of the tension between these two goals, see Barrows, 1-5, 28-63, 243-65.) The persuasiveness of this interesting proposition aside, it seems to me to fail—for two interrelated reasons—to come to grips satisfactorily with the sociological aspect of role conflict generally, and pertaining to the Paramount Chiefs in particular. First, Barrows confuses role conflict with its genus, social conflict. The second reason derives from the first and follows the line of his own argument as summarized above: unable to connect role conflict *per se* to the formation or behavior of the two types of alliances, he is, concomitantly, unable to demonstrate even by indirection that such conflict has functional (and/or dysfunctional) significance for political development or integration in Sierra Leone.

## VII

Anticipating that the transition to independence in Tanzania in 1961 would unleash countervailing forces to the "conservative effects of recruitment and socialization into roles" (p. ix), and that political change would therefore require changes in role norms, Raymond F. Hopkins set out, in *Political Roles in a New State*, to study role conflict arising from the clash between old and new political forms. But his field investigation revealed that, barely a half-decade after independence, "the institutionalization of role norms that spelled out emerging rules of the game for the new political system" (p. ix) had already become more important than role conflict; the latter phenomenon, though still discernible, appeared to Hopkins to be less significant than it had perhaps been in the earlier period of nationalist struggle and decolonization. Consequently, Hopkins's study of the character of national politics in Tanzania from the perspective of a sample of its politi-

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cal elite deals more with institutionalization than with change, more with "role consensus" and "role congruence" than with role conflict. (The concept of role consensus, as employed by the author, refers generally to agreement among role expectations held by all the members of any particular group—for instance, the citizenry, the political elite, the legislators, and so forth; the concept of role congruence refers to the degree to which different sets of role expectations match or are similar—for instance, between legislators and administrators, or between either group and one of its members.)

Hopkins analyzes quantitative data obtained from interviews with national legislators and national administrators, along with the content of parliamentary speeches, (1) for the expectations and norms that those respondents associate with legislative, administrative, and presidential roles in Tanzania, and (2) for the respondents' attitudes as they pertain to authoritarianism, anomie, faith in people, and democratic practices. Qualitative data on the presidential role are drawn from the speeches and writings of President Julius Nyerere.

Undoubtedly the most important of the new role norms had to do with the style of politics in Tanzania. A closed system of politics, with the presidency at its center, was rapidly becoming institutionalized as a compromise between the open style of politics in which negotiation and bargaining prevail and the conflict style of politics with its emphasis on coercion and personal insecurity. Containment of dissent had become the hallmark of the closed political system and, correlatively, presidential approval was the principal basis for legitimizing its rules and behavior. (Strong reinforcement for this political tendency is discernible in the study's scores on four personality traits—authoritarianism, anomie, faith in people, and democratic practices—that Hopkins derived from his interviews of elite members.)

Perhaps the major strength of *Political Roles in a New State* is, paradoxically, the recognition by its author of the great complexity of empirical role analysis and of the limitations of his own study in this regard. For example, seeking "the most economical and significant results" (p. 53), Hopkins decided not to attempt an empirical delineation of either the central and peripheral attributes in, or the cultural and personal aspects of, the roles of Tanzanian elite members. Nor did he attempt to identify the range of behavioral alternatives that were available to those actors, especially as they sought to resolve role conflict or to cope with role ambiguity. Moreover, Hopkins chose not to probe for the obligatoriness of particular role expectations held for elite members

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by their peers or by others in the general population. Unable to distinguish empirically between obligatory expectations and optional expectations, he sheds no light on the latitude that Tanzanian legislators and administrators may have had in performing their roles. While recognizing the importance of the legitimacy factor in role analysis, Hopkins chose not to examine it empirically; his study asks what the two groups of officials *would* do in their role performance without ever inquiring what they *should* do. Finally, having opted not to probe for the sanctions that may attach to violations of role norms, the author is unable "to establish the latitude of acceptable behavior for [those] role occupant[s]" (p. 248) on whom the study concentrates.[32]

Among the several omissions in *Political Roles in a New State*, the most troublesome ones have to do with two concepts in the role perspective, "obligation" and "sanction." As a consequence of his decision to forgo incorporating those concepts into his empirical analysis, Hopkins is not able to establish either the parameters of acceptable behavior for the political elite in Tanzania or the strength of new role norms in its system of closed politics. While his attitudinal data on authoritarianism, anomie, faith in people, and democratic practices do generally reflect the political tendency in that society, they are not by themselves adequate to assess the durability of its role consensus. The personal attitudes of an individual are likely to be less stable and therefore more transitory than, for example, his core beliefs. And the influence that personal attitudes have on role performance can vary considerably between social situations for an individual, and also between individuals confronting the same situation. For these reasons, the durability of role consensus should be assessed alternatively or conjointly with measures of role interaction. Two such measures are role obligation and role sanction.

Obligation is a corollary of social organization. Accordingly, every society (or group) needs to instill in its members motives for regulating their behavior in conformity with social usage. These motives are shaped for the most part by sanctions—that is, by "reaction[s] on the part of a society or a considerable number of its members to . . . mode[s] of behavior which . . . [are] thereby approved (positive sanctions) or disapproved (negative sanctions)."[33] Social usages are not, of course, uniformly binding upon the individual. Whereas some may be regarded by the members of society (or of a group) as obligatory, in-

[32] *Ibid.*, 120-22, 202-22.

[33] A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1961), 205.

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volving "rules of behavior the failure to observe which entails a negative sanction of some sort,"[34] other usages may be widely construed as optional. Moreover, some that are obligatory for one individual may not entail sanctioning of another individual in the event of deviant behavior. Rankings based on prestige, wealth, and power, among other factors, may affect the obligatoriness of social usages for different individuals in society (or in a group).

The two concepts, obligation and sanction, thus draw our attention to a problem that confronts all social and political systems: that of maximizing conformity between expectations for the behavior of members, and their actual behavior. The stability of a system is in part a function of the degree of conformity between the two.[35] A society (or group) affirms what A. R. Radcliffe-Brown has referred to as "social sentiments"[36]—its own definition of "social health," as it were—by variously punishing its members' transgressions and rewarding their conformity with social usage. To comprehend those sentiments as well as their consequences for the members' role performance, the investigator must address, individually and by type, a whole range of sanctions operative in any society (or group). But that immediately poses a problem. In virtually all societies, negative (punitive) sanctions are more specific than positive (remunerative) ones, and social sanctions (originating in others and directed toward the individual) are more readily identifiable than personal sanctions (originating in and directed toward the individual). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that empirical studies of role and of role conflict are characteristically asymmetric with regard to sanction, and usually concentrate on the punitive-social type (where others punish the individual for his behavior). Probably moved more by practical than by theoretical considerations, investigators generally choose to ignore or to de-emphasize the other types of sanction: punitive-personal (where the individual punishes himself for his behavior), remunerative-social (where others reward the individual for his behavior), and remunerative-personal (where the individual rewards himself for his behavior).

Hopkins's discussion of sanction, which deals exclusively with the punitive-social type, reflects the tradition of too-narrow inquiry. Even if he had been able to broaden the scope of his study to include an empirical analysis of punitive sanctions in the elite political culture of

[34] *Ibid.*; see also Nadel (fn. 29), 45-62.

[35] William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," *American Sociological Review*, xxv (June 1960), 483-96.

[36] Radcliffe-Brown (fn. 33), 210-11.

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Tanzania, major difficulties would still remain. Without a concurrent analysis of the more inclusive typology of sanctions, it would not be possible to arrive at other-than-hedged answers to the following questions: What are the mechanisms that instill in individual legislators and administrators, and the President of Tanzania, motives for regulating their behavior in conformity with new role norms in a closed system of politics? How durable, in fact, is the role consensus that Hopkins ascribes to those officials?

## VIII

I have been guided in this article by the principle that even where works of scholarship have merit, it is often illuminating and useful, for review purposes, to stress their important weaknesses. This principle is especially appropriate where, as in the three books under review, the analytic focus is on matters that are likely in the future to command the attention of growing numbers of political scientists in African studies: problems of role conflict and of role performance among diverse officials in Africa. It is appropriate also where the approaches that investigators have adopted may some day guide the work of others. Even as the books by Price, Barrows, and Hopkins aid our understanding of different aspects of political and administrative life respectively in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, they evince major weaknesses, all of which together point to a more general problem often encountered in this scholarly genre.

In all three studies, we observe that empirical role analysis is intended by the investigator to promote the refinement of theory so as to provide a better understanding of a particular political system as well as of some broader social and political implications of change in transitional societies. Thus, Price's principal objective as a role analyst is to illuminate, through the case of Ghana, the social basis of administrative behavior. Barrows's is to discover, through the case of Sierra Leone, the consequences that linkage politics, organized around role conflict and coalition behavior, may have for development and integration in the modernization process. And Hopkins's is to establish, through the Tanzanian case, the bases for institutionalizing new role norms in closed systems of politics. Employing diverse methodologies in different social contexts, the works by Price, Barrows, and Hopkins together point up the wide applicability of the role perspective in social and political research.

But also discernible in their three studies is unresolved stress between

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the theoretical edifice that each investigator would raise and the conceptual and empirical foundation on which he would have it stand. Laced (as is the literature on role theory generally) with ambiguous concepts, and flawed also by the omission of key role-related concepts, each of the studies lacks precision and complexity sufficient to sustain the weight of its theorizing enterprise. Of the three investigators, only Hopkins explicitly confronts this dilemma, but he does not satisfactorily resolve it. By deciding to jettison much conceptual baggage in an effort to enhance the reliability of his investigation, he has run the risk of compromising its essential validity (pp. 248-49). The question remains how to reduce or eliminate the characteristic asymmetry of edifice and base in empirical role analysis in the African context, and to achieve a better balance between the need for reliability and of validity.

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


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


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

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